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.-~Small-scale fisheries of 
San  Miguel Bay,  Philippines: 
options for management 
and research This report is dedicated to 
the small-scale fishermen of  San Miguel Bay 
who struggle daily in the face of  considerable hardships 
to  derive income from their fishing 
sufficient to sustain their families. 
11  Progress  [is] the increasing control of 
the environment by life. .  .  Our problem 
is whether the average man has increased 
his  ability to control  the conditions of 
his life." 
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viii Preface 
The research project "Small-Scale Fisheries of San Miguel Bay: A Multidisciplinary Analysis" 
was  conducted jointly by the Institute of Fisheries Development and  Research (IFDR) of the 
College of Fisheries,  University of the Philippines in the Visayas and the International Center 
for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM), both based in Manila, Philippines. 
The San Miguel Bay fishery is one of the more important fisheries of the Philippines, being a 
shallow productive body of water producing large catches of fish, shrimp and other crustaceans. It  is 
located in  the Bicol Region of the Philippines near the southern end of the island of Luzon, approxi- 
mately 400 km south of Manila, the capital city and major market for fishery products. 
In addition to the Bay's high biological productivity, there were several other reasons why this 
site was chosen for an in-depth multidisciplinary  study, the first of its kind in the Philippines, if not 
all of Southeast Asia. The Bicol Region is one of the more depressed areas of the country, with per 
capita incomes well below the national average.  For this reason, and because of the potential for 
increased production from the agricultural sector, the Bicol River Basin Development Program 
(BRBDP), an integrated area development plan, was formulated in the early 1970s with the major 
purpose of building the necessary physical and social infrastructure to bring irrigation  to the re- 
gion's rainfed rice land. With its  subsequent responsibilities expanding both geographically beyond 
the Bicol River basin and administratively to include activities other than rice, the BRBDP became 
interested in the potential for incorporating  fishing into its development planning. The opportunity 
existed, therefore, for this IFDR/ICLARM research project to provide some of the basic biological 
and socioeconomic information on the fisheries that would make such planning possible. 
Other reasons for selecting San Miguel Bay relate to the biology of the fishery. With a narrow 
mouth in the north, the Bay sustains what can be identified essentially as a unit fishery, with almost 
all the fishing activity of residents around the Bay confined to the Bay itself. Moreover, data were 
available from the 1950s, thus providing  a basis for comparison with data collected by this research 
project, and allowing the researchers to address allegations that the Bay is overfished. 
Finally, two major gear types typical of Philippine waters, gill-netters  and trawlers, compete 
for the same stocks within the Bay. This research project was designed to determine the distribution 
of total catch and revenues among major gear types, so  that informed decisions regarding possible 
gear  regulations could be made by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) and the 
municipalities  which have responsibility for enforcing fishery regulations in  San Miguel Bay and 
other fishing grounds of the country. 
In addition to funding from IFDR and ICLARM the project received grants from the United 
Nations University (UNU), Tokyo, Japan and the Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources 
Research and Development (PCARRD), Los Baiios,  Laguna, Philippines. IFDR and ICLARM are 
both very grateful for this support because the completion of this research project would have been 
impossible without it. 
The project has produced four previous technical reports, jointly published by IFDR, ICLARM 
and UNU, which cover the biological, economic and sociological aspects of the San Miguel Bay 
fisheries: Pauly, D. and A.N.  Mines, Editors. 1982. Small-scale fisheries of San Miguel Bay, Philippines: biology 
and stock assessment.  ICLARM Technical Reports 7,124 p. Contains the following papers: 
Mines, A.N. The assessment of the fisheries: objectives and methodology. 
Mines, A.N.,  D. Pauly, N.A. Navaluna and J.M. Vakily. The physical environment. 
Pauly, D. The fishes and their ecology. 
Cinco, E.  Length-weight relationships of fishes. 
Navaluna, N.A. Morphometrics, biology and population dynamics of the croaker fish, Otolithes 
ruber. 
Pauly, D.,  A.N.  Mines and N.A. Navaluna. Catch and effort in the small-scale fisheries. 
Vakily, J.M.  Catch and effort in the trawl fishery. 
Pauly, D. History and present status of the San Miguel Bay fisheries. 
Smith, I.R.  and A.N.  Mines, Editors. 1982. Small-scale fisheries of San Miguel Bay, Philippines: eco- 
nomics of production and marketing. ICLARM Technical Reports 8,  143 p.  Contains the following 
papers: 
Smith, I.R., A.N.  Mines and G.  Bahia.  The research site, data collection and methods of analysis. 
Yater, F. Gill-netters: costs, returns and sharing systems. 
Supanga,  N.C. and I.R. Smith. Costs and returns of stationary gears. 
Supanga, N.C. Costs and earnings of Cabusao push nets. 
Tulay, E. and I.R. Smith. Costs and earnings of mini trawlers. 
Navaluna, N.A. and E. Tulay. Costs and returns of small and medium trawlers. 
Cruz, W.  Institutional and technical aspects of access to municipal fishery resources. 
Yater, F.,  A.E.  Esporlas and I.R. Smith. Economic aspects of processing and marketing. 
Smith, I.R.  and A.N.  Mines. Implications for equity and management. 
Bailey, C.,  Editor. 1982. Small-scale fisheries of San Miguel Bay, Philippines: social aspects of produo 
tion and marketing. ICLARM Technical Reports 9,57 p. Contains the following papers: 
Yater,  L.R. Field research methodology and general characteristics of fishing families. 
Esporlas, A.E. The seasonality of fishing, marketing and processing. 
Villafuerte, E.D.  and C.  Bailey. Systems of sharing and patterns of ownership. 
Yater,  L.R.  The fisherman's family: economic roles of women and children. 
Yater,  L.R. Problems in the fishery as perceived by the fishermen. 
Bailey, C.  1982. Small-scale fisheries of San Miguel Bay,  Philippines: occupational and geographic 
mobility. ICLARM Technical Reports 10,57 p. 
This, the fifth and final technical report synthesizes the complementary findings of the first 
four reports above, discusses the need for managing the San  Miguel Bay fisheries and outlines 
optional management mechanisms and research approaches. 
The specific results presented in this final report are drawn primarily from the first four 
technical reports of the project and the 23 papers therein. Citation of these individual papers is 
omitted to avoid repetitious  disruptions in the text. 
DR. I.R. SMITH 
Director 
Traditional Fisheries Program 
ICLARM 
PROF. A.N.  MINES 
Project Leader and Director 
IFDR Executive Summary 
Competition for access to and use of coastal fish resources in much of the tropics have notice- 
ably increased in recent decades. Areas that traditionally have been the sole preserve of artisanal or 
small-scale fishermen using such time-tested techniques as hook and line, traps and gill-nets have 
come under increased pressure from modern gear types. Nowhere has the resulting competition for 
a limited resource been stronger than in coastal trawlable grounds where valuable shrimps'are found. 
SAN MIGUEL BAY 
One such fishing ground is San Miguel Bay in the Bicol region of the Philippines (Fig. A). The 
Bay is a large shallow estuary, becoming shallower over the years. Until World War  I  I it had been 
fished primarily by such fixed gears as  filter nets and traps and a limited number of mobile fishing 
units that included four Japanese beam trawlers. Over the last four decades, the level of fishing 
effort significantly increased. In part this was from motorization  of much of the non-trawl fleet and 
from a steady 2% per annum growth in numbers of fishermen. However, most was from increases in 
the number of trawlers; there are currently almost 100 small trawlers operating in the Bay. 
These "baby"  trawlers, as they are called, range from two to five gross tons (GT), and most are 
registered as  "municipal"  fishing craft, hence under Philippine law are considered small scale. 
Technically speaking the upper limit to the "municipal"  category is 3 GT.  Commercial fishing 
using vessels larger than 3 GT is banned from within 7 km of the coastline in many Philippine 
provinces, including those of Bicol where San Miguel Bay is located. "Baby"  trawlers can fish legally 
in waters deeper than 4 fathoms (7.3  m), and this requires permission from local municipalities. 
Otherwise they must stay in waters beyond 7 fathoms (12.8 m) deep. 
Including "baby"  trawlers with their 100-125 hp diesel engines in the same categqry as  un- 
motorized gill-netters, for example, certainly masks the fundamental differences between these gear 
types and makes control over trawling activities extremely difficult, if not impossible. With no 
enforcement, however, they routinely trawl throughout the Bay, regardless of depth. 
The result of the historical increase in effort in the Bay is a situation characterized by: 
full biological exploitation; 
reduced profits in the fishery as  a whole and even losses for some non-trawl gears; 
highly uneven distribution of catch and incomes in favor of trawlers; and 
outmigration of fishing community labor in search of higher incomes elsewhere. 
Petitions by various fishermen groups have been sent to national authorities which in 1982 
resulted in a Presidential decree banning all large-scale commercial trawlers (those registered as  over 
3 GT) from the Bay. This ban affected only a limited number of trawlers; fishermen's complaints 
against the "baby"  trawlers have continued and been aired repeatedly in a local magazine, Balalong. 
The non-trawl fishermen are  particularly critical of the common practice of registering trawlers 
bigger than 3 GT as  municipal craft and they have threatened "to  enforce the ban themselves 
even at the risk of violence"  (Balalong, 3 Jujie 1983). Sabaq 
Libmanm  *~alobonqa  - 
10 km  Municipal waters 
Fig. A. Lefr:  San Miguel Bay showing bottom features and major towns. Municipal waters are shaded. Central por- 
tion of  the  Bay  is  under  jurisdiction  of  national  fisheries authorities. Right:  Delineation of areas where trawling 
is permitted is  complicated by the gradual shallowing of the Bay which puts most of the trawling grounds outside 
the municipal waters. 
In the account that follows, the trawling fleet is separated from true small-scale fishing gears to 
highlight and quantify the differences between them. 
RESEARCH STUDY 
San  Miguel Bay was  the site of an intensive multidisciplinary three-year research project 
conducted by the Institute of Fisheries Development and Research (IFDR) of the University of the 
Philippines in the Visayas (UPV) and ICLARM to  document the conditions of the fisheries and 
fishing communities there so  that these communities could be  integrated into the development 
planning of the Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP). 
The research project had three parts, biology, economics and sociology, and has been reported 
in  a number of papers,  most of which are included in five Technical Reports published jointly by 
IFDR and ICLARM, with the United Nations University and the Philippine Council for Agriculture 
and  Resources Research and Development providing partial funding. The research project not 
only documented prevailing biological and sociological conditions, but also evaluated a range of 
management options for the fisheries of San Miguel Bay. 
FINDINGS 
Catches from the Bay were found to be three to four times higher than reported in official 
statistics. The total catch is about 19,000 tonnes, of which 4,000 t consist of balao,  a tiny shrimp. 
They are captured by small motorized craft called mini-trawls; there are some  190 of these essen- 
tially small-scale units manned by about 400 fishermen which constitute a discrete fishery. Of the 
xii remainder, 15,000 t, 60% is caught with a variety of small-scale (non-trawl)  traps and seines by over 
5,000  fishermen and 4Wo  by 95 trawlers of various sizes. Apart from the balao fishery, there is con- 
siderable competition among gear types for the major species caught. Historical data obtained from 
various research boats and commercial trawlers were also used for comparative purposes (Fig. B). 
The results show dramatic increases in effective effort and declining trawlable biomass but are 
consistent with a total catch that is levelling off. (The continued high catch from the Bay is possibly 
due to the fact that the largesize slow-turnover species have been replaced by smaller, fast-turnover 
species.) Detailed stock assessments using a variety of mathematical models suggest that the Bay is 
omd  in the sense that an increase in effort by either the trawl or the small-scale fishery would 




Fig.  B. The  evolution of effort  (horsepower  only) and stock  size  (trawlable biomass only) from  1936 to 1981 (based on various 
sources). 
Extreme competition for use of the resource and uneven distribution of benefits were shown 
by the economic analysis. The "baby"  trawlers, representing only 3% of the Bay's  fishing units and 
employing 7% of the fisheries' labor force, earn the largest share of catch value and 50% of that part 
of the profits (revenues exceeding all costs,  including a "fair"  return to capital) from the fishery 
that accrue to fishermen. 
The government tax on fuel and the fuel suppliers-cum-fish processors also divert part of the 
profits from the fishermen. However, trawlers, which use diesel fuel, have been able to maintain 
their competitive edge over small-scale gears  (which if motorized use regular gasoline) because the 
government tax on regular fuel (P2.5411) at  the time of the study was five times that on diesel fuel. 
If  trawlers had to  pay the same fuel tax as  the small-scale "fleet",  they would have operated at a loss 
in 198081. This finding provides evidence to support the view that industrial fisheries are often 
subsidized directly or indirectly while small-scale fisheries are not. Though lower taxes on diesel fuel 
are viewed by the national government as conducive to industrialization in the economy as a whole, 
they have had a negative effect on small-scale fisheries. Adding to the problem is that continued ex- 
pansion of the trawl fleet can be expected as  long as  the average trawl unit continues to  be profit- 
able,  as  was the case  in 198081. 
The sociological analyses indicated that the ownership and earnings of the trawlers are highly 
concentrated: five families own 50% of the trawler fleet. In contrast, the small-scale "fleet",  con- 
sisting of approximately 2,300  fishing units, is dispersed among approximately 2,000  households. 
The investigations also revealed that very limited alternative employment opportunities exist in the 
vicinity of the Bay, which explains the low earnings of labor both within the fishery and outside 
as  well as  the significant rate of outmigration from the Bicol area. Outmigration has not been suffi- 
cient, however, to  offset population  growth. 
xiii All perspectives of the San Miguel Bay fisheries, including those of fishermen themselves, lead 
to  the same conclusion (see Table A): the Bay is sorely in need of management. The increasing 
problems of overfishing and uneven distribution of benefits can only be minimized if steps are taken 
to limit the amount of fishing effort. Continued credit programs are unlikely to solve the problems 
of the small-scale fishermen unless steps are taken to regulate those gear types with which they 
compete. Even then, the growth of fishing communities and expected future entrants to the non- 
trawl fishery imply that any partial attempt to  control fishing effort in the Bay will only be "buying 
time."  Regardless of time frame,  management of the fisheries is required. 
MANAGEMENT OPTIONS 
If  steps are taken to limit fishing effort in San Miguel Bay, not all current users can be accom- 
modated. Any management intervention and reallocation of use rights will be inherently political in 
nature because management would redistribute current and future incomes earned from the San 
Miguel Bay fisheries. Such a move is likely to  be objected to  by those among the current users who 
would be adversely affected. 
Because of the sensitive nature of these issues, the San Miguel Bay research team evaluated a 
full range of management options. Provided here are several options with their advantages and 
disadvantages (see Table 0). Further details can be found in the main body of the report. Any 
management measure adopted would depend upon the prior selection of the management objec- 
tives.  If  the major objective would relate to maintaining or even increasing incomes of the majority 
of the Bay's  users rather than promoting the most economically efficient (i.e.,  profitable) gear 
type, some limitation on the trawling fleet should be considered. 
Although a whole range of management interventions was  considered, most did not seem 
appropriate or enforceable for a multispecies multigear fishery such as  in San  Miguel Bay.  For 
example, fleet or individual quotas, taxes, seasonal closures and price controls were all viewed as 
impractical for one reason or another.  Mesh-size restrictions (i.e.,  increasing mesh size),  while 
potentially useful in the short run, were thought to be difficult to enforce and because they control 
only one component of fishing effort, are not a long-term solution to the Bay's  problems. Finally 
adjusting the diesellregular gasoline fuel tax differential would not be practical given the govern- 
ment's broader development objectives for non-fishing sectors. 
Trawlers presently pay only nominal license fees.  One option for limiting their activities would 
be to  increase these fees,  either setting them higher or auctioning them off with limits to the num- 
ber any one individual can take. This option, coupled with strict enforcement of existing area 
restrictions, would probably be most effective for reducing trawl fishing effort. Also,  a licensing 
scheme  could earn significant income (resource rents) for the licensing authorities which could 
(should) be used for incomegenerating  activities in the coastal communities of the Bay. There is 
evidence that non-trawl  gear types would fill the niche vacated by any trawlers that may be ex- 
cluded, thus increasing smallscale catch and incomes in the short term at least. 
Longer-term solutions that would deal with the problem of population growth and thus 
growing numbers of fishermen necessitate looking outside the fisheries sector. 
One of the major constraints to management of the Bay is the overlapping jurisdiction of local 
and national authorities and legislation. Confusion over who potentially controls what has been the 
result. Treating all trawlers as  a distinct gear type separate from small-scale gears,  and then control- 
ling their activities, would be a good first step to reduce this confusion. 
A MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP 
However,  more than this is necessary to guarantee success  of any attempt to manage the 
fisheries of  San Miguel Bay.  If  fishermen themselves do not participate in any aspect of the planning 
or implementation  of management of the fisheries, one can be certain that circumvention of any 
xiv Table A.  Summary of  results of the multidisciplinary investigation of the San Miguel Bay fisheries. 
Stock assessment  Economics  Sociologylmobility 
Ownership pat- 













Ecology of  fishes described. Silt 
deposition of 2.5 cmlyr esti- 
mated 
Costs and earnings  Reported for each major gear type, invest- 
ment costs,  costs and earnings, determinant' 
of catch, and returns to owners and crew 
according to  various sharing system prao- 
ticed. Showed that for some gears lesp. 
small trawlers), owners and crew earn signi- 
ficantly more than their opportunity costs, 
while most non-trawl fishermen do not. 
Little concentration of ownership for 
non-trawl gears,  highly concentrated 
for  trawlers.  Kinship important for 
non-trawl  gears;  less M  for trawlers. 
Diverse  sharing  systems  determined 
by kinship end alternative income op 
portunities. 
Annual catch (198081  esti- 
mated to  be 19.000 t. including 
sergestid shrimp. From species 
composition by gear type, ex- 
tent of competition among 
gear types established. 
Role of women  Women  control family  finances and 
have important role in fishing invest- 
ment  decisions;  women  dominate 
marketing system. 
Total costs and 
value of catch 
Total annual value of catch (198081) 
estimated to  be approximately P53 million; 
total costs to be approximately P50 million 
(valuing fuel at its market price). Distribu- 
tion of value among competing gear types 
established. 
Horsepower in  fisheries increased 
from 1,WO hp (1971) to 18,800 
hp (1980).  Fishermen's 
perceptions 
of resource 
Three-quarters believe average catch 
declining:  113  blame  trawlers;  114 
blame  increase  in  all  categories  of 
fishermen;  114  don't  know reason. 
Estimated using surplus yield 
models to  have declined from 
8,900 t (1947) to 1,650t (1980) 
indicating overexploitation. 
Fishing incomes  For non-trawl fisher'y,  crewmen incomes 
range from P164-218 monthly; P339699 
monthly for trawler crewmen. Only small 
trawler owners earn enough to place them 
above poverty threshold. 
Important  socioeconomic  role  of 
"suki"  system  of  favored  buyer. 
seller and mutual help implied. 
Marketing 
system 
22.8 t/km2 including sergestid 
shrimp. Used to  suggest that 
increased effort will not increase 
catch. 
Resource rents 
(pure profits) in 
the fishery 
Share of resource rents being earned by 
each major gear type was estimated. Con- 
centration of current resource rents in 
the hands of a small number of trawlers 
was demonstrated. Most of the small- 
scale non-trawl gears were earning little  or 
no resource rents; therefore there was a 
very skewed distribution of  benefits from 
the fishery. The government earned a 
major share of the rents through its tax 
on fuel. Procersorslfuel suppliers earned 
a small share through oligoprony/oligo- 





Forty-five  percent  of  respondents 
willing to move to different munici- 
pality to take  up different  oaupa- 
tion, 39% willing to  move  todifferent 
province,  willingness cuts  across  all 
groups  by age,  education  and asset 
ownership, 88% want their  children 
out of fishing. 
Available evidence suggests that 
the Bay is overfished in  the sense 
that an increase in  effort by either 
the trawl or non-trawl fishery 
would not result in  increased  catch, 
but rather exacerbate the present 
allocation problems between the 
trawl and non-trawl fisheries. 
Migration  Significant  outmigration but inwffi- 
cient  to reduce  numbers of fisher- 
men.  Females more likely to migrate 
out then males. 
Alternative 
occupations 
Prospects of  full-time  local  alterna 
tives very dim; some hope of supple 
mentary  income through small-scale 
animal  husbandry  and  comrnercial- 
agriculture. 
Extent of over- 
fishing 
Increases in  effort  will add to  mas, 
further dissipate remaining resource 





Short-term solution  requires reallo- 
cation of benefits from fishery, long 
term solutions  must  be sought out- 
side fishery. 
Performance  and 
economies of scale 
in  wholesale market 
No  significant economies  of  scale found 
for processors.  In  target communities, a 
small number of prowsron  control the 
bulk of the volume handled, and entry 
barriers are high. 
Performance  and 
ewnomies of scale 
in  retail market 
No  significant economies  of scale or entry 
barriers in  fresh or dried fish marketing 
from target communities. Large number 
of middlewomen earn only slightly more 
per day than the fishermen from whom 
they buy. regulations chosen will be the rule. It is critically important in this fishery, as  elsewhere, that a 
management partnership be  forged between fishermen and the local and national officials with 
responsibilities in the fisheries sector. The research team's  proposed solution is the creation of a San 
Miguel Bay Fisheries Authority. 
Such an Authority would have responsibility for setting management objectives for the whole 
Bay, collecting the background information necessary for selecting management steps,  as  well as 
implementing, monitoring  and enforcing them. 
The fishermen,  both smallscale and trawler operators, must participate in decisionmaking by 
this Authority if it is to  deal successfully with the twin problems of overfishing and inequitable 
distribution of benefits that currently exist in San Miguel Bay. 
Lack of fishermen's  participation  will most likely subvert any management plan; indeed, some 
measure of local decisionmaking and enforcement offer much better hope for fisheries management 
than do nationally centralized attempts at regulation. 
THE BROADER PROBLEM 
The general features of what the research team has learnt about the San Miguel Bay fisheries 
apply to a large number of other fisheries throughout the Philippines, various Southeast Asidn 
countries and, to a lesser extent, to many other tropical developing countries. 
It was conflict of interest similar to that in San Miguel Bay,  but involving much larger numbers 
of trawlers and small-scale fishermen, which prompted the Indonesian government to ban trawling 
in that country. Other conflicts of this kind, often violent, have been reported from various parts of 
the IndoPacific. The lesson seems to be that in tropical demersal fisheries-because  they generally 
involve shrimps that are caught inshore-conflicts  between trawl operators and small-scale fishermen 
are almost unavoidable in the long run;  projects of the type conducted in San  Miguel Bay are 
indispensable for clarifying the issues involved and outlining some of the possible remedies. 
Table B.  Alternative management objectives for San  Miguel Bay and alternative interventions needed (if any) to  address each objec- 
tive. 
Alternative objectives  Alternative interventions 
A.  Objectives related to  harvest sector 
lncrease sustainable yield  Maximum  yield  probably  achieved  under  current  conditions,  but 
stabilization of effort or control over size  at  first capture  (e.g.,  in- 
crease  minimum  mesh  size)  required to avoid long-term decline  in 
trawlable biomass and further changes in  species composition. 
Increase economic efficiency (i.e.,  resource  Encourage  innovation  and  progressiveness to reduce  fishing costs. 
rents)  Substantial reduction in  effort and costs required; numerous specific 
interventions can be considered (e.g.,  quotas, licenses, taxes, selective 
price controls,  area  or seasonal closures). Decision also needed as  to 
which gear  types should be regulated and whether to leave increased 
rents in the fishery  or to extract for use by institutions other than 
fishermen. 
lncrease employment in  fishing 
Provide conditions conducive to more 
equitable distribution of income 
(a) between labor (crewmen) and 
capital (owners); and 
Restrict capital-intensive  gear  types;  maintain  most of the current 
large-mesh nets of the small-scale fishery  and increase some others; 
allow  continued  unrestricted  entry  of  small-scale  fishermen;  con- 
tinue  subsidized  credit  for  small-scale  labor  intensive gear  types. 
(a)  No  intervention  in current  sharing  arrangements  necessary  as 
present  systems  appear  responsive to respective opportunity costs; 
labor share  can be increased by increasing labor opportunity costs; 
encourage  owner-operator  fishing  and  discourage  multiple  owner- 
ship to  make more crewmen become owners. 
xvi Table 0. Continued 
Alternative objectives  Alternative interventions 
(b)  among competing gear types 
Reduce conflicts between the large-scale 
and small-scale sectors 
Raise incomes of fishing households above 
the poverty threshold 
Reduce environmental impact of 
activities in and near the Bay 
lncrease government revenues from the 
fishery 
lncrease production of exportable 
species to earn foreign exchange 
B.  Objectives related to fisheries inputs and 
marketing sectors 
Improve technical and economic efficiency 
of input supply, processing and market- 
ing sectors 
lncrease opportunities for village employ- 
ment in  the input supply, processing 
and marketing sectors 
C.  Objectives related to the regional economy 
Provide sufficiently attractive alternative 
income sources. . .  so  as  to reduce 
dependence upon fishing 
Maintain social and political stability 
in the fishing communities 
surrounding  San Miguel Bay 
(b) Restrict  certain gear  types,  especially  small trawlers;  introduce 
parity in taxes on inputs, especially gasoline and diesel fuel. 
Enforce existing legislation;  redefine 'municipal'  fisheries to exclude 
small trawlers, then limit small-trawler numbers or areas of operation 
or ban them;  establish trawling barriers in  areas off limits to trawlers. 
Given prevailing low incomes throughout Bicol,  long-term increases 
in fishing household incomes possible only through combination of 
(a) limited entry that excludes some fishermen thus benefitting those 
that remain,  (b) alternative/supplementary income generation; short- 
term increases possible by subsidizing inputs or reducing .taxes there- 
on (e.g.,  gasoline tax) used by small-scale fishermen; and (c) education 
programs that increase skills and mobility of fishing families. 
Siltation  inflows due  to uplahd agriculture activities, while causing 
gradual  shallowing and  reduction in Bay's  area,  also bring nutrients 
of probable benefit to the fishery;  halt conversion of mangroves to 
alternative uses  (e.g.,  fishponds). 
lncrease municipal license fees, taxes on inputs, catch and/or incomes 
so  as  to extract increased  resource  rent in favor of the government 
(municipal, provincial, regional or national). 
No  major intervention necessary;  present conditions (e.g.,  siltation, 
fishing out of predators and trawling) are  favorable to shrimp pro- 
duction.  Increasing mesh  size  may  increase average  size  of shrimps 
caught but would not necessarily increase total catch or catch value. 
Encourage use  of  standard weights  and measures;  increase flow of 
price  information  from  local  markets  to  beach  landings  through 
channels  other than those controlled by middlemen;  improve land- 
ing  and  auction  facilities,  encourage  better  product handling and 
processing techniques;  improve  fuel  supply  and  market  roads to 
more remote communities. 
Decentralize  and  increase  number  of  processing  establishments; 
provide  credit  to  small-scale  processing  entrepreneurs;  encourage 
community organizations to undertake group processing and market- 
ing and  organize  the  appropriate group  (i.e.,  women,  not men) to 
undertake these activities. 
General economic development and diversification  in the Bicol Region 
to increase the presently  low opportunity costs of fishing labor and 
capital; land reform for rice and non-rice land; investment incentives 
to decentralize Manila-based development;  strengthening of local and 
regional  institutions and  delegation  of  authority  to them. Specific 
activities  for  fishing  communities  may  include  small-scale  agro- 
industry such as  pig farming. 
Generate  local  employment  opportunities  to  reduce  rural-urban 
migration; restrict certain efficient capital-intensive  gear types viewed 
by the majority of fishermen as  detrimental to their interests; strength- 
en  military presence to keep "peace  and order"  or establish manage- 
ment  institutions  that  permit  fishermen  involvement  in decision- 
making regarding resource use and allocation. Small-Scale Fisheries of San Miguel Bay, Philippines: 
Options for Management and Research 
SMITH,  I.R.,  D.  PAULY AND  A.N.  MINES.  1983. Small-scale fisheries of San  Miguel Bay,  Philippines: 
options for  management  and  research.  ICLARM Technical  Reports 11,  80 p.  Institute of Fish- 
eries Development and  Research, College of Fisheries, University of the Philippines in the Visayas, 
Quezon City, Philippines; International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management, Manila, 
Philippines; and the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan. 
Abstract 
This report synthesizes the respective research findings of the biology, economics and sociology modulespf a 
multidisciplinary study of the small-scale fisheries of San  Miguel Bay,  Philippines and examines various options for 
management of this very productive multispecies niultigear fishery. 
The  report highlights (1) the lack of potential for  further expansion of the fishery;  (2) the competition in 
resource use that prevails between 2,300  small-scale gears  on the one hand, and 95 trawlers on the other hand; (3) 
the highly skewed distribution of benefits from the fishery between these two groups; and (4) the limited alternative 
employment opportunities available locally to  the majority of the Bay's small-scale fishermen. 
The  need  for the creation of management  institutions and  mechanisms that control the level of effective 
fishing effort in the Bay  and that address the equity issues related to distribution of benefits from the fisheries is 
stressed.  The trade-offs among various management options, including  those that limit the fishing effort of trawlers, 
are  explored.  It is recommended that  a  San  Miguel Bay  Fisheries Management Authority be established and that 
fishermen participate in all decisionmaking regarding management of the Bay's  resources. 
Finally, the methodologies used  for data collection and  interpretation during the course  of  the study  are 
discussed in the context of the information requirements necessary for managing a complex fishery such as  that in 
San Miguel Bay. Part A. Options for  Management 
1. Introduction 
The original general objective of this research study was to document the biological, economic 
and sociological conditions prevailing in the fisheries and fishing communities of San Miguel Bay 
(Fig. 1) so  these fishing communities could be integrated into the development planning for the 
Bicol Region of the Philippines. Specific objectives of each discipline involved in the study flowed 
from the overall objective. These specific objectives were as  follows (Maclean 1980): 
Biology (stock assessment): to assess the status of the fishery resources of San  Miguel 
Bay. 
Economics:  to determine catch, effort and  incomes of municipal fishermen,  costs and 
returns for the major municipal fishing gears and the economic efficiency of the market- 
ing and distribution system. 
Sociology: to examine the nature of the flow of human resources between municipal 
fisheries and other rural sectors and to assess the potential of programs that seek to reduce 
the dependence of fishing households on capture fishing (occupational and geographic 
mobility study); to determine the economic role of women and children; to examine the 
factors that influence sharing systems for the major municipal gear types; and to describe 
sociological aspects of the marketing system and the effect on it of seasonal changes in 
catches. 
The Bicol Region where San  Miguel Bay  is located has one of the lowest per capita income 
levels among all regions of the country (NEDA 1982), and consequently the national government is 
making a concerted effort through its Bicol River Basin Development Program to raise employment 
and incomes in the area.  Fishermen, moreover, have been identified as constituting one of the 
poorest sectors within Bicol (USAID 1980). The original overall objective of this research study, 
related to integrated rural development planning, had an inherently long-term focus in terms of its 
examination of ways in which incomes in fishing communities could be raised. 
Implied in such a goal is the belief that there are linkages and resource flows between fishing 
communities and non-fisheries sectors that can be influenced or changed in some fashion to the 
benefit of fishing communities, their income levels and standards of living. Indeed, this research 
project has shown that in the long run, the solutions to low levels of income in fishing communities 
that fish fully exploited resources will emanate primarily from outside the fisheries sector per se; 
that is, economy-wide economic growth and development will be necessary. 
This long-term approach,  however, provides little immediate consolation for fishermen in 
Bicol. As the research progressed during 1979-1982, it gradually took on an added dimension that 
focused more directly on the San  Miguel Bay fisheries, the current pattern of resource exploitation 
and potential short-term solutions to the twin problems of overfishing and low incomes for the 
Bay's  small-scale fishermen. It became apparent that the fishery itself, which has both trawl and 
non-trawl components and has been alleged to be overfished (Simpson 1978), couM potentially be 
managed in such a way that benefits derived from fishing could be distributed more equitably in 
favor of the majority of fishermen. Mongo.  j  Y 
City 
Fig. 1. San Miguel Bay, Philippines. 
Traditional approaches to problems of poverty in small-scale fisheries sectors have focused 
upon technical solutions (e.g.,  upgrading of gears) in the belief that increases in income could be 
gained by increasing the productivity of individual fishermen. However, when resources are already 
fully exploited, technical improvement of benefit to some but not all fishermen will most likely 
exacerbate inequalities in income distribution rather than provide a solution to the poverty of the 
many (Smith 1979). A focus on technical solutions was  apparent in the Philippines during the 
1970s when credit schemes and programs of cooperative development were launched to facilitate 
technical improvements in the small-scale coastal fisheries of the country (Smith et  al. 1980). For 
example, San Miguel Bay fishermen received a substantial number of loans during this period and 
there was considerable expansion in fishing effort as  the gill-net fleet subsequently became motor- 
ized. Simultaneously, the Bay's  fleet of trawlers also rapidly expanded. 
By 1980, however, changes began to occgJr  in the widely held perception that the Philippine 
coastal resourcescould  sustain further expansion in fishing effort. Indeed, concern about overfishing 
in  several major fishing grounds, including San Miguel Bay, had been raised as early as  the mid-1970s. The Integrated Fisheries Development Plan of the Philippines for the 1980s prepared by the Fishery 
Industry Development Council (FIDC) was the first official public recognition of the limitations to 
further expansion of Philippine fisheries: 
Present harvest is estimated to be 1.6 million MT  out of an estimated potential yield of RP (Republic  of 
the Philippines) waters placed at 1.65 million MT * 200,000 MT  (FIDC 1981). 
More recent government statements indicate seriousness of intent and awareness of the need 
for management or limitations on effective fishing effort, and also recognition of the difficulties 
ahead : 
Because  of the reported depletion of resources in internal waters and, more recently, the reported 
decline in tuna catch, the government has realized the crying need for national fisheries management. 
The (current) development plan proposes the adoption of a selective licensing scheme for fishing vessels 
which will limit their operations in specific areas. The implementation of limited entry will be hindered 
by opposition from fishermen unused to being regulated and by the very limited enforcement capability 
(Samson 1982). 
Management of a fishery implies some degree of control over access to or use of the resource, 
and in the case of multispecies fisheries where several gear types may be competing for the same 
stocks, this control may benefit one group of fishermen at  the expense of another. These trade- 
offs between competing groups of fishermen are of special concern when stocks are already fully 
exploited. 
Under such circumstances, fishery managers must take into account not only the stock assess- 
ment findings of biologists and the economics of the fishery, but also the considerations of sociolo- 
gists regarding the potential impact on fishermen and fishing communities of any change in the 
prevailing distribution of assets and income. In other words, the information required for managing 
such a fishery must be drawn from multidisciplinary data and perspectives. 
Moreover, because control over the fishery will affect the distribution of benefits derived from 
fishing, fishery management programs have an overt political element. An analogous situation exists 
in Philippine agriculture where land reform programs and their size limitations (7 ha) for rice and 
corn farms have produced a partial shift in asset distribution in that sector. Whether mandated from 
the national  government or resulting from local deliberations involving affected groups, fishery insti- 
tutions cannot avoid the distributional and hence political impact of their management decisions. 
Within the social sciences there is debate among professionals as toyvhether researchers should 
simply state what is or rather proceed to recommend what should be.  Because of the inherent 
political nature of fishery management decisions, the research staff of the IFDRIICLARM San 
Miguel Bay project take the position that "the facts should speak for themselves."  Thus, this report 
contains (1) statements of the biological, economic and sociological findings of the study; (2) dis- 
cussion of their implications regarding the need for control over fishing effort; (3) presentation 
of management options in  the context of alternative management objectives, and (4) discussion of 
the advantages and disadvantages of each. The primary purpose of this report is thus to outline 
management options and not to provide management recommendations. 
2.  The San  Miguel Bay Fisheries 
FISHING GEAR AND DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP 
The fisheries resources of San Miguel Bay are exploited by various gear types, most of which 
are classified in the Philippines as  "municipal"  gears.  By definition the "municipal"  category 
includes all vessels  less than 3 gross tons (GT) and all fishing gear for which no vessel  is required. 
All vessels over 3 GT are considered "commercial"  and are licensed by the Bureau of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Resources (BFAR). This legal distinction groups together under the 'municipal' label such 
diverse gears as small trawlers, gill-netters  and handliners. Although perhaps suitable for licensing 
purposeswhich mandate municipal licensing of all vessels smaller than 3 GT, this distinction between "municipal"  and "commercial"  is arbitrary and inadequate for purposes of analysis of the multigear 
San Miguel Bay fishery. 
For the purposes of this management study, gears used in San Miguel Bay were classified into 
three categories: 
1.  Small-scale non-trawl  gears,  which range from simple handlines to tidal weirs. There were 
nearly 2,100  units in San  Miguel Bay  in 1980. They mainly catch demersal and small 
pelagic fish. Investment costs per fishing unit (gear and vessel,  if applicable) in 1980181 
were P250-13,000." 
2.  Small-scale trawlgear, which includes one class of vessels only-the  mini trawler or itik-itik. 
A total of 188 mini trawlers were present in 1980. They are used almost exclusively to 
catch a small sergestid shrimp, balao. Average  1980-8  1 investment cost for vessel and gear, 
?9,200. 
3.  Large-scale trawlgear, which includes three classes of trawlers-small  (< 3 GT), medium 
(3-10 GT) and large (> 10 GT but usually > 100 GT). The small and medium groups com- 
prise 95 units. Their main target is shrimp but demersal fish constitute the majority of the 
catch.  Investment costs in 1980-81 ranged from ?55,000 for small trawlers to P70,000 for 
medium trawlers. Large trawlers are not considered further as  their fishing grounds are 
outside the Bay, though they occasionally trawl as  they pass through the deeper areas near 
the mouth of the Bay. 
The above distinction between small scale and large scale can also be thought of in terms of 
investment costs; small scale are those with investment costs less than P20,000  in 1980. A small 
trawler (investment cost = P55,OOO)  is thus a largescale gear. 
In terms of the BFAR regulations, categories 1 and 2 are "municipal"  as  are the small trawlers 
of category 3.  These small trawlers which are also known as "baby"  trawlers in the Philippines, may 
be permitted by thevarious municipalities to  fish in shallow waters of the Bay, deeper than 4 fathoms 
(7.3 m); otherwise, they are legally required to work in waters deeper than 7 fathoms (12.8 m). At 
the time of data gathering, medium and large trawlers were also required to fish in waters deeper 
than 7 fathoms but in February 1982 commercial fishing (vessels > 3 GT) was totally banned from 
San Miguel Bay. 
Details of ownership are shown in Table 1. The 2,300 small-scale fishing units are owned by 
approximately 2,000  households. Although there is some concentration of ownership of fixed gears, 
small-scale gear ownership is widely disbursed. A total of 1,500 households own no fishing unit, 
however. In contrast, small and medium trawlers averaged three per owner-household. However, 
ownership was even more concentrated; almost 50% of the trawlers were owned by five families. 
Prior to World War  II,  few fishing vessels in the Philippines were motorized and Umali (1937) 
reports only three Japanese beam trawlers of 40 hp each operating in the Bay in 1936, or a total of 
120 hp. By 1980-81, total horsepower had increased toan estimated 18,800 hp. Most of this increase 
has occurred since 1972 when the first small and medium trawlers were introduced. Of this horse- 
power, 70% or 13,200  hp is installed in small and medium trawlers with the balance, 5,600  hp, 
divided between mini trawlers and motorized gill-netters. 
In  the mid-1  97Os,  the Philippine government initiated  several major credit programs for munici- 
pal fishermen, often tied to the formation of fishermen's cooperatives or associations (Smith et al. 
1980). A major line of credit was the Small Foreshore and River Fishermen Program of the Develop- 
ment Bank of the Philippines. This program operated for five years and made loans exceeding P279 
million until its suspension in 1978 due to extremely low repayment rates nationwide (< 5%). A 
total of approximately P4.5 million was  lent to 1,206 municipal fishermen in San Miguel Bay for 
the purchase of small boats lbancas),  marine engines,  and fishing gear accessories. The bulk of the Table 1. Number of fishing units and ownership patterns of  the San Miguel Bay fishery, 1980-1981. 
No. of fishing units 
Small-scale fishery  Large-scale fishery 
Gear type (local name)  (Non-trawl)  (Trawl)  (Trawl) 
Scissor net (sakag) 
Hook and line (banwit) 
Gill-net (pankela 
Mini trawl (itik-itik) b 
Stationary liftnet (bukatot) 
Fish pot (bubo) 
Longline (kitang) 
Fish corral (bakld 
Small trawler ('baby' trawl;panquerna) 
Crab liftnet (bintoll 
Filter net (biakud 
Spear gun (antipara) 
Medium trawler ('baby' traw1;panquerna) 
Mobile bagnet (basnigjc 
Beach seine (sinsoroj 
Fish weir habay) 
Round haul seine (sapyao) 
Stationary tidal weir (ambak) 
Cast net (dala) 
Total no. of units 
Total no. of owners 
Total no. of households  3,500  N.A.~ 
Total no. of fishermen  5,100  500d 
a~his  is the general term: see Table 2 for further description. 
b~his  gear  is treated as  small scale separately from the small and medium trawlers because of its much lower investment cost and 
the special nature of the resource it exploits (see p. 6). 
'~ish  primarily outside the San Miguel Bay. 
d~xcluding  owners who do not fish. 
e~.~.-not  available (trawler crewmen were not surveyed by household). 
gill-net fleet was  motorized during this period, and the mini-trawl fleet greatly expanded. By 1981, 
the replacement value of the entire fleet of motorized trawl and non-trawl vessels and gear together 
exceeded PI  5 million. 
In contrast to the recent rapid increase in capital inputs to the fishery, the fishing labor force 
has been growing at  a slower rate of 2% per annum. Consequently, the capital intensity of the gears 
used has increased considerably during the past decade. 
THE CATCH 
As for any fishery, the identity of the stock(s) exploited by the fishermen around San Miguel 
Bay had to be established before inference could be made on the impact of fishing on the resource. 
San Miguel Bay is an estuary, and as  such harbors a demersal fish fauna consisting predominantly of 
euryhaline fishes. The rocky outcrops and coral reefs at the mouth of the Bay are characterized by a 
different fauna consisting predominantly of reef f ishes, such as Serranidae, Acanthuridae and Chaeto- 
dontidae, which are very sparsely represented within the Bay itself (Herre 1953). Thus, although 
detailed fish community studies were not conducted, it  was possible to separate the fish stocks 
within San Miguel Bay proper from other adjacent multispecies stocks. A major effort was directed toward obtaining figures from which the total catch from the Bay 
could be estimated. A combination of secondary data from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources (BFAR) and the Philippine Fish Marketing Authority (PFMA) and extensive primary 
data collected by the research teams was  used to estimate 1980-81 total catch.  Because  PFMA 
and BFAR data covered only largescale trawlers and also appeared incomplete, the catch and effort 
data collected from operators of the major trawl and  non-trawl gears during the course of the 
project formed the core of the data used in assessing the status of the San Miguel Bay fisheries. Both 
the biology (stock assessment) and economics teams made total catch and catch per gear estimates. 
The biology team'sestimate of annual total catch based on various data sets spanning approxi- 
mately two years beginning in early 1980 was  19,133 t of which'4,473 t were sergestid shrimp or 
balao caught primarily by the mini trawlers (Tables 2and 3). Of this total, 580 t (3%)  was estimated 




Palata  w 
Total 
Annual no.  Annual no.  Catch  annual 
Total  of trips of  of trips of  per trip  catcha  Major groups caught 
b 




Lift  net (bukatot) 
Filter net (biakus) 
Fish corral (baklad) 
Mini trawl (itik itik) 
Scissor net (sakag) 
Longl  ine (kitanglc 
Hook and line fbanwitlc 
Crab liftnet (bintollc 
Fish trap (bubolc 
Spear gun (an tiparalc 
Fish weir (sabaylc 
Stationary tidal weir fambaklc 
Beach seine (sinsorolc 
Total  12,231 
Otolithes ruber (48.6). Sciaenidae 
(291, rnisc. spp.  (8.73) 
Mugilidae (52.9).  Sciaenidae 
(22.51,  rnisc. spp.  (15.3) 
Sharks and rays (48.71,  misc. 
spp.  (38.1  1, Arius thalassinus 
(8.1 1) 
Crabs (85.8), misc. spp.  (12.1  ), 
Sciaenidae (1.70) 
Mugilidae (65.2). Sardinella spp. 
(34.41, Crabs (0.234) 
Stolephorus spp.  (79.81, misc. 
spp.  (9.07). Sardinella spp. 
(7.65) 
Stolephorus spp.  (45.5). 
Leiogmthidae (19.8). 
balao (1  1.2),  misc. spp.  (15.0) 
Misc. spp.  (41.8). Crabs (18.0). 
Sciaenidae (13.5) 
"Balao"  (88.51,  mix.  spp.  (6.71, 
shrimps (4.7) 
"Balao"  (50). shrimps (50) 
Carangidae (20). Pomadasydae 
(20), rnisc. spp.  (60) 
Misc. spp.  (100) 
Crabs (100) 
Misc. spp.  (100) 
Pomadasydae (251, misc. spp. 
(75) 
Shrimps (501, misc. spp.  (50) 
Mugilidae (331,  misc. spp.  (67) 
Carangidae (34), Sardinella 
spp. (33). Stolephorus spp. 
(33) 
". 
a~otal  catch, including  4,472  t of "balao"  (sergestid shrimp). 
b~ajor  groups only; totals therefore do not add up to 100%. See  Table 3 for other groups. 
C~ased  on information provided by A.E.  Esporlas. Names in  parentheses are in Bicol language. Table 3. Total annual catch, and large-scale fishery and smallde  fishery catches by taxonomic groups for San Miguel Bay, 1980- 
1981, as estimated by the project biologists. 
Taxonomic group 
Catch (t) by:  % caught by: 
Total annual  Largescale  Small-scale  Large-scale  Small-scale 
catch (t)  fishery  fishery  fishery  fishery 
Sharks and rays  45  36  9  79.9  20.1 
Stolephorus spp.  2,100  1,369  73 1  65.2  34.8 
Ssrdinella spp.  795  201  594  25.3  74.7 
Arius thalassinus  44  6  38  13.0  87.0 
Mugilidae  1,190  330  860  27.7  72.3 
Otolithes ruber  2,004  409  1,595  20.4  79.6 
Sciaenidae (excluding 0. ruber)  1,468  313  1 ,I 55  21.3  78.7 
Pomadasydae  34  21  13  61.5  38.5 
Carangidae  269  57  21 2  21.3  78.7 
Leiognathidae  112  38  74  33.8  66.2 
Trichiuridae  324  254  70  78.5  21.5 
Scomberomorus  commersoni  75  28  47  37.9  62.1 
Miscellaneous species  4,406  3,018  1,388  68.5  31.5 
Squids  250  235  15  93.9  6.1 
Crabs  500  1 20  380  24.0  76.0 
Penaeid shrimps  1,044  46 1  583  44.2  55.8 
Sergestid shrimps (balao)  4,473  0  4,473  0  100.0 
Total catch  19,133  6,896  12,237  36.0  64 .O 
to be caught by large commercial trawlers near the mouth of the Bay. The total area of San Miguel 
Bay is 840 km2 so  this catch represents a yield of 22.6 t/km2, comparable to some of the highest 
yields per unit area recorded for bays in Texas (Saila 1975) and for coral reef fisheries (Marshall 
1979; Alcala 1981). 
The economics team independently estimated total catch for a slightly different time period 
(June 1980 to May  1981) using different data collection methods. For example, the biologists 
used  a  1.5  power factor to relate medium trawler catches to those of small trawlers, while the 
economists, using record-keeping  data, showed that medium trawlers caught 1 .I  1 times as  much as 
small trawlers during their reference period. 
Both groups depended in part upon catch estimates for minor small-scale gears provided by the 
sociology team from data collected during its household survey. The economists' estimate of total 
catch (which  did not include that of large trawlers) was very close to the biologists' estimates- 
18,967 t, of which 4,781 t or 25.2% was balao caught by mini trawlers; small and medium trawlers 
caught 30.6% of total catch and the small-scale non-trawl gears caught the remaining 44.2% (Fig. 2). 
Previous investigators ignored the small-scale catch and thus certainly underestimated the total 
catch. 
Besides documenting the high productivity of this body of water (on a per area basis) the data 
in Tables 2 and 3 encapsulate the major characteristic of the San Miguel Bay fisheries; namely that 
the large-scale and small-scale fisheries essentially compete for the same  resources. 
The small-scale fishery is generally much more selective than the large-scale fishery, but, with 
the exception of the balao, all resources in Table 2 are exploited simultaneously by both fisheries. 
Indeed, the interaction between the two fisheries is much stronger than suggested by Table 3 
as much of the catch of the small and medium trawlers consists of the young of all other groups 
which are exploited more or less selectively as  adults by the small-scale non-trawl fishery. 
This latter feature, incidentally, appears very important in San Miguel Bay, because the com- 
monly held assumption that non-trawl fisheries catch young fish while trawlers catch bigger fish 
is totally inapplicable; indeed, the converse is true. Singlespecies assessments were conducted for an important first-class fish (the croaker, Oto- 
lithes ruber), three species of anchovies (Stolephorus spp.)  and the penaeid shrimps. The results 
suggest that the small mesh size (which may be as  small as  8 mm when trawlers fish for anchovies) 
used by the small and medium trawlers, combined with the high fishing mortality (see below) that is 
now prevailing in  the Bay have a negative effect on yields, and that a significant increase of mesh 
sizes would probably increase the catches of these fish and shrimps. Because the fish and shrimps of 
San Miguel Bay interact biologically through competition and predation, however, the increase of a 
Fig.  2.  Distribution of catch  among  the various gear 
types of San  Miguel  Bay  as  estimated by the project 
economists. 
resource produced by a reduction of its  fishing mortality could result in the decrease of an even 
more valuable resource via  increased predation. The data at hand suggest,  for example, that the 
reduction of certain low value fish such as the Leiognathidae (sap-sap) has led to an increase in 
catches of shrimps. 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES 
Even such simple inferences as those above regarding shifts in species composition are  not 
without problems, however, because the Bay itself has changed over recent decades. Changes in 
species composition could be due to siltation as  well as  to changes in fishing pressure. A bathy- 
metric survey conducted in mid-1980 revealed that the Bay  is now markedly shallower than is 
suggested by comparison with the most detailed nautical chart presently available, which is based on 
soundings made mainly in 1907. It is  estimated that a minimum rate of silt deposition of 2.4 cmlyear 
has occurred. This confirmed a trend suggested by the observable fact that landing places in Sabang, 
Calabanga,  previously accessible to small trawlers are  now so  shallow that the catch has to be 
dragged on flat-bottom boats across extensive mudflats. On the other hand, the extremely high 
productivity of the Bay undoubtedly is due in part to  the high volume of nutrient-bearing silt that 
is deposited in the Bay from the Bicol River. 
The implications of the siltation of the Bay are numerous but can be grouped into practical 
and legal implications. 
The practical implications pertain to the fxt  that with large tracts of the Bay becoming too 
shallow for trawling, fixed gears become attractive again, a feature which should mitigate the effects 
of increasing fuel prices. Another practical implication of the increased siltation of the Bay is that directly or indirectly it should have a marked effect on the productivity of the Bay, and on the 
species composition of its benthic communities. 
The legal implication of the rapid siltation of the Bay relates to the regulation that excludes 
small trawlers from waters shallower than 7 fm (or 4 fm if specifically permitted by the municipality 
concerned). The last decades have seen substantial reduction of the area of San Miguel Bay legally 
accessible to small trawlers. 
DECLINE OF THE TRAWLABLE STOCKS 
Since the first trawling survey was conducted in San Miguel Bay in 1947, research vessels have 
repeatedly conducted exploratory fishing in the Bay. Also, several agencies have occasionally moni- 
tored catches of privately-owned  trawlers. Consequently, historical catch data on a per haul basis 
are available for the period 1947-1980.  The estimates of apparent density (t/km2)  derived from 
these data indicate that there has been a significant decline in the trawlable stocks since 1947 to less 
than 20% of their original value, from 10.6 t/km2 in 1947 to 2.0 t/km2 in 1980 (Fig. 3). Trawlable 
bipmass as  used here is defined as the biomass accessible to the large-scale (trawl) fishery and 
explicitly excludes balao which is not caught by the small, medium and large trawlers. 
The estimated catch of largescale trawlers for the period June 1980-May 1981 of approxi- 
mately 6,000 t was 3.6 times the estimated trawlable biomass. This value is similar to estimates 
made for the Gulf of Thailand (Pauly 1979a). This means that on the average, each square kilometer 
of San Miguel Bay is effectively swept by trawlers three and a haif times each year. That the small 
biomass can sustain this high effective effort and production is an indication of the high turnover 
rate of the stocks. 
Fig. 3. The  decline of  trawlable biomass  in San Miguel Bay, Philippines, 
1947-1980. Adapted from Pauly (1982). 
Most models used in stock assessment are for single species stocks and they suggest overfishing 
occurs when standing stock is reduced to values of 50-40%  of virgin stock (Figs. 4A and 4B). These 
models also suggest that once overfishing has occurred, catches could be increased through a reduc- 
tion of fishing effort. Because of the multispecies nature of the fishery, however, the yield-effort 
relationship for the San Miguel Bay fishery is probably more or less flat-topped (Fig. 4C), such that 
a reduction of overall effort would not necessarily lead to an increased total catch. By the same 
token, of course, increases in fishing effort will also not lead to higher total catch. 
However, because of the strong interaction in terms of species caught between the large-scale 
fishery and the smallscale non-trawl  fishery, a reduction of effort by either one of these two fish- 
eries would lead to an increased catch of the other fishery as  cqn be seen in Fig. 4C.  For this reason, unexploited 
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Fig. 4.  Different  theoretical  yield  models and the underlying relationship to the exploited biomass: A:  Schaefer's  parabolic yield 
model which was  developed for single-species fisheries and implies MSY at a biomass corresponding to  50% of the unexploited bio- 
mass,  and a level of effort which drives the stock to extinction. 6: Fox's  model, which implies MSY at a biomass corresponding to 
37% of the unexploited biomass, and a much reduced, but non-zero catch at very high levels of  effort (see Ricker 1875 for Schaefer's 
and Fox's  models). C:  A flat-topped yield model is thought to be appropriate for tropical multispecies fisheries  (see Larkin 1982). /' 
No single level of effort generates "MSY"  because the total yield,  over the range of effort that is applied in a developed fishery 
neither  increases  nor declines markedly.  Note that this model does not exclude a "transfer"  of part of the catch from one sector 
of  the fishery to  another, as  illustrated here (see also Pauly 1982). 
effort reduction in the San Miguel Bay fishery is more a question of resource allocation among 
competing users (i.e.,  a socioeconomic or political question) than a question of preventing biological 
overf ishing. 
CURRENT LEVELS OF INVESTMENT 
The 2,382  fishing units that operated in San Miguel Bay in 198081 represented a significant 
level of investment (Table 4). Two-thirds  of this amount was  invested in the small-scale (non-trawl 
plus mini trawler) fleet; one-third in large-scale trawlers. However, the capital-labor ratios were 
considerably higher in the latter. To create a job in the small and medium trawl fishery costs over 
P10,000  or 2-3 times as much as i*t  does to create one job in the non-trawl  fishery. Labor intensity, 
however, does not necessarily imply profitability as the costs and earnings analysis showed small 
trawlers to be more profitable than the smallscale fishery. This difference in profitability, however, 
was due to a differential in the fuel tax paid by the two fleets (see p.  14 for further discussion). 
Still, the data in Table 4 indicate the extreme disparity in levels of investment per fishing unit 
between small- and large-scale gears and the problems that arise from grouping all these gears under 
a single "municipal fisheries" label. The P55,OOO-P70,000  investment required for small and medium 
trawlers is well beyond the means of most small-scale fishermen and far exceeds the usual lending 
limit (P15,OOO)  of the rural banks under the various credit programs of the government. 
COSTS AND EARNINGS OF MAJOR GEAR TYPES 
Daily trip data from 64 fishing units were collected for 12 months, June 1980-May 1981, to 
determine the costs and earnings of the major gear types operating in San Miguel Bay. The results 
reported here represent data from a total of 11,248 fishing trips by these major gear types (scissor Table 4. Levels of investment (pesos) in the San Miguel Bay fisheries (1981  ) and capital-labor ratios (major gear types). 
1981 
Replacement  No. of  Total  Crew  Capital-labor 




Subtotal  5,252,000 
Smallscale fishery 
Gill-netter Inon-motorized)  2,800  150  420,000  2  1,400: 1 
Gill-netter (motorized)  13,000  350  4,550,000  3  4,333:l 
Mini trawl  9200  1  88  1,729,600  2  4,600:1 
Fish corral  9.1 00  89  809,900  2  2,550: 1 
Liftnet  12,200  171  2,086,200  4  3,050: 1 
Filter net  3,500  60  210,000  1-2  2,333:l 
Scissor net  250  634  158,500  1  250: 1 
Subtotal  9,964,200 
Total investmenta  15,489,200 
'~xcluding  645 miscellaneous minor gears for which no economic data were collected. 
nets, motorized gill-nets, stationary liftnets, fish corrals, filter nets, mini trawlers, small trawlers and 
medium trawlers). 
Costs and earnings of these major gears are summarized in Table 5 on a per-fishing-unit  basis. 
After deducting all operating, fixed, variable and opportunity costs from the value of their catch, 
scissor nets, stationary liftnets and medium trawlers incurred losses in 1980-1981. Gill-netters, the 
most common of the mobile non-trawl  gears,  earned negligibly more than all costs. Fish corrals, 
mini trawlers and especially small trawlers earned large pure profits. 
VALUE OF CATCH, FISHING COSTS AND RESOURCE RENTS 
Extrapolating  to  the fishery asa whole based on prices received by fishermen, it was determined 
that the total annual value of the catch in the period under study was P53.5 million, of which P50.5 
million was costs and P3 million was pure profit or positive resource rents* (Table 6). Over one-half 
of the annual value of the catch came from shrimps and squids (Fig. 5). Almost 42% of the value of 
the catch was earned by small and medium trawlers (Fig. 6). Similarly, over 50% of the pure profits 
were earned by the small trawlers with mini trawlers earning much of the rest (Fig. 7). Liftnets were 
unable to cover their costs, though this may be due to bad weather having delayed the beginning of 
the liftnet season in 1981. 
As with the catch, the distribution of the catch value and profits is highly skewed towards the 
large-scale trawlers. Since only 35 families owned the 95 large-scale trawlers (5 families owned 40 
units), compared to  2,287  small-scale  fishing units owned by 2,000  households, there was significant 
concentration  of benefits from the San Miguel Bay fisheries. 
Theoretical considerationswould suggest that all resource rents would be dissipated in an open- 
access fishery such as San Miguel Bay. That this has not yet occurred may be due to some barriers 
to  entry and particularly  to  the rate at which entry has taken place. Fish corrals may have benefitted 
'Resource  rents represent the difference between total revenues from the fishery and the total costs of fishing. Table 5. Annual costs and earnings in  pesos of major gear types (per fishing unit, 1980-1981).~ 
Gear types studied 
Scissor  Motorized  Stationary  Fish  Filter  Mini  Small  Medium 
net  gill-net  liftnet  corral  net  trawler  trawler  trawler 
Annual value of catch  607  32,900  10,000  16,200  7,700  38,500  228,700  254,400 
Less operating costs deducted 
before sharing 
fuel (gasoline, kerosene 
and LPG)  n/a  1 1,700  3,800  1,600  100  17,200  89,300  128,900 
oil  nla  300  50  0  0  500  600  2,000 
parts, repair, maintenance  n  la  1,300  200  150  300  600  9,700  7,900 
food and others (cigar- 
rettes, etc.)  1  50  3,600  700  700  700  3,500  14,200  17,600 
hired labor  n  la  nla  nla  2,900  nla  nla  n  la  nla 
ice  0  0  0  0  0  0  9,400  11,400 
Subtotal  150  16,900  4,750  5,350  1,100  21,800  123,200  167,800 
Net revenue before sharing  457  16,000  5,250  10,850  6,600  16,700  105,500  86,600 
Net income of owners  b  457  .  7,700  2,350  10,850  3,300  7,100  65,300  60,100 
Less costs borne by  owners 
fixed costsC 
d 
57  3,700  5,450  5,650  1,500  1,650  21,400  30,800 
variable costs  0  700  0  0  0  200  23,700  27,500 
opportunity costs!  440  3,400  1,300  1,300  700  2,450  8,300  10,900 
Owner's pure profit 
(or loss) 
Net income of crewmen  f  nla  8,300  2,900  2,900~  3,300  9,600  40,200  26,500 
Less labor opportunity costs 
of crew  h 
nla  7,600  2,700  3,400  3,200  4,800  25,200  28,700 
Crew's pure profit 
(or loss) 
Pure profit (or  ,loss) per 
fishing uni+  (40)  600  (4,200)  3.400  1,200  7.600  26,900  (11,300) 
---- 
nla: not applicable 
a~ll  figures rounded off (except for scissor net). 
blncludes income from owner's share of net revenue, and in  the case of small and medium trawlers, includes income from broker's 
fee and engine maintenance reserve. 
Clncludes  depreciation, licenses arid other fees. 
dlncludes engine, vessel and gear maintenance expenses which are not charged before sharing. 
elncludes opportunity costs of non-fishing owner's investment capital, own labor and family labor (if applicable). 
flncludes share of net revenue for all boat pilots, maestros,  machinists and  ordinary crewmen as appropriate. 
g~eprssents  hired labor expenses already deducted before sharing. 
h~ee  Smith and Mines (1982) for derivation of these labor opportunity costs. 
l~he  sharing system allows some of the rent (pure profits) to be passed on to  the crew (see Nahan 1982 for another example). 
'sum of owner's and crew's  pure profit (or loss). Squids  3.2% % 
\  All other  / 
Stationary gears 
Small trawlen 
Fig. 5. Distribution of total value  of  annual San Migual  Fig. 6.  Distribution of  total value  of  annual San Miguel 
Bay  catch  (P53.5 million in 1980181  ) by species groups.  Bay  catch  (P53.5  million in 1980181) by gear  type. Not 
included  here  is  the  value  of  fishermen's  take-home 
catch  nor  the  oligopolyloligopsony profits of  fuel  sup- 
plierslf  ish processors. 
from entry barriers in the sense that only limited numbers can be accommodated and at least in 
some locations, senior or elder fishermen known as  amonojadors still play an allocative function. 
The high investment costs limit the rate of growth of the small trawler fleet. The fact remains that 
further expansion in the effective effort of the fleet is likely to  dissipate that portion of the remain- 
ing profits that accrues to  fishermen. 
The pure profits shown in Table 6 and Fig. 7 represent those accruing to the fishing fleet. In 
addition, fuel supplierslprocessors and the Philippine government earned pure profits from the San 
Miguel Bay fishery in 1980-1  981. 
Operating costs made up 56% of the costs of the San Miguel Bay fishery (Fig. 8), of which 
almost two-thirds were for fuel expenses.  Fuel prices increased twice during the period of study and 
fishermen complained of being caught between declining catches and increasing fuel costs. Many 
small-scale fishermen obtained gasoline on credit from gasoline suppliers (who double as  processors) 
in  return for agreements to sell their catch to  them at reduced prices. Significant oligopoly/oligop- 
sony* profits were being earned by these supplierslprocessors who were thus capturing a share of 
the resource rents. The P53.5  million annual value of the fishery is based upon prices received by 
the fishermen; gasoline suppliers' share of the resource rents which may be as  high as  P2 million 
would increase the value of the fishery, and of course influence the distribution of benefits derived 
therefrom. 
Almost one-third of the fuelloil expenditures of fishermen consists of government taxes. In 
1981, these taxes were approximately 45%  (P2.5411)  on regular gasoline which the Briggs and 
Stratton engines of the gill-netters  and mini trawlers use and 14% (P0.4611) on the diesel fuel used 
by the small and medium trawlers. Total annual fuel expenditures were P18.5 million, of which 
approximately P5.5  million represent taxes. The dieselfgasoline tax differential is part of a package 
of incentives that the Philippine government has adopted to promote industrialization. 
The revenue generated by these fuel taxes is used by the government for road construction, 
energy exploration  and special projects; theoretically, then, some of the tax revenues could be used 
for the benefit of fishing communities among other groups in the population at-large. Part of the 
tax can also be rebated to  the refineries to cover their losses due to currency exchange fluctuations 
*Limited numbers of sellers and limited numbers of buyers with consequent abilities to influence prices in their favor. Table 8. Breakdown of 1980-1981 annual San Miguel Bay fishing costs (PSO million) by cost item and fishing gwr types. 
--  -  --  -- -  --  --  -- 
All fishing units 
Scissor  Motorized  Stationary  Fish  Filter  Mini  Small  Medium  All other 
nets  gill-nets  liftnets  corrals  nets  trawlers  trawlers  trawlers  gearsa  Totals 
No. of fishing units 
Variable costs 
Fuelloil  0  4,200,000  658,350  142,400  6,000  3,327,600  6,742,500  2,618,000  846,400  18,541,250 
Repair and maintenance  0  700,000  34,200  13,350  18,000  150,400  2,505,000  708,000  1,354,240  5,483,190 
Ice  0  0  0  0  0  0  705,000  228,000  0  933,000 
Food and miscellaneous  95.1 00  1,260,000  1 19,700  62,300  42,000  658,000  1,065,000  352,000  1,184,960  4,839,060 
Subtotal variable costs  96,l 00  6,160,000  81  2,250  218,050  66,000  4.1  36,000  11,017,500  3,906,000  3,385,600  29,796,500 
Fixed costs 
Depreciation, licenses 
and fees  36,138  1,295,000  931,950  502,850  90,000  310,200  1,605,000  616,000  1,777440  7,164,578 
Opportunity costs 
Owner's capital and 
labor  278,960  1.1 90,000  222,300  11  5,700  42,000  460.600  622,500  218,000  1,015,680  4,165,740 
Crew laborb  0  2,660,000  461,700  302,600~  192.000  902,400  1,890,000  574,000  2,285,280  9,267,980 
Total all costs  410,198  11,305,000  2,428,200  1,139,200  390,000  5,809,200  15,135,000  5,314,000  8,464,000  50,394,798 
Pure profits (loss)  (25,360)  210,000  (718,200)  302,600  72,000  1,428,800  2-01  7,500  (226.000)  0  3,061,340 
Total value of catch  '384,838  11,515,000  1,710,000  1,441,800  462,000  7,238,000  17,152,500  5,088,000  8,464,000  53.456.1  38 
%ince  many of these other gears  are  used from nonmotorized bancas, the total costs (which were derived from total catch and average price received of P2.87lkg) and assuming 
zero (pure profit) have been divided 10% to fuelloil; 16% to repair and maintenance; 14% to food and miscellaneous; 21% to fixed costs;  12% to owners' opportunity costs; and 27% 
to crew labor opportunity cost. All percentages except for fuelloil and ice are interpolated from the distribution of these costs for those gear  types for which complete cost records 
were obtained. 
blndudes opportunity costs of owners' labor in those cases where fishing unit is owner-operated. 
Copportunity  cost of hired laborers each of whom is actually paid PI0  daily (P2,900 per fishing unit per year) or P258,100  total. Loss 
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Fig. 7.  Distribution of annual pure profits and losses  (resource rents) in  thousands of pesos 
among the various fishing gear types of San Miguel Bay (1980181  1. 
Pure profits 
accruing to 
maintenance  (10%) 
Fig. 8. Distribution of annual costs and pure profits in  the 
San  Miguel Bay  fishery,  1980-1981 (total P53.5 million; 
63% of operating costs is for fuel and oil; 30% of these 
expenditures are in  the form of fuel taxes which represent 
crew  the  government's share  of pure profits (resource rents). 
(6%) 
and increase-4 prices of crude oil. Product prices at the refinery in 1981 were almost identical: 
P2.52  (gasoline) and P2.47  (diesel) not including government taxes or various delivery charges 
(Caltex head office, Manila, pers, cemm.). Retail prices of fuel are fixed by the government. The 
crude cost equalization differential, as  the rebate to refineries is called, can be no more than P0.9611 
(gasoline) and PO.1711  (diesel). The differential however, is not necessarily rebated in full to refine- 
ries by  the government. 
The Philippine government thus earned approximately P5.5 million resource rents from the 
San Miguel Bay fisheries. In addition, because of the higher tax rate on regular gasoline than on diesel, the small and medium trawlers were indirectly subsidized in comparison to the non-trawl and 
mini trawl fishermen, further skewing the benefits in favor of those that already have the larger 
share of catch, catch value and profits on a per-fisherman and per-fishing unit basis. If small trawlers 
had to pay the same  tax on diesel as do those small-scale gear types using gasoline, the average small 
trawler would have incurred losses of approximately P30,600  rather than pure profits of P26,900. 
Given the price differentials between diesel and gasoline fuels, why have non-trawl fishing units 
not converted from gasoline to  diesel engines? Part of the answer lies in the fact that investment 
cost is roughly four times as high for a diesel engine of a size comparable to the 10-  to 16-hp  gasoline 
engines commonly used throughout the Philippines (Hoiazo 1982). Despite its more economical 
operating characteristics, a diesel engine costing more than P10,OOO-P12,000  is probably beyond the 
financial reach of most small-scale fishermen. Moreover, the narrow bancas and mini trawlers are ill- 
suited to  accommodate the heavier, bulkier diesel engines. Other factors favoring the continued use 
of gasoline engines are that the most commonly used engine (Briggs and Stratton single cylinder) is 
easily maintained, and the supplier provides mechanics' and maintenance  courses and service represen- 
tatives throughout the country. 
From the above, it is clear that the value and distribution of resource rents from the San 
Miguel Bay fishery depends upon the costs determined for inputs. Cost-benefit studies should make 
use of shadow ("true opportunity cost")  prices in their calculations (Gittinger 1972; Panayotou 
1982), but economic analyses of tropical fisheries often seem to have been confined more narrowly 
to strictly 'financial'  analysis, whereby rates of return on investment are  reported using market 
prices without any reference to opportunity costs of labor or capital or to possible subsidies or 
taxes on inputs such as  fuel. 
There is considerable debate on these opportunity cost and shadow price concepts among 
economists and it is especially difficult to establish the "true"  opportunity costs of capital and 
labor, which in some cases may be very low (see Squire and van der Tak (1975)  for a discussion of the 
issues). For example, there are those who will argue that an opportunity cost of labor as used here 
(P10-20lday depending upon skill level and location) is too high, given the prevalence of unemploy- 
ment and disguised unemployment in the Bicol Region (see Castillo (1979) for regional employment 
and income data). Conversely, the %  opportunity cost of investment capital selected for this study 
may be thought by some  to be too low, given the alternative investment opportunities outside 
fishing that are probably available to  owners of trawlers. However, for owners of gill-netters  who 
received government loans and who did not repay them, any positive value for opportunity cost of 
capital (and of depreciation) distorts theanalysis as far as private gill-netters  are concerned. Certainly 
there is a social cost involved in providing capital to small-scale fisheries because the government has 
alternative investment opportunities open to it. 
The appropriate labor opportunity cost, or shadow wage  rate, depends not only upon the 
presence of locally available employment options, but also upon the mobility of labor. In the case 
of San Miguel Bay, there have been significant rates of outmigration from the area in response to 
the low prevailing wage  in Bicol and better opportunities elsewhere, especially Manila. Because of 
this outmigration, it would be incorrect and potentially very misleading to assign a near-zero opportu- 
nity cost to San Miguel Bay fishery labor. There are also more practical reasons for this viewpoint. 
A shadow wage rate less than P10-20 would increase the pure profits accruing to crewmen labor (see 
Table 5). Given the history of development-oriented approaches in attempting to solve poverty in 
fishing communities, such a claim of higher pure profits would reinforce tendencies to expand fish- 
ing effort within San Miguel Bay which would actually increase poverty. Moreover, establishing a 
lower opportunity cost for labor could allow planners to rationalize that since pure profits are 
earned, nothing need to be done to raise incomes of the small-scale fishermen of San Miguel Bay. 
Rather, the results show that incomes of crewmen derived from fishing on non-trawl fishing 
units are roughly comparable to the PI0  daily wage that prevailed for other laborers' occupations 
(e.g.,  carpenter's helper, copra worker, sorter in fish processing establishment). These income data, and incomes after all are the primary determinant of well-being of fishing households, imply that 
the mobility of labor is such that the markets for labor in fishing and other rural sectors in Bicol are 
in rough equilibrium. Consequently, given the stock assessment conclusion that increased catch is 
not possible from the Bay as a whole,  any further technological improvements will most likely 
depress average catches, increase average costs and hence depress average fishing incomes below the 
opportunity wage  in the short term. In the longer term, equilibrium in the labor markets will again 
result, but at  a lower opportunity cost for labor. 
There are other factors at play here, of course, especially population growth rates. The research 
data indicate that despite outmigration, absolute numbers of fishermen are growing by about 2% 
annually. Thus, population growth has contributed to increases in effective fishing effort along with 
the technological improvement of vessels and gears noted earlier. 
It must be stressed here that population growth is a less important explanation for increased 
fishing effort than is technological change.  In the face of technological improvements, population 
control programs alone therefore will have little impact on effective fishing effort. Nevertheless, 
both factors, coupled with lack of any control over access to the San Miguel Bay fisheries, have 
produced a situation where fishing incomes are low in absolute terms, though roughly equivalent to 
the low rural laborer incomes that prevail throughout the Bicol Region. 
As  will be discussed in the next subsection, when one takes into account income in-kind (fish 
taken home by the crew and not sold), fishing labor income is probably slightly higher than that of 
most agricultural workers in the vicinity of San Miguel Bay. It is reasonable to conclude that this 
in-kind income represenls a premium accruing to fishermen to compensate for the higher risk in 
fishing. 
SHARING SYSTEMS AND INCOMES OF OWNERS AND CREWMEN 
In common with most fisheries around the world, crewmen and owners in San Miguel Bay 
share the net revenue which represents value of the catch minus certain operating expenses. The 
division of the net revenue varies depending upon the gear  type, whether or not the owner actually 
goes fishing, the opportunity cost of labor in the area and the extent of non-economic (social and 
kinship) relationships that may exist between owners and crewmen. 
A typical sharing arrangement for a motorized gill-netter is depicted in Fig. 9. The income of 
the owner varies depending upon whether or not he joins the fishermen; if so,  he receives a labor 
share that would normally accrue to  a crewman (or boat pilot). Trawler owners do not go  fishing 
but remain onshore to manage their fishing business and to handle marketing of the catch of their 
boat(s). 
The only gear type for which no sharing system was found was the fish corral. In this case, 
crewmen received PlOIday regardless of the total value of the catch. Because this payment to labor 
approximates labor opportunity cost, owners of this gear  have been able to keep the full resource 
rent (pure profits) earned by their gears rather than pass any of it along to ordinary crewmen as 
occurs for most other gears. Of course, offsetting this potential disadvantage is the fact that fish 
corral crewmen also bear less risk than do their counterparts who participate in sharing systems and 
thus share in losses also. 
One factor which appears to have resulted in some shifts in the gill-netter sharing system is the 
presence in certain areas of increased alternative employment opportunities for labor. The usual 
sharing arrangement for gill-netters  is 50% of net revenue to the owners and 50% divided among the 
crew. Non-fishing  owners sometimes give an  incentive payment to pilots from their share.  In Sabang, 
Calabanga where the presence of the trawler fleet has opened up opportunities for labor as  trawler 
crewmen and generated added secondary employment opportunities in  fish processing (e.g.,  drying) 
and in transportation, gill-net owners now offer their crews a 6W0  share of net revenue. This type of 
flexibility in sharing was found to be less prevalent in largescale trawl fishing units, however, than 
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Fig. 9. Typical sharing system of Cabuseo gill-netters with boat pilot receiving incentive share 
fmm  boat owner. (Data from 2,106  fishing trips of nine gill-netters in 1980181  ).8 
'~ote  that these  costs  and  incomes are for a gill-netter with crew of three, one of whom 
was  a  pilot receiving an  incentive share  from the non-fishing owner..Not  all gill-netter  pilots 
received such  an  incentive, however  (see Table 7 for income of crewmen from all gill-netters in 
the study sample). 
b~efore  deducting  fixed and variable costs borne by owner. 
in  the small-scale units where kinship ties between owners and crew are more common. This separa- 
tion of ownership from the actual fishing operation is a further category that separates small and 
medium trawlers from the bulk of the "municipal"  small-scale, non-trawl fisheries (see also Smith 
et al. 1980 and Spoehr 1980). 
Because of these variations of sharing systems within and among gear types, owner and crewmen 
incomes will also vary. Based on daily record-keeping data from 64 fishing units of various types 
(covering 11,248 fishing trips in all) and using weighted averages of incomes by sharing system for 
each sampled gear type, average monthly incomes of non-fishing owners, owner-operators, pilots 
(maestros),  machinists and ordinary crewmen were calculated (Table 7). The income figures in this 
table represent cash incomes after deduction of all fixed and variable costs (not including opportu- 
nity costs of own capital and labor which were deducted to calculate pure profits or losses). These 
income figures are those that fishermen would view as their earnings and that economic analysts 
would compare with opportunity costs to determine the presence or absence  of pure profits. 
It is immediately apparent that the incomes of owners and crewmen of scissor nets, motorized 
gill-nets, liftnets and filter nets are considerably lower than those of their counterparts on mini 
trawlers and small trawlers. Crewmen on fish corrals, as explained earlier, are a special case  in  that 
they receive a daily wage,  to the apparent benefit of owners. Also, the relatively low incomes for 
owners and crewmen of medium trawlers are a reflection of the highfuel expenses of those units. 
Small trawlers are thus in a different income ca tngory from all other gear  types in San Miguel Bay. 
Also shown in Table 7 are the average numbers of fishing days per month for these gear types. 
Especially for the smallscale gear types, crewmen are expected by owners to participate in gear repair on some nonfishing  days. The monthly incomes shown represent earnings for all days com- 
mitted to the fishing unit, both fishing and onshore. Therefore, crewmen incomes per day worked 
(1980-1  981) were as  follows: 
Small-scale fishery: 
Scissor net (owner-operator)  P 9.05 
Motorized gill-net  10.50 
Stationary liftnet  9.65 
Fish corral  8.50 
Filter net  9.65 
Mini trawler  17.45 
Largescale fishery: 
Small trawler  24.75 
Medium trawler  14.00 
There are several important points to be made regarding the results above and those in Table 7. 
First, these incomes do not represent fishing household income. Most fishing households have more 
than one fishermen and some own more than one fishing unit. Concentration of ownership and hence 
of incomes is particularly characteristic of the small/medium trawler fleet. Second, many non-trawl 
ordinary crewmen shift from one gear type to another. During the fishing season they have opportu- 
nities for increasing their monthly incomes (though not their daily incomes) in  this manner. Never- 
theless,  large numbers of fishermen did not fish continuously throughout the year (Table 8). Third, 
all crewmen receive some of the catch in-kind  for their family's subsistence. Though a valuation of 
this in-kind income is not included in the above income figures, it is estimated that the daily take- 
home catch per gill-netter crewman, for example, was approximately 0.7  kg valued at P2.20. 
Fourth, the daily incomes of crewmen for the non-trawl gears  (P8.50-P10.50) are slightly 
higher than the prevailing wage in other occupations when income in-kind is included. This income 
above the opportunity cost of labor may be thought of as  a premium for the added risk and uncer- 
tainty in  fishing. Interestingly, Librero et  al. (1982) have also found fishing incomes in several other 
locations in the Philippines to be slightly higher than income earned in  other rural occupations such 
as  agricultural laborer, 
Fifth, the higher crew incomes on small trawlers explain why many non-trawl fishermen aspire 
to places in the crew of small trawlers. There are limited numbers of these crew positions available, 
however. The possibility of increased incomes has apparently led some small-scale fishermen to  turn 
over their individual PI  5,000 Biyayang Dagat (a currently available government credit program for 
small-scale fishermen) loans to a guarantor who will then build a small trawler and guarantee them a 
place in the crew in return. 
Finally, and most importantly, the monthly incomes of the majority of fishermen, despite 
being equal to or slightly higher than the opportunity wage,  are still e~tremely  low. Seventy-two 
percent of respondent fishermen had no other source of supplementary income.  In 1980 after 
compensating for inflation, household incomes (including in-kind earnings) for a rural family of six 
would have to be at least PI  5,389  annually to exceed the rural poverty threshold established for 
1971 (P5,OOO)  by the Development Academy of the Philippines (Abrera 1976).* Although in  this 
study of San Miguel Bay, fishermen did not estimate household incomes per se,  it is quite clear that 
the monthly incomes per fisherman shown in  Table 7,  coupled with an average household size of 
6.8,  would leave the vast majority of the 3,500  San Miguel Bay fishing households well below the 
DAP poverty threshold. Only owners of  small trawlers are likely to have incomes exceeding the 
poverty threshold. 
*Rural Consumer Price Index was approximately 90.0 in 1971 (1972 = 100); 167.3 in 1975;and 277.0 by Januery 1980. 
(Source: Dept. of Economic Research, Central Bank of the Philippines). Table 8. Number of months fishermen  in San Miguel  Bay  pent fishing in the 12 months from February 1980 to January  1981 







Source: Primary data from socioeconomic survey  (Bailey 1982a). 
Note: Data  unavailable on  21 of our 641 respondents. The 23 respondents who  reported no  fishing in 12 months preceding our 
survey gave various reasons such  as  health for their inactivity. Cumulative figures do not total 100% due to rounding. 
These results are consistent with the findings of others who have studied income levels in the 
Bicol (Castillo 1979;  Rondinelli 1980; USA1 D 1980). Indeed, the government's statistics (NEDA 
1975) showed 873% of Bicol families with incomes below the DAP poverty threshold in 1971; by 
1975 this figure had increased to 93.8% after adjusting the povetty threshold for inflation in rural 
areas (NEDA 1982). In real income terms, the majority of the Bicol households were worse off at 
the end of the 1970s than they had been at  the beginning of the decade.  For small-scale fishing 
households the problem has translated into increasing costs due to inflation, a decline in catch 
which they attribute primarily to trawlers, and fish prices received at the beach that have  not 
increased as rapidly as costs, especially costs of fuel. 
MARKETING AND MARKETING ORGANIZATIONS 
Improvements in marketing are frequently proposed as one means of raising incomes of fishing 
households. To assess the potential for this solution, the activities of various categories of middlemen 
and processors and of women in marketing were examined. As  in many other fisheries of the world, 
women play an essential role in marketing of the catch from San Miguel Bay. Fishermen involved in 
harvesting generally leave the selling of their catch to their wives or to other female members of 
their household. 
The structure of the marketing sector was  influenced by several external factors. The extent of 
processing (i.e.,  drying and salting) varies with the seasonal nature of the catch (and the gear  shifts 
that accompany it) and of the weather. Approximately 3m  of the Bay's  catch was  processed. 
Generally speaking, the more isolated the community, the greater the extent of processing within 
the community. Communities in the southern part of the Bay and near Mercedes in the northwest 
were more closely linked by road to urban markets and were more likely to be frequented by larger 
numbers of buyers, not only making for a more competitive environment in which fishing house- 
holds disposed of their catch, but also reducing their need to dry much of their catch. Highest rates 
of dissatisfaction with the existing marketing system were recorded in the more isolated communi- 
ties such as Siruma on the northeast coast of the Bay. 
The majority of fishing households were tied to particular buyers, known locally as  suki, from 
whom they obtain credit and sometimes inputs, such as fuel, and to whom they must sell their atch, often at a 1  WO  discount in price received. Despite this tie, the majority of fishermen-respondents 
expressed satisfaction with this arrangement. 
Another factor which influences the extent of ties between harvesters and middlemen was the 
type of gear  used and the size of the catch. For example, owners of gill-netters  and other minor 
non-trawl gears  usually sold their catch to their suki or to rigaton (m&#dlewomen)  who bought 
directly at the landing. Rarely were fishing households using these gedtypes involved directly in 
wholesale or retail marketing. In contrast, there was  more vertical integration in markets that 
handled the catch of trawlers. Owners of small trawlers usually served as their own brokers and in 
some cases as  processors of their own and others' catch. The same was true for many of the owners 
of mini trawlers, which in fact could largely be classified as processors first and owners of mini 
trawlers second. 
In the more remote communities, processing was  often a household activity with women 
playing  a prominent role; in communities such as Castillo, Cabusao and Sabang, Catabanga a few 
large processors dominated the market; their daily incomes were  much higher as a result. The 
majority of small-scale processors and fresh and dried fish dealers, however, earned daily incomes 
(P10-35)  that were only slightly higher than the incomes of the better-off fishermen. Economies of 
scale in processing and marketing were found to be distinctly limited, and most middlewomen who 
sold fresh and dried fish seemed to have adopted attitudes of live-and-let-live  visa vis their competi- 
tors, an attitude regarding competition reminiscent of that found in other Philippine markets 
(Szanton 1972). Consequently, given present conditions, it is difficult to markedly improve the 
marketing sector tb  the benefit of small-scale fishing households, although some  potential exists for 
cooperative processing activities. Entry barriers here are high, however, because processors are a 
major source of credit to fishermen. 
In light of the limited success with fishing cooperatives in Bicol and elsewhere in the country, 
it is concluded that a single-function  cooperative or association is unlikely to succeed. Preferable 
would be groupings that engage in gasoline supply, processing and marketing such as in Mercedes 
(Toh 1980). These groupings should consist of women,  not of men whose current function in 
fisheries is limited primarily to harvesting. Finally, as presented in the next section on management 
options, there may be a very useful function for groupings in fishing communities to perform in 
terms of fisheries management. 
MIGRATION PATTERNS AND ALTERNATIVE 
SOURCES OF INCOME 
Dependency upon fishing varies from one community to another around San Miguel Bay, but 
in general there are only limited local alternatives for generating supplementary household income. 
The most attractive means of increasing income, especially for young people, has been to migrate 
out of the Bicol Region altogether (Kim 1972; lllo and Lynch 1974a, 1974b; Cariiio 1979; Roco 
1980). 
In an earlier study that covered the whole of Bicol, Piansay et al. (1979) found that 88% of 
fishing households had no income source other than those that were fishery-related, such as  harvest- 
ing, processing and marketing. The earlier results are consistent with the results of this study which 
also showed a heavy dependence upon fishing for San Miguel Bay households (Table 9). The most 
important means of supplementing fishing income was through agriculture; but most fishing house- 
holds faced a severe constraint in this regard due to their lack of access to land. Less than 1  WO  of 
641 fishing household respondents in the present study had regular access to farm land while only 
1% owned rice or coconut land, the two most common forms of productive land in the vicinity 
of San Miguel Bay fishing communities. 
The potential for local agriculture to  absorb surplus fishing labor was assessed;  there are dis- 
tinctly limited possibilities. For example, the very small size of rice land holdings in the area,  which Table 9. Prevalence of supplemental occupations among respondent fishermen In San Migurl Bey. 
Type of supplemental 
employment  No.  Percentage 
No  supplemental occupations 
Farming 
Planting of root crops, maize, etc. for home 
consumption only 
Laborer (including  agricultural or other 
temporary laborer) 






Source: Primary data from socioeconomic survey (Bailey 1982~). 
Note: Total percentage does not equal 100 due to rounding. 
averaged 2.52 ha in Camarines Sur and 3.39 ha in Camarines Norte in 1971 (NCSO 1971a, 1971b), 
implies that most rice land is farmed by owners and does not require large amounts of hired labor. 
Land reform activities in  the area have concentrated upon tenant rice farmers to the exclusion of 
landless laborers and fishermen. Under land reform in coastal barrios of Cabusao and Calabanga, 
Certificates of Land Transfer involved only 165 tenants and the average size of plots awarded was 
only 0.88  ha (Ministry of Agrarian Reform, Magarao Office, Camarines Sur). Consequently, fishing 
households are unlikely to benefit directly from redistribution of rice lands,  though they may 
benefit indirectly from road and other infrastructure improvements that accompany the develop- 
ment of irrigation networks in the rice land areas to the south of the Bay. 
An assessment was made of other employment opportunities in lowland and upland activities- 
agriculture, aquaculture, cottage industries and agroindustries-such  as  preparation of commercial 
feeds for livestock-and  smallscale animal husbandry. It was concluded that only the last two of 
these offered much hope for absorbing rural labor from other sectors or supplementing fishing 
household incomes. In particular, pig-raising using mixed or local breeds, which is already practiced 
by over 40% of fishing households, seemed well-suited to  add small amounts to family incomes. 
However, even these more promising alternatives hold little prospect for attracting large numbers of 
fishermen, so  as  to result in a reduction of effective fishing effort. 
As  long as industrial development in the Philippines  is centered in and around Metro Manila, 
the marginalization of rural areas such as  Bicol can be expected to continue. The response of Bicol 
residents to  continuing lack of local opportunities is most evident in migration patterns. The Bicol 
Region has historically had one of the highest rates of outmigration in the Philippines and this can 
be expected to  continue (Drew et al. 1975). Contrary to views commonly held elsewhere in the 
world that fishermen are immobile (Gordon 1954). Filipino fishermen have often expressed willing- 
ness to  change occupations and locations (results of numerous studies are summarized in Smith et 
al. 1980). Interviews of fishing households in San Miguel Bay in  the present study produced similar 
results. High degrees of stated willingness to change  both occupation and residence were found 
among fishermen regardless of age,  educational attainment, ownership of house or land, and type of 
fisherman (e.g.,  owner-operator, crewman). For example, 44% were willing to  change occupation 
even if it required a move to  a different municipality. An overwhelming majority (83%) of respon- 
dents would encourage their children to leave their home community if  an occupation elsewhere provided higher income and standard of living. This stated willingness to change occupations and 
residence is consistent with actual migration patterns over the past 30 years. 
Nevertheless, due to natural population increase offsetting outmigration which resulted in a 2% 
annual rate of increase (Table lo), it is estimated from the present study that numbers of fishermen 
increased from 3,200  in 1948 to 5,600  in 1980, adding to the increases in effective fishing effort 
caused by introduction of synthetic netting and particularly motorization. 
Table 10. Populations of the fishing barrios of the coastal municipalities  of San Miguel Bay, 1939-1980. 
Year  Average annual 
rate of increase 







Total  1  7,267  22,685  28,781  32,348  35,664  39,516 
Annual rate of increase  -  3.08  2.00  1.18  1.97  2.07  2.04 
Source: Bureau of Census and Statistics (1939,1948,1960); NCSO (1970a. 1970b. 1975a, 1975b, 1981). 
FISHERMEN'S VIEWPOINT 
In  addition  to  gathering data from respondents regarding occupational and geographic mobility, 
researchers obtained data regarding fishermen's  perceptions of the San Miguel Bay fisheries. The 
single most important issue of concern for the fishermen-respondents (n = 641  was the alleged 
recent decline in  their catch. Of the 79% who claimed lower catch, fully 75% blamed various forms 
of increases in  effective fishing effort. Examples in the words of the fishermen themselves were: 
"destructive trawlers (fine meshed nets);"  "increased  number of fishermen;"  "depletion of the Bay;" 
and the "use  of more improved gear by other fishermen."  Respondents were particularly outspoken 
regarding the illegal operation of trawlers in depths less than 4 fm (7.3 m). 
The solutions offered by these fishermen to the above problem epitomize the basic conflict 
between individual solutions and those that would benefit fishermen as  a group. Almost without 
exception the suggested solution to declining catch was to improve one's  own vessel and gear so  as 
to  compete better with other fishermen, including trawler operators. Only secondarily mentioned 
was the need to effectively enforce existing regulations that delimit areas of operation for trawlers. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this multidisciplinary  analysis of the small-scale fisheries of San  Miguel Bay, 
taken together (Tables 1  1 and 12) not only illustrate the dichotomy between the largescale and 
small-scale fisheries but also imply that: 
Improvements in technology will not increase total catch, but rather will increase costs, 
further reduce pure profits (resource rents) and in the long run reduce incomes of the 
majority of small-scale fishermen. 
Technical improvements cannot adequately address the inequitable distribution of benefits 
that presently exists between the small-scale and the large-scale fisheries. Table 11. Summary of data on the SawMiguel Bay fisheries, 1980-1981. 
Smallscale fishery  Largescale fishery  Totals for the 
Non-trawl  Mini  Smalllmedium  San Miguel Bay fisheries 
Characteristics  gears  trawlers  trawlers  (all fishing units) 
No. of fishing units  2.1  00  188  95  2,382 
Total horsepower  2,592  3,008  13,200  18,800 
No, of fishermen 
No. of households owning 
fishing units  =  1,800  =  150 
5,600  in 3,500 
households 
Average investment cost 
per fishing unit (PI  250-  13,000  9,200  55-70,000  P15.5  million current 
replacement cost 
Percent of total catch (19,133 t)  44  25  31 
Percent of total value 
(P53.5  million) 
Percent of pure profits (resource 
rents)a (P3 million)  15~ 
Crewmen cash incomes/mo (PI  164-218  342  339-8  1  od 
Owner cash (non-fishing) 
incomes/mo (f  (-773Ie-740  432  146~-1,693 
a~oes  not include resource rents earned by the government and by fuel suppliers/processors. 
b~ne-half  of this is earned by fish corrals; 40% by motorized gill-netters. 
 mall trawlers only; medium trawlers did not cover their opportunity costs. 
d~ighest  incomes are earned by pilots on small trawlers. 
e~wners  of stationary liftnets incurred losses. 
f~owest  incomes are earned by owners of medium trawlers. 
Effective fishing effort is likely to increase further through added investment and popula- 
tion growth unless steps are taken to limit effort in some way. 
Increases in effective fishing effort are most likely to  come in the form of additional small 
trawlers (because of their lower fuel tax payments than those using gasoline engines) which 
will further skew the distribution of catch, catch value and incomes in their favor, to the 
detriment of the majority of the Bay's fishermen. 
Improvements in marketing or even increased roles for fishing households in processing and 
marketing  are likely to  add only minimally to incomes of the majority of fishing households, 
though some possibilities may exist for group processing activities. 
Locally available incomegenerating  activities other than fishing are neither available in suf- 
ficient numbers nor with high enough income to provide significant employment for the 
steadily growing population in coastal communities of the Bay. 
All perspectives of the San Miguel Bay fisheries, including those of fishermen themselves, point 
to the same conclusion; that is, the twin problems of overfishing and inequitable distrihutiom of 
benefits can only be overcome if steps be taken to limit effective fishing effort by managing the 
Bay's  fisheries. Reductions in  effective fishing effort in the Bay can also be expected to lead to 
reductions in  costs and hence increases in the resource rents of this fishery. Table 12. Summary of results of the multidisciplinary investigation of the San Miguel Bay fisheries. 












Ecology of fishes described. Silt 
deposition of  2.5 cmlyr esti- 
mated 
Costs and aarnings 
Total costs and 
value of catch 
Reported for each major gear type, invest- 
ment costs,  costs and earnings, determinants 
of catch, and returns to  owners and crew 
according to  various sharing system prac 
ticed. Showed that for some gears (esp. 
small trawlers), owners and crew earn signi- 
ficantly more than their opportunity costs, 
while most non-trawl fishermen do not. 
Ownership pat- 
terns and sharing 
system 
Little concentration of ownership for 
non-trawl  gears,  highly concentrated 
for  trawlers.  Kinship important  for 
non-trawl  gears;  less  so  for trawlers. 
Diverse  sharing  systems determined 
by kinship and alternative income op 
portunities. 
Annual catch (1980-81) esti- 
mated to  be 19,000 t, including 
sergestid shrimp. From species 
composition by gear type, ex- 
tent of competition among 
gear types established. 
Role of women  Women  control  family finances and 
have important role in fishing invest- 
ment  decisions;  women  dominate 
marketing system. 
Total annual value of catch (198081) 
estimated to be approximately P53  million; 
total costs to be approximately P50  million 
(valuing fuel at its market price). Distribu- 
tion of value among competing gear types 
established. 
Horsepower in fisheries increased 
from1300 hp (1971) to 18,800 
hp  0980).  Fishermen's 
perceptions 
of resource 
Threequarters  believe average  catch 
declining:  113  blame  trawlers;  114' 
blame  increase  in  all  categories  of 
fishermen;  114  don't  know reason. 
Estimated using surplus yield 
models to have declined from 
8,900 t (1947) to 1.650 t (1980) 
indicating overexploitation. 
Fishing incomes  For non-trawl fishery, crewmen incomes 
range from f  164-218 monthly; P339-599 
monthly for trawler crewmen. Only small 
trawler owners earn enough to place them 
above poverty threshold. 
Marketing 
system 
Important  socioeconomic  role  of 
"suki"  system  of  favored  buyer. 
seller and mutual help implied.  22.8 tlkm2 including sergestid 
shrimp. Used  to  suggest that 
increased effort will not increase 
catch. 
Resource rents 
(pure profits) in 
the fishery 
Share of resource rents being earned by 
each major gear type was estimated. Con- 
centration of current resource rents in 
the hands of a small number of trawlers 
was demonstrated. Most of the small- 
scale non-trawl gears were earning little or 
no resource rents; therefore there was a 
very skewed distribution of benefits from 
the fishery. The government earned a 
major share of the rents through its tax 
on  fuel. Processorslfuel  suppliers earned 
a small share through oligopronyloligo- 





Forty-five  percent  of  respondents 
willing to mwe to different  munici- 
pality to take  up different  occupa- 
tion, 39% willing to  moveto different 
province.  willingness cuts  across  all 
groups  by age,  education  and  asset 
ownership, 88%  want their  children 
out of fishing. 
Available evidence suggests that 
the Bay is overfished in  the sense 
that an increase in effort by either 
the trawl or non-trawl fishery 
would not result in  increased catch 
but rather exacerbate the present 
allocation problems between the 
trawl and non-trawl fisheries. 
Migration  Significant  outmigration but insuffi- 
cient  to reduce  numbers  of fisher- 
men.  Females more likely to migrate 
out than males. 
Alternative 
occupations 
Prospects of full-time  local  alterna- 
tives very dim; some hope of supple- 
mentary  income through small-scale 
animal  husbandry  and  commercial; 
agriculture. 
Extent of over- 
fishing 
Increases in  effort will add to  costs, 
further dissipate remaining resource 
rents and reduce incomes for majority 
of fishermen. 
Performance  and 
economies of scale 
In  wholesale market 
No  significant economies of scale found 
for processors. In  target communities, a 
small number of processors control the 
bulk of the volume handled, and entry 




Short-term solution  requires re-allo- 
cation of benefits from fishery, long- 
term  solutions  must  be sought out- 
side fishery. 
Performance  and 
economies of scale 
in  retail market 
No  significant economies of scale or entry 
barriers in  fresh or dried fish marketing 
from target communities. Large number 
of middlewoman earn only slightly more 
per day than the fishermen from whom 
they buy. 3.  Present Management of San Miguel Bay Fisheries 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Calls to manage Philippine fisheries were first made almost 50 years ago,  but progress towards 
management has been slow. Umali (1932), for example, after discussing the activities of 70 Japanese 
trawlers throughout the Philippines stated: 
Depletion which may come about in the future as  the natural outcome of the continuous and unregulat- 
ed activity of beam trawlers may be prevented by the Government exercising complete control of this 
method of fishing, and guarding against overactivity in  order to insure and conserve the richness of our 
seas. 
By 1937, Umali reported the spread of these trawlers from Manila Bay to San Miguel Bay. His 
research (1937) was apparently conducted in response to petitions forwarded by fish corral owners 
to national authorities in opposition to  these Japanese-owned beam trawlers. He concluded: 
beam trawling operations in San Miguel Bay need to be regulated .  . .  such regulatory measures must 
be based on results of scientific investigation . .  . 
Umali went on to  comment on the need for "coordination of the different local regulations relating 
to  fisheries .  . .  to avoid conflicts between the commercial . . .  and municipal operators and among 
the local fishers themselves." 
The Second World War  intervened and Japanese  trawling in San  Miguel Bay was  curtailed. 
Trawling activity resumed again after the war on a limited scale. Warfel and Manacop (1950) were 
the next group of researchers to comment on the Bay, observing that 
This is  the only ground in the Philippines where trawling is regulated through the Philippine Bureau of 
Fisheries. It is closed to dragging from June 1  to October 31 each year, during which period fishing with 
other gear  is allowed. 
and 
Four or fhe trawlers probably could be maintained without endangering the resources. The closed 
season  now in effect, although unproven as  an effective conservation measure, seems to afford the 
beginning of a proper system of management. The conflict between native fishing gear  interests and 
power-operated  boats is minimized by the closed season. 
For the next thirty years until this present study, occasional exploratory fishing expeditions and 
biological studies were conducted in the Bay but no further advice was  offered regarding the need 
for management of the Bay's fisheries except for one recommendation of Legasto et  al. (1975) who, 
remarkably, advocated closing the whole Bay to  all types of fishing for a period of five years!  What 
the many thousands of fishermen of the Bay were to do in the interim was  not disclosed. 
CURRENT STATUS OF THE FISHERY 
The closed season for trawlers mentioned by Warfel and Manacop (1950) was  no longer in 
effect by 1980 and it  could not be determined whether it was ever enforced or how and when it 
lapsed. A mix of municipal  and BFAR regulations then prevailed; these appear to provide an unneces- 
sarily complex and cumbersome framework for the management of the Bay. Rather than rational 
management, by 1980 the Bay was characterized by essentially open-access conditions and appeared 
in danger of typifying Hardin's  (1968) "tragedy  of the commons,"  with overcapitalization and 
dissipation of all positive resource rents with increases in fishing costs. By the late 1970s, Simpson 
(1978) claimed that the Bay was overfished. Small and medium trawlers had rapidly expanded in 
both numbers and horsepower during the 1970s and a significant portion of the gill-net fleet had 
become motorized. By 1981, total horsepower in  the small-scale and targe-scale fleets was  18,800 hp. 
The resiliency of the stocks and the continued high prices of the penaeid shrimps that have 
come to be the most valuable component of the catch are two reasons continued exploitation at 
these high levels of effort remains possible. The level of resource rents found in 1980-81 (P3 million 
accruing to  fishermen, mostly trawlers; P2 million to  fuel suppliers and processors; and P5 million to the government in the form of fuel taxes) was  still positive, implying that equilibrium has not yet 
been reached. The rents accruing to fuel suppliers/processors and the government through fuel taxes 
inhibit further expansion in levels of effort of the small-scale non-trawl fleet. However, the rent 
earned by the small trawlers and the mini trawlers represents an opportunity for new entrants. 
The rationale for improved management of the Bay's  fisheries stems from the conclusions 
drawn by scientists working in  the three disciplines (stock assessment, economics, sociology) which 
are briefly summarized below. Relevant catch and effort statistics are shown in Table 13. 
Table 13. Summary of major catch and effort statistics1 of the San Miguel Bay fisheries, 1980-1981. 
Annual catch  19,000  t  including  4,800  t  of  sergestid  shrimp.  Total annual 
catch probably levelling off. 
Catch composition  Increased  proportion of  small  fastgrowing short-lived species. 
Trawlable biomass  1,650 t in 1980, down from 8,900 t in 1947. 
Total no. of fishing units  2,382:  of which 95 are small and medium trawlers; 188 are mini 
trawlers catching sergestid shrimp. 
Total no. of fishermen  5,600, increasing 2% annually. 
Total horsepower  18,800 hp up from 2,100 hp in 1971. 
Catch per unit effort  Declining. 
'~hese  results, which show  dramatic increases in effort and declining trawlable biomass, are consistent with a levelling off (not 
yet declining) catch. The continued high catch from the Bay is possibly due to the fact that the large slow-growing long-lived species 
have been replaced by small fast-growing short-lived species. 
The stock assessment work, using both total biomass and single-species based methods led to 
the conclusion that further increases of effort will not increase catches. If, as appears likely, effort 
increases in the form of additional largescale trawlers, there will be a further transfer of catch away 
from the small-scale non-trawl  fishery to the large-scale fishery. 
The economic analysis confirmed this competition between the small-scale and largescale 
fisheries. The two fisheries combined produced a catch worth approximately P53 million per annum 
(based on prices received by fishermen) and a resource rent for the fishermen of P3 million in 
198081. Unless entry is limited, expected additions to the large-scale fleet will probably com- 
pletely dissipate this rent in the next few years.  Moreover, the present resource rent earned by 
fishermen is distributed very unevenly, with the small and mini trawlers (263 fishing units) earning 
85%,  while the small-scale fishery (2,099 fishing units) earns the balance. Data on concentration 
of fishingasset ownership provided by the project sociologists confirmed the highly skewed distribu- 
tion of benefits from the fishery. 
The sociological analysis, particularly studies on the occupational and geographical mobility of 
the San Miguel Bay fishermen, added another dimension to these results by showing that employ- 
ment opportunities outside the fishing sector are rather poor and that there is a high rate of migra- 
tion out of fishing communities. This migration, however, is more than offset by population growth 
so  the absolute number of small-scale fishermen continues to increase. The Bay can be characterized 
as  having a growing number of fishermen but finite fish resources. 
Thus, biological, economic and sociologica! perspectives all gave the San Miguel Bay fishery the 
same  diagnosis: effective management is needed to contain fishing effort and address allocation 
Issues. JURISDICTION OVER SAN MIGUEL BAY FISHERIES 
The Bay is bordered by six municipalities in two different provinces. These are Mercedes in 
Camarines Norte and Sipocot, Cabusao,  Calabanga, Tinambac and Siruma in Camarines Sur (Fig. 1, 
p. 3). There are 46 fishing villages around the Bay. Inland from the Bay's western shoreline is the 
Bicol National Park which is under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, Ministry 
of Natural Resources. The Park does not border on the Bay. 
Municipal authority over waters to three nautical miles (5.5 km) offshore was  established by 
Commonwealth Act No. 4003 in 1932. Under Presidential Decree No. 704 (dated 1975) jurisdiction 
over the waters of San Miguel Bay is divided between the municipalities  and the Bureau of Fisheries 
and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). The relevant sections are shown below; important points have been 
highlighted. 
Sec.  3(p). Municipal waters -  include not only streams,  lakes and tidal waters included within the 
municipality, not being the subject of private ownership, and not comprised within national parks, 
public forests, timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between 
two lines drawn perpendicular to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the 
municipality touch the sea  at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and three 
nautical miles from such coastline. Where two municipalities are so  situated on the opposite shores that 
there is less than six nautical miles of marine waters between them, the third line shall be a line equi- 
distant from the opposite shores of the respective municipalities. Disputes regarding jurisdiction over 
freshwater lakes not included within the limits of a municipality of freshwater or tidal streams forming 
boundaries between municipalities, shall be referred by the councils of the municipalities  concerned to 
the provincial board. 
Sec.  4. Jurisdiction of the Bureau. -  The Bureau shall have jurisdiction and responsibility in the manage- 
ment, conservation, development,  protection, utilization and disposition of all fishery and aquatic 
resources of the country except municipal waters which shall be under the municipal or city government 
concerned: Provided, that fish pens and seaweed culture in municipal centers shall be under the jurisdic- 
tion of the Bureau: Provided, Further, that all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting 
fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary (now Minister) 
of Natural Resources for appropriate action and shall have full force and effect only upon his approval. 
The Bureau shall also have the authority to regulate and supervise the production, capture and gathering 
of fish and fisherylaquatic products. 
The Minister of Natural Resources (MNR) and provincial boards also have a role to play regard- 
ing approval of municipal ordinances and resolutions and arbitration of any disputes about munici- 
pal jurisdiction, respectively. 
The 3-nautical-mile  (5.5 km) boundary to  municipal waters results in the greater part of the 
Bay coming under municipal jurisdiction, albeit of six different municipalities, while the central 
4m  (approximately) of the Bay comes under the jurisdiction of the BFAR (Fig. 10). 
Municipalities  have authority to license all vessels that are 3 GT or under. According to PD 
704, Section 3(0); the exact definition is: 
Municipal and/orsmall-scale fishing -  Fishing utilizing fishing boats of three gross tons or less,  or using 
gear  not requiring the use of boats. 
All vessels over 3 GT, regardless of gear type, fall into the category of 'commercial fishing' and 
are licensed by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. The granting of fishing privileges by 
municipalities requires approval of the municipal ordinance by the Minister of Natural Resources 
(PD 704, Section 29) : 
Grant of Fishery Privileges. -  A municipal or city council conformably with an ordinance duly approved 
by the Secretary pursuant to Section 4 hereof, may: 
a)  grant to the highest qualified bidder the exclusive privilege of constructing and operating fish 
corrals, oyster culture beds, or of gathering "bangus"  fry, or the fry of other species,  in municipal 
waters for a period not exceeding five (5) years: Provided, that in the zoning and classification of 
municipal waters for purposes of awarding, through public bidding, areas for the construction or operation of fish corrals, oyster culture beds or the gathering of fry, the municipal or city coun- 
cil* shall set aside not more than one-fifth (115) of the area embarked for the gathering of fry, as 
may be designated by the Bureau, as  government "bangus"  fry reservation: Provided, Further, that 
no fish corral shall be constructed within two hundred (200) meters of another fish corral in marine 
fisheries, or one hundred (100) meters in fresh water fisheries,  unless they belong to the same 
licensee, but in no case  shall the distance be less than sixty (60) meters, except in waters less than 
two (2) meters deep at low tide, or unless previously approved by the Secretary 
authorize the issuance to qualified persons of license for the operation of fishing boats three (3) 
gross tons or less,  or for the privilege of fishing in municipal waters, with nets, traps or other fishing 
gears: Provided, that it shall be beyond the power of the municipal or city council to impose a 
license for the privilege of gathering marine molluscs or the shells thereof for pearling boats and 
pearl divers, or for prospecting, collecting or gathering sponges or other aquatic products, or for the 
culture of fisherylaquatic products: Provided, Further, that a licensee under this paragraph shall not 
operate within two hundred (200) meters of any fish corral licensed by the municipality, except 
when the licensee is the owner or operator of the fish corral but in no case  within sixty (60) meters 
of said corral. The municipality or city council shall furnish the Bureau, for statistical purposes, 
such information and data on fishery matters, as  are reflected in such forms. 
In addition to the above restrictions  on the placement of fish corrals, which in San Miguel Bay 
are to some extent regulated/licensed by  amonojadors (Supanga and Smith l982), two other areas 
of regulation that are important background for a discussion of fisheries management options for 
the Bay are (1) those pertaining to depth zones and (2) those regulating the use of trawlers. These 
two  sets of regulationsare interrelated, especially as  they affect the operation of the so-called "baby" 
trawlers (renamed small and  medium trawlers in reports of this project). The San  Miguel Bay 
example, however, points out several discrepancies in these regulations that apparently leave un- 
answered questions concerning operation of trawlers. 
First of all, Presidential Decree 1015, Section 2 amended Section 35 of PD 704 to read as 
follows: 
Sec.  35. Trawl fishing in waters seven  (7) fathoms deep or less. -  Subject to the provisions of Section 17 
hereof,  no person shall operate trawls in water seven (7) fathoms deep or less;  Provided, that baby trawls 
using fishing boats of three (3)  gross tons or less  may operate in areas four (4) fathoms deep or more if 
authorized by existing municipal ordinances duly approved  by the Secretary now Minister. Provided, 
Further, that the President of the Philippines may,  upon the recommendation of the Secretary now 
Minister ban the operation of trawls in waters within a distance of seven  (7) kilometers (3.78  nautical 
miles) from the shoreline if public interest so  requires. 
Various petitions regarding illegal operations of commercial trawlers in San  Miguel Bay have 
been sent by municipal fishermen to national authorities since the early 1970s. The most recent 
was sent in late 1981. Subsequent to this most recent petition, commercial fishing (vessels > 3 GT) 
was banned for five years from San Miguel Bay by Fisheries Administrative Order (FAO) No. 136 
effective March 1982 (see Appendix A). In September 1982, the President issued Letter of Instruc- 
tion (L01) 1269 banning commercial trawling and purse seining from waters within 7 km of the 
coast of all Bicol provinces (see Fig. 10). This ban was  later extended by the May 1983 proclama- 
tion of President Marcos which banned indefinitely all commercial trawl and purse seine fishing 
from waters within 7 km of the coastline of the entire Philippine archipelago. As  of December 
1983, the national parliament had not taken the necessary action to approve this proclamation. 
In any case,  fishing by large and medium trawlers is now effectively banned from the San Miguel 
Bay and its immediate environs. FA0  No. 136 also defined the waters of San Miguel Bay as  those 
south of a line drawn from Culasi Point in  the west to Siruma Island in the east. 
FA0  No. 136 and the more recent Presidential proclamation, however, do not affect small and 
mini trawls. In accordance with PD 704 Sec. 35 (as amended and as  cited above) municipalities may permit trawling by vessels less than 3 GT between the 4-fm and 7-fm marks. Such permission must 
be granted by municipal ordinance approved by the Minister of Natural Resources; if no ordinance 
is passed these trawlers must stay beyond the 7-fm mark. 
There are two factors here, however, that complicate interpretation  of this municipal authority. 
The available nautical charts for San Miguel Bay were last updated in 1976, but the soundings data 
for the Bay proper on these charts are the same as  those on the 1907 edition of the nautical charts. 
The updated charts are thus clearly inaccurate, because since 1907 silt from the Bicol River and 
other smaller streams that empty into the Bay has been deposited at the rate of approximately 
2.5  cm/year (Mines et al. 1  982). In  the 75 years since the Bay's depths were last measured, about 2 m 
of silt has accumulated on the bottom. Consequently, the 4-fm and 7-fm lines as  shown on the avail- 
able charts no longer apply. The new lines should be drawn at approximately 1-fm  deeper depths on 
the old chart instead (Fig. 10). The portion of the Bay deeper than 4 fm has been reduced from 
60% of the surface to 45% and the area deeper than 7 fm from 20% to 15% (Fig. 11  1. The areas in 
which small trawlers can legally operate has thus been much reduced, the exact area depending 
upon the status of municipal ordinances regarding trawling in the 4 to 7-fm depths. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the shallowness of the Bay  in some 
areas puts both the 4-fm and 7-fm depths beyond municipal waters and within waters under the 
jurisdiction of BFAR (Fig. 12). According to  the letter of the law, BFAR has no authority to allow 
trawling in waters  less than 7 fm. Consequently, it is this study's  interpretation of the existing 
regulations  that trawling of all kinds is totally banned from the municipal waters of Sipocot, Cabusao, 
Calabanga and Tinambac, but is permissible in the waters of Siruma and Mercedes beyond 7 fm. 
Fig.  10. Left:  San Miguel Bay  showing bottom features and major towns. Municipal waters are shaded. Central portion of the Bey is 
under jurisdiction of national fisheries authorities. Right:  Delineation of  areas  where trawling is  permitted is complicated by the 
gradual shallowing of the Bay which puts most of the trawling grounds outside the municipal waters. Depth (m)  Depth (f)  .  .. 
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Fig.  11. Schematic representation of the surface area of San Miguel Bay legally accessible to  trawlers below  3 GT  (small trawlers) and above 3 GT  (medium  and large trawl- 
ers).  Note impact of siltation which reduces the area legally accessible to  trawlers of all kinds.  The 4-fm limit only applies if the respective municipality has passed the 
appropriate ordinance. See p. 34. As cited earlier, municipalities must pass ordinances to license fishing vessels  (PD 704 Sec.  29) 
and to permit trawling by vessels < 3 GT in waters between the 4 and 7-fm depths (PD 704 Sec. 35 
as  amended by PD  1015, Sec.  2). In both cases,  before becoming law, the ordinances must be 
approved by the Minister of Natural Resources. 
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Fig. 12. Depth contours in relation to distance from the shoreline for San Miguel Bay municipalities,  based upon 1907 soundings 
updated to account for siltation. 
Director Felix Gonzales of BFAR has kindly provided details on the current status of munici- 
pal ordinances from the six San Miguel Bay municipalities (pers. comm.,  23 February 1983). This 
information is summarized in Table 14. It can be seen that only Calabanga and Tinambac munici- 
palities have passed the necessary ordinances to permit trawling in their municipal waters between 4 
and 7 fm. However, since the 4-fm mark in the vicinity of these two municipalities is now beyond 
their municipal boundary, these two ordinances have lost their meaning. Even the 1907 4-fm line is 
beyond the municipal waters of Calabanga though Tinambac would have a small area of its  waters 
deeper than 4 fm based on the outdated charts. Neither of the two municipalities (Mercedes and 
Siruma) with 4-fm to 7-fm depths in their municipal waters have passed the necessary ordinances to 
permit trawling there. 
Consequently, under the current mix of national legislation and municipal ordinances prevailing 
in San Miguel Bay, trawling by vessels smaller than 3 GT can be conducted legally only in waters 
deeper than 7 fm. This conclusion is highly significant because it means that contrary to their 
current areas of operationsmall trawlers must confine their operations to  the middle deeper portions 
representing only 15% of the total surface area of the Bay (see Figs. 10 and 11  ). According to the 
letter of the law, mini trawlers are also restricted  to these waters deeper than 7 fm, depths where 
successful operation would be impossible. Table 14. Summary of municipal ordinances1 and water depth information by municipality in  San Miguel Bay (1982). 
Fishery ordinance 
Trawl gears are  has been passed 
specifically  permitting 
4-fm boundary  7-fm boundary  Basic fishery  included in  trawling 
is within  is within  ordinance has  basic fishery  in the 4-7 fm 
Municipality  municipal waters2  municipal waters2  been passed  ordinance  depths 
Mercedes, Camarines Norte  yes  yes  yes  yes  no 
(P50 annual license fee) 
Sipocot, Camarines Sur  no  no  no  -  no 
Cabusao, Camarines Sur  no  no  yes  no  no 
Calabanga, Camarines Sur  no 
Tinambac, Camarines Sur  no 
no  yes  yes  yes 
(P45 annual license fee) 
no  yes  yes  yes 
(P45 annual license fee) 
Siruma, Camarines Sur  Yes  yes  yes  no  no 
'Based  on information received 23 February 1983 from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (Director F. Gonzales, 
pers. comm.). 
2~ased  on estimates of depth from Mines et al.  (1982) which reduce by approximately 1 fm the depths indicated in the 1907 
Coast and Geodetic Survey chart of San Miguel Bay (see Fig. 10, p. 32). 
The above review of existing legislation and ordinances indicates their inadequacy to deal with 
the special circumstances of shallow bays and estuaries such as San  Miguel Bay. Not only are small- 
scale specialty gears such as mini trawlers legally banned from the only areas where their fishing 
methods can be applied, but also small trawlers are legally unable to operate within the waters of 
the very municipalities  that must license them. If nothing  else, these points imply that the present 
'municipal' and 'commercial'  distinctions are inadequate to deal with the case of trawlers less than 
3 GT. 
These legal distinctions aside, it remains true that mini, small and medium trawlers operated 
throughout the Bay during 1980 and  1981. Small and  medium trawlers were observed trawling 
within 0.5  km of the shore, especially in the shallow waters of Cabusao, Calabanga and Tinambac 
where shrimp are found in large quantities. PD 704 authorizes personnel of the Bureau of Fisheries 
and Aquatic Resources, the Coast Guard, the Philippine Constabulary and municipal officials to 
enforce fishery regulations. Letter of Instruction No. 550 (dated 6 June  1977) also deputizes 
barangpy  (village-level) officials  as fish wardens. However, none of these personnel and officials has 
an adequately functioning vessel to patrol the Bay. 
The March 1982 ban on commercial fishing using vessels > 3 GT within the Bay was enforced 
at its outset by medium trawlers commissioned by the Regional Office of BFAR. However, this 
enforcement of the ban was short-lived. It is easy of course to say  that if only existing legislation 
were enforced, the problems of competition and conflict between small-scale and trawl gears could 
be avoided. Certainly, confinement of small trawlers to  that 15% area of the Bay where they can 
legally operate would do much to shift the distribution of catch and incomes from the largescale 
trawl fishery in favor of the non-trawl fishery. This problem (and potential solution) is also present 
in other fishing grounds of the country, such as  Manila Bay  (Mariano 1981  ). 4.  Management Options 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the attempts to regulate the operation of certain gear types in San Miguel Bay as  des- 
cribed earlier, lack of enforcement has led to a laissez-faire approach to management of the Bay's 
fisheries. 
The fisheries literature abounds with theoretical and empirical arguments against laissez-faire 
approaches to open-access fisheries because the social costs of wasting resources (or dissipating re- 
source rents) are so  high. The major theoretical works include those with biological perspectives 
(Baranov 1925; Graham 1935; Schaefer 1954; Beverton and Holt 1956; Gulland 1974) and economic 
perspectives (Gordon 1954; Scott 1955; Christy and Scott 1965; Anderson 1977). Anthropologists 
and sociologists are also contributors to fisheries management perspectives but have focused almost 
exclusively upon empirical studies (e.g.,  Firth 1966; Alexander 1982). Other more recent works 
from the above disciplines are too numerous to cite in full here, but the interested reader can refer 
to Smith (1979), Pauly (1979a), Emmerson (1980) and Panayotou (1982) for Southeast Asian 
examples and experiences, useful summaries and bibliographies. Because of the tendency worldwide 
for fisheries to become overexploited, establishing use rights or restrictions  of some form to  control 
levels of effective fishing effort is now an accepted prerequisite for the management of any fishery. 
The rationale for restricting fishing effort varies depending upon the underlying management 
objective chosen. The three most commonly cited objectives include: 
to increase the annual sustainable yield from the fishery; 
to increase the annual resource rents derived from the fishery; 
to increase employment or more equitably distribute incomes derived from the fishery. 
These objectives are,  respectively, biological, economic and socioeconomic in nature and each 
would be associated with a different level of effective fishing effort. 
Notice that the terms "increase"  and "more  equitably" are used rather than the term "opti- 
mize".  This choice of terminology implies an interest in determining the direction and type of 
change in fishing effort rather than in determining precisely the 'optimal level' of fishing effort. 
Pinpointing the optimal level of fishing effort would depend not only upon the chosen management 
objective but also would require a scientific database of a time-series nature that is simply not avail- 
able for San Miguel Bay or most other Southeast Asian fisheries. 
For the sake of exposition, however, the economic (or efficiency) rationale for management 
can be pursued. The exact magnitude of the sustainable resource rents that can be derived  from any 
fishery as a result of reductions in effective fishing effort depends,  among other factors, upon: 
the shape of the sustainable yield (or total revenue) curve (e.g.,  parabolic, logarithmic and 
skewed to the right, or flat-topped-see  Fig. 4,  p. 11); 
future shifts in species composition (resulting from changes in levels of effort) that result 
in changes in total revenue; 
the shape of the total costs curve; 
future shifts in  total costs (e.g.,  fuel price increases); 
future shifts in demand and relative prices of the species that make up the catch and which 
result in changes in total revenue; and 
the degree to  which effective fishing effort is actually controlled or limited. 
There are highly sophisticated mathematical dynamic models available which can be used to 
simulate alternative outcomes due to changes in these and other bioeconomic variables. However, 
the assumptions that would have to be made in order to use these models with the limited data cur- 
rently available for San Miguel Bay suggest that this approach would not be fruitful. Consequently, 
the following evaluation of management options for San Miguel Bay fisheries must necessarily be 
primarily qualitative in nature. It is perhaps helpful to  clarify what is known and what is not known about these bioeconomic 
aspects of the San Miguel Bay fisheries before proceeding to  an in-depth  analysis of management 
options. With cost and revenue data available for a 12-month  period in 1980-81, it was estimated 
that the total value of the catch based on ex-vessel prices was P53 million"; that total costs (includ- 
ing fuel taxes) were P50 million (leaving P3 million of resource rents accruing to the Bay's fishing 
units); that the government earned a P5 million share of the resource rent through its  tax on fuel; 
and that fuel suppliers/processors reduced the value of the catch to fishermen through their oligopoly1 
oligopsony power and earned approximately P2 million resource rent. Total resource rent from the 
fishery thus was approximately PI0  million, or nearly 20% of the annual value of the fishery. The 
relative magnitudes of these estimates are more important than their exact values. It is worth noting 
in this context that the P53 million value of the fishery in 1980-81 may have been above, below or 
on the sustainable total revenue curve. Only time series data could resolve whether current revenue 
and resource rents are sustainable. Fig. 13 depicts these estimates in a relative way which serves as a 
useful framework for discussion. 
The exact shapes of the costs and revenue curves are not known, although results of the 
present study suggest that the yield curve (on which the revenue curve would be based) most likely 
levels off at the high levels of effort that presently are applied in San Miguel Bay. The underlying 
yield curve of this multispecies fishery is thus assumed to differ from the traditional single-species 
Schaefer sustainable yield curve which is parabolic in shape  (see  Larkin 1982 for an extended 
discussion). Changes in species composition as effort changes therefore may produce a total revenue 
curve that is also flat-topped. In  other words, increases in effective effort will not generate a notice- 
able increase in annual catch or revenues but would reduce resource rents, while reductions in effort 
*Not included in the above annual catch value estimate is the value of that portion of the catch taken home by the crew for 
their family's consumption. Based on number of fishermen (=5,000),  average number of days fished per year (250 days), average 
volume of daily take-home catch (0.7 kg) valued at P2.87/kg,  the total annual value of this home consumed catch would be 
approximately P2.5  million. See Stevenson et al. (1982) for rationale for making these computations earlier in a study than done 
here. 
EFFECTIVE EFFORT 
Fig.  13. Relationships between effective effort and total costs and revenues in the multispecies fishery of San 
Miguel Bay.  At level of effort E,  AB equals  resource  rents accruing to fishermen; BC equals resource rents 
accruing to the tax authority;  CE equals total of all direct and  imputed (opportunity) costs of all inputs 
(less taxes); AE equals the total revenue based on prices received by fishermen (including in-kind home con- 
sumption and adjusted for oligopoly/oligopsony profits of input suppliers and middlemen). would produce a slight reduction in annual catch and revenues, but would substantially increase 
resource rents. If it is assumed that total costs decline with reductions in effort, then at some 
unspecified but reduced level of effort, these resource rents will be maximized. 
The presence of positive resource rents as  in the case of San Miguel Bay could lead to the 
interpretation  that at current levels of fishing effort, resource rents are already at their highest level. 
Accepting this conclusion would imply that present levels of catch and total revenues would in- 
crease with increasing fishing effort (though the increased costs associated with increased effort 
would thus reduce resource rents); conversely, a reduction in effort would reduce not only catch and 
total revenues, but also resource rents. The already extremely high levels of catch per unit area for 
the Bay suggest,  however, that the fishery is now operating somewhere in the upper right hand 
section of Fig. 13 where reductions in effort would yield increased resource rents. 
These increased resource rents represent potential savings that are currently being 'wasted'  due 
to  excessive levels of effort and costs (i.e.,  inefficiency) in the fishery. If 'saved'  they could be in- 
vested to produce other goods in the economy and total production of 'all goods'  would increase. 
The potential benefits from management in the form of reduced costs which lead to increased 
resource rents can be substantial. Van Cleve (1978), for example, believes that at least 5 million 
tonnes of fish are lost annually worldwide due to overfishing which produces yields less than those 
which are sustainable under optimum conditions. Gulland (1  982) estimates that US$500 million are 
wasted annually in the North Sea  alone through lack of control over fishing effort. Other more 
specialized studies of lobster fisheries in Australia (Meany 1979), Canada  (Henderson and Tugwell 
1979) and the United States (Bell  and Fullenbaum 1973; Fullenbaum and Bell 1974) have concluded 
that maximum annual resource rents may be as  high as  25% of the current annual total value of 
these fisheries. These authorsand Nahan (1982) who studied Malaysian West Coast fisheries, showed 
that optimum levels of fishing effort (those levels which produce maximum resource rents) would 
be anywhere between onequarter and two-thirds of those levels of effort which prevail at open- 
access equilibrium. 
The above scenario and comparison with results elsewhere is the essence in simple terms of the 
bioeconomic argument for managing, or controlling levels of effort in the San Miguel Bay fisheries. 
Precise determination of the optimum fleet size or level of effort is difficult under even the most 
favorable circumstances due to the dynamic nature of multispecies fisheries. Nevertheless, even 
when limited historical data on costs and revenues are available, the direction of desirable change 
can still be identified. Even this first step is a significant advance. 
Other considerations, such as  employment and income distribution, modify this bioeconomic 
perspective to the extent that they depart from the efficiency criteria of increasing resource rents 
(Panayotou 1982). Increasing  employment in the fishery, for example, will entail increases in fishing 
effort rather than the reductions  in effort which would increase resource rents. Changing the distribu- 
tion of income derived from the fishery may entail incentives or disincentives for certain types of 
vessels or gear which may increase costs and hence reduce resource rents. 
Multigear fisheries such as  San Miguel Bay present particular problems in analysis and setting 
of management objectives because it is not possible to assume,  as do most theoretical single-species 
bioeconomic models, that all fishing units in the fishery have uniform costs. The data assembled for 
the San  Miguel Bay fishery indicate markedly different costs between gill-netters and trawlers, 
for example, and varying degrees of efficiency and financial profitability. Because costs (and govern- 
ment taxes) are not distributed evenly among all fishing units in the Bay, and catch rates and prices 
also vary,  resource rents (and therefore incomes) are also distributed unevenly. 
This diversity among the small-scale and large-scale fisheries of San Miguel Bay does not mean, 
however, that the basic conceptual framework as  depicted in Fig. 13 does not apply. Rather, the 
underlying relationships among catch, catch value, effort, costs and resource rents are valid and help 
establish in which direction levels of fishing effort should move. The realities of tropical fisheries management are such that managers need advice now, even 
based on limited informatian, rather than later at the leisure of research scientists who would 
undoubtedly prefer a more perfect world and certainly more complete knowledge. Some interventions 
appear to be necessary in San Miguel Bay to rectify a deteriorating biological, economic and social 
environment for the majority of the Bay's fishermen. It is in  the spirit of trying to clarify fisheries 
management options despite our admittedly incomplete knowledge that the remaining sections of 
this chapter are written. 
ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES 
AND INTERVENTIONS 
The intervention(sj  chosen for a given fishery should depend upon the conditions of that fish- 
ery and the management objectives selected. There has been a tendency in Philippine fisheries 
circles (and elsewhere in the world) to think in terms of better boats and gear,  credit schemes,  input 
subsidies and community cooperatives or associations as the most appropriate forms of intervention 
by which small-scale fishermen can be assisted. These types of interventions have been characterized 
by Smith (1980) and Smith et al. (1980) as 'development' oriented in  contrast to 'managementr 
oriented. Development oriented approaches are those that directly or indirectly lead to increases in 
effective fishing effort; management, in contrast, places limits on levels of effective fishing effort. 
The potential impact of the traditional development approaches to small-scale fisheries are more 
fully explored in Smith (1979) and Panayotou (1982).  Given that in San  Miguel Bay further expan- 
sion of fishing effort will merely dissipate the remaining resource rents that accrue to fishermen and 
hence not increase incomes, these traditional development approaches will not be further discussed 
in this report except as they relate to interventions in the marketing sector, where they only in- 
directly affect the harvesting activity and the levels of effort applied. 
The complexity surrounding the choice of management objectives and alternative interventions 
suggests the best means of clarifying them would be to limit the discussion to the major points only. 
The interested reader can refer to Pauly and Murphy (1982) and Gulland (1974) for extensive con- 
sideration of biological perspectives on management and Anderson (1977) and Panayotou (1982) 
for economic perspectives. The following discussion focuses upon the practical application of these 
theoretical perspectives to the special conditions of San Miguel Bay. 
Management objectives 
There are obviously numerous management objectives that can be considered for San Miguel 
Bay fisheries depending upon how broadly one defines management. Not only can the objectives 
considered include  the production or harvesting sector but also input supply, processing and market- 
ing. A comprehensive plan that includes not only vertical relationships within the fisheries sector 
but also horizontal linkages with other sectors in the rural and urban economy of Bicol could also 
be developed. 
Fisheries biologists and economists often think of fisheries management in rather narrow terms 
related only to the harvest sector. While this report focuses primarily on management of the harvest- 
ing sector of the fishery, certain broader issues related to input and marketing sectors and the rural 
economy of which the San  Miguel Bay fisheries are also considered. This broader focus is necessary, 
as  will be shown, to provide a longer-term perspective of the potential for management of the 
fisheries in the context of technological advancement, steady  population growth, and economic 
conditions prevailing in the Bicol region. 
With this broader context in mind, alternative management objectives for San  Miguel Bay 
fisheries and fishing communities can be grouped into three major categories: 
(a)  Those related specifically to the harvesting sector of the fishery. For example, 
to increase the sustainable yield from the fishery; to increase the economic efficiency of the fishery; 
to increase employment in fishing; 
to provide more equitable distribution of income between labor and owners of capital 
or among gear types; 
to raise incomes of fishermen above the poverty threshold; 
to reduce environmental degradation in the Bay; 
to reduce conflict between the small-scale and large-scale sectors of the fishery; 
to increase government revenues from the fishery; 
to provide conditions conducive for innovation among fishermen in order to maintain 
efficiency and income levels; 
to increase production of exportable species to earn foreign exchange. 
(b)  Those related to linkages between the harvesting sector and other sectors, such as inputs 
and marketing. For example, 
to improve the technical and economic efficiency of the input supply, processing and 
marketing sectors; 
to increase opportunities for village employment in the input supply, processing and 
marketing sectors. 
(ci  Those related to the Bicol regional economy. For example, 
to maintain social and political stability in the fishing communities surrounding San 
Miguel Bay; 
to provide sufficiently attractive alternative income sources in the area of San Miguel 
Bay so  as to reduce dependence upon fishing. 
Given the prevailing conditions in  the San Miguel Bay fisheries, achieving most of the objectives 
listed in the first category above will require some reallocation if not reduction in levels of effective 
fishing effort. This is because the current high levels of effort in both the small-scale and large-scale 
sectors have produced economic overfishing and skewed distribution of benefits from the fishery. 
The first group of objectives also includes items that are mutually exclusive. For example, 
given the likely flat-topped shape of the yield curve, it is not possible to increase the sustainable 
yield from the fishery and at  the same time increase its economic efficiency. The former is achieved 
at current levels of effort while the latter would require reduced effort to increase the difference 
between revenues and costs. These types of incompatibilities in objectives commonly show up in 
national fisheries development plans that seek to be "all  things to  all people" by simultaneously 
calling for maximum output and employment for producers, maximum nutrition at minimum prices 
to consumers and maximum foreign exchange earnings for the government (Lawson 1978). For 
example, the Philippine fisheries plan has been described by Samson (1982): 
The primary objective of the government for fisheries development is the maintenance of self-sufficiency 
in fish supply. The underlying reasons for this concern are the traditional reliance on fish as  food and 
fishing as  a countryside activity. The government has a declared commitment to the rational exploitation 
of the country's fishery resources, improved handling and distribution, uplifting the livelihood of rural 
fishing families and the generation of foreign exchange through exports. (emphases added) 
Certainly in the case of fisheries such as  San Miguel Bay where the biological limits to expansion 
have been reached, management will necessitate choosing a set from among all possible objectives, 
or at  the very least ranking them according to priority. This is especially true of those objectives 
related to managing the production or harvesting sector. 
The second category of management objectives above  includes those that do not require 
reductions in effective fishing effort per se,  but which cannot be overlooked if one takes a com- 
prehensive view of the fisheries. Some of the objectives listed in the third category can be more 
easily achieved if agreement is reached on those in the first category, Achieving social and political 
stability in the area,  for example, may be assisted by agreement on management objectives related 
to allocation of use rights and benefits of the fisheries. Of course there are other means to assure peace and order such as  the use of force but this approach adds to the "costs"  of fisheries manage- 
ment, and may be a more expensive approach than taking steps to reduce the potential for com- 
petition and conflict between the small-scale and large-scale fisheries. 
As  researchers, the authors of this report are  not themselves recommending any specific 
management approach. The selection of specific management objectives should come from those 
institutions and fishing communities that have the legal mandate to manage the Bay's  fisheries. 
Given the alternative objectives presented above for the consideration of these  institutions and 
communities, the discussion in this report explores the various means by which these alternative 
objectives can be achieved and the trade-offs in qualitative terms among the different interventions. 
Management interventions 
Before discussing alternative interventions, it is worth recalling that the current status of the 
fisheries of San Miguel Bay is the result of past and current interventions. The major interventions 
included credit for municipal fishermen (little of which was  repaid), attempts to demarcate areas for 
trawl fishing, assignment of fishing rights for placement of certain fixed gears  by amonojadors, 
differential government taxes on diesel fuel and gasoline (higher on gasoline than on diesel), and 
construction of all-weather roads to communities at  the southern base and northwest opening of the 
Bay. 
For each management objective listed in the preceding section, the alternative interventions 
that might be considered to achieve that objective are presented in Table 15. Some of the listed 
objectives can be achieved by maintaining the status quo and thus may not require specific interven- 
tions other than those already existing. Others simply may require enforcement of existing regula- 
tions. 
Table 15. Alternative management objectives for San  Miguel Bay and alternative interventions needed (if any) to address each objec- 
tive. 
Alternative objectives  Alternative interventions 
A.  Objectives related to harvest sector 
lncrease sustainable yield  Maximum  yield  probably  achieved  under  current  conditions,  but 
stabilization of effort or control over  size  at  first  capture  (e.g.,  in- 
crease  minimum mesh  size)  required to avoid long-term decline  in 
trawlable biomass and further changes in species composition. 
Increase economic efficiency (i.e.,  resource  Encourage  innovation  and  progressiveness  to reduce fishing costs. 
rents)  Substantial reduction in effort and costs required; numerous specific 
interventions can be considered (e.g.,  quotas, licenses, taxes, selective 
price controls, area  or seasonal closures). Decision also  needed as  to 
which gear  types should be regulated and whether to leave increased 
rents in the fishery  or  to extract for  use by institutions other than 
fishermen. 
lncrease employment in fishing 
Provide conditions  conducive to more 
equitable distribution of income 
(a) between labor (crewmen) and 
capital (owners); and 
Restrict capital-intensive  gear  types;  maintain  most  of the current 
large-mesh nets of the small-scale fishery  and  increase some  others; 
allow  continued  unrestricted  entry  of  small-scale  fishermen;  con- 
tinue  subsidized  credit  for  small-scale  labor  intensive gear  types. 
(a)  No  intervention  in  current  sharing  arrangements  necessary  as 
present  systems  appear  responsive  to  respective opportunity  costs; 
labor share  can  be  increased by  increasing labor opportunity  costs; 
encourage  owneraperator  fishing  and  discourage  multiple  owner- 
ship to make more crewmen become owners. 
Continued Table 15 continued 
Alternative objectives  Alternative interventions 
(b) among competing gear types 
Reduce conflicts between the largescale 
and small-scale sectors 
Raise incomes of fishing households above 
the poverty threshold 
Reduce environmental impact of 
activities in  and near the Bay 
lncrease government revenues from the 
fishery 
lncrease production of exportable 
species to earn foreign exchange 
B.  Objectives related to fisheries inputs and 
marketing sectors 
Improve technical and economic efficiency 
of input supply, processing and market- 
ing sectors 
lncrease opportunities for village employ- 
ment in the input supply, processing 
and marketing sectors 
C.  Objectives related to  the regional economy 
Provide sufficiently attractive  alternative 
income sources. . .  so  as  to reduce 
dependence upon fishing 
Maintain social and political stability 
in the fishing communities 
surrounding San Miguel Bay 
(b) Restrict  certain gear  types,  especially  small trawlers;  introduce 
parity in taxes on inputs, especially gasoline and diesel fuel. 
Enforce existing legislation;  redefine 'municipal'  fisheries to exclude 
small trawlers, then limit small-trawler numbers or areas of operation 
or ban them; establish trawling barriers in areas off limits to trawlers. 
Given prevailing low incomes throughout Bicol,  long-term increases 
in fishing household incomes possible only through combination of 
(a) limited entry that excludes some fishermen thus benefitting those 
that  remain,  (b) alternative/supplementary income generation;  short- 
term increases possible by subsidizing inputs or reducing taxes there- 
on (e.g.,  gasoline tax) used by small-scale fishermen; and (c) education 
programs that increase skills and mobility of fishing families. 
Siltation  inflows due  to upland agriculture activities, while causing 
gradual shallowing and  reduction in Bay's  area,  also bring nutrients 
of probable benefit to the fishery;  halt conversion of mangroves to 
alternative uses  (e.g.,  fishponds). 
lncrease municipal license fees,  taxes on inputs, catch and/or incomes 
so  as  to extract increased  resource  rent in favor of the government 
(municipal, provincial, regional or national). 
No major intervention necessary;  present conditions (e.g.,  siltation, 
fishing out of predators and trawling) are  favorable to shrimp pro- 
duction.  Increasing mesh  size  may  increase average  size  of shrimps 
caught but would not necessarily increase total catch or catch value. 
Encourage use  of standard  weights  and measures;  increase flow of 
price  information  from  local  markets  to  beach  landings  through 
channels  other than those controlled by middlemen;  improve land- 
ing  and  auction  facilities,  encourage  better product handling and 
processing techniques;  improve  fuel  supply  and  market  roads  to 
more remote communities. 
Decentralize  and  increase  number  of  processing  establishments; 
provide  credit  to  small-scale  processing  entrepreneurs;  encourage 
community organizations to undertake group processing and market- 
ing and  organize  the appropriate group ke.,  women,  not men) to 
undertake these activities. 
General economic development and diversification  in  the Bicol Region 
to increase the presently  low opportunity costs of fishing labor and 
capital;  land reform for rice and non-rice land;  investment incentives 
to decentralize Manila-based development;  strengthening of local and 
regional  institutions and  delegation  of authority to them.  Specific 
activities  for  fishing  communities  may  include  small-scale  agro- 
industry such as  pig farming. 
Generate  local  employment  opportunities  to  reduce  rural-urban 
migration; restrict certain efficient capital-intensive  gear types viewed 
by the majority of fishermen asdetrimental to  their interests; strength- 
en military presence to keep "peace  and order"  or establish manage- 
ment  institutions  that  permit  fishermen  involvement  in decision- 
making regarding resource use and allocation. Several objectives share appropriate interventions in common which allows them to be grouped 
for more indepth evaluation and discussion. This grouping also draws attention to the fact that 
achieving one objective or another is often a matter of the degree to which the intervention in 
question is applied. For example, given the likely shape of the yield curve, maintaining sustainable 
yield from the fishery requires only that effective effort be prevented from expanding beyond 
current levels. Increasing economic efficiency requires a reduction in levels of effective effort. 
Significantly reducing areas of conflict between large-scale and small-scale fisheries may require 
even total elimination of one or the other sector. The degree of application of any particular inter- 
vention will thus depend upon the management objective or combination of objectives that are 
chosen by those with management authority. 
Due to the restricted database, any evaluation of alternative management interventions must 
necessarily be qualitative in nature. Similar predictions based on theoretical models were used by 
Smith (1979) and Panayotou (1982).  The latter's presentation of impacts of alternative interventions 
was a particularly useful base from which a matrix for San  Miguel Bay was  developed (Table 16). 
This matrix is indicative of the likely direction of change only. The following evaluation includes 
two major elements: (1  ) likely impact of management interventions on selected biological, economic 
and sociological parametersof theSan Miguel Bay fishery; and (2) ability of the intervention to meet 
certain implementation  criteria. The reference points for this evaluation are the results presented in 
Chapter 2 of this report and the relationships among yields, revenues, resource rents and fishing 
effort as depicted for the San Miguel Bay in Fig. 13, p, 37. 
DISCUSSION OF INTERVENTION MECHANISMS 
General issues 
Interventions in the San Miguel Bay fisheries have impact not only upon the fish stocks (catch, 
sustainable yields, catch composition) and the fisheries (various gear types) but also upon fishing 
communities, the marketing system and  institutions that presently share the costs,  benefits or 
resource rents from the fisheries. Impacts make themselves felt in the short term and/or the long 
term. For example, impacts on tropical multispecies fish stocks due to effort reductions are felt in a 
short period due to the nature of these stocks which rebound quickly (Saeger 1981  ). In contrast, a 
decline in profitability for a certain gear type will take some time to translate into reduced fishing 
effort because fishermen will probably continue to fish as long as they cover their variable costs 
even though their fixed costs are not covered by their returns. Only when it comes time to replace 
vessels,  engines or gear will some fishermen leave the fishery thus producing an overall reduction in 
effort. 
Most management interventions needed in fisheries as in San Miguel Bay represent means of 
directly or indirectly reducing levels of effort in either the large-scale fishery, the small-scale fishery 
or both. Limitations on effort in the largescale fishery will reduce that sector's share of the catch to 
the probable benefit of the small-scale sector, at least in the short term. In the very long term, 
increases in population (number of fishermen) and technological growth in the small-scale fisheries 
will eventually dissipate the temporary resource rents that would prevail with the reduced large-scale 
fishing effort. Indeed the existence of resource rents will likely attract new entrants at  a rate higher 
than the population growth rate, other employment options remaining unchanged, after which 
small-scale fishermen would again be earning approximately their opportunity costs as  they are 
now. Given the low levels of income that can presently be derived from alternative activities available 
to small-scale fishermen of San Miguel Bay (opportunity wage = P10-15 depending upon location) it 
isassumed in  theanalysis in Table 16 and the following discussion that it is not socially or politically 
feasible or desirable to limit entry or levels of effort in the small-scale fishery in any way. Conse- 
quently, the disincentives shown, with the exception of limiting ownership to single vessels,  focus Table 16.  Interventions mechanisms to limit access  and/or effective effort in San Miguel Bay and their likely impact in qualitative terms 
in the short-term  (ST) andlor long-term  (LT) (relative time) where applicable  (and if enforced) and  criteria for  implementation of 
management intewentions (rated high (HI,  medium (M) or low (L)  potential to meet criteria). 
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Educational programs Table 16. Continued 
STATUS QUO (no  enforcement o 
existing regulation and no  control 
over effective effort; nominal 
trawler license faas oniv) 
I  Increase trawl mesh rlze 
Llcenses for trawlers 
- Reduced number of traw 
er licenser auctioned to 
highest bidden 
- Grandfatherlbuyback 
of trawlers Ip  51  1 
Catch quotas (set below 
present levels of catch) 
- Fleet ltrawlen) 
I  - Individual trawlen 
- On gasoline fuel 
- On diesel fuel 
- On catch 
- On exports 11.e.. shrimp) 
- On incomes Iprogressive) 
Price controls (ceiling$) 
- On selected species 
- At retail level 
Area closures (to  trawlers) 
Seasonal closures 
- Gear specific Itrawlerr) 
- Species specific 
Trawler restrictions 
- Selective banr Ismail 
trawlers only1 
- Total banr (all trawlers 
mciuding mini  trawlers) 
- Obstacles on reafloor  I----- 
*  Alternatwe or rupplemen- 
taw income 
(  Marketing improvements 
Educational pmprams 
Implementation criteria  Limitations 
Increased  rocial unrest; present nominal license fees do not limit entry or effort. 
Does not limit effective  effort of trawler.  in  the long run because other components of effort 
can still expand. Aisodiffic~lt  toenforce. 
Despite lim~tation  on number  or effort of trawlers,  longterm growth in numben of non-trawl 
firharmen  will  result  ~n no  Icngterm  benefits,  but increased  resource rents and government 
rwenum in the short term. 
Provides gradual phase  out of trawlers,  but does  not restrict gradual increases in effort in the 
non-trawl sector; a useful short to medium term strategy. but cost to  government is high. 
May  reduce fishing  employment  in short term until boat ownership  fully dispersed. Doer not 
provide longterm control over expansion of fleet size. 
E~tablishing  quotas for fleet or individual vessels extremely complex. Even if  quota is established, 
vessel upgrading and gear improvement would still occur, thus still resulting in  overcapitalization. 
Probably impossible to  enforce, in any care. 
Tax rates Could be selectively applied;for  example, increasing diesel fuel tax only would increase 
Parity with geroline taxer. reduce trawler fleet sffort and thus produce a more equitable rituation 
vis s  uir the non-trawl fleet. 
Substantial objections from fishermen likely. 
Tax collections could be centralized.  Leaves problem of distribution and use of additional rev* 
nues unresolved; no  special benef~ts  to  the fishery sector may result. 
Special incame tax for fishermen unenforceable  in general context of widespread tax avoidance. 
Only  price  ceilings discussed here;  price floors (which may represent subsdies at certain timer1 
are  not conrbdered a  management intervention but rather  one which  is  designed to stimulate 
fishing effort. 
Unenforceable;  fishermen  will fail  to understand reason why  price control would be in their 
long-term  interest.  Seasonality  in supply and  prices will require  setting  of ceiling  prmes on  a 
frequent basis. 
Potentially  more enforceable.  but differences among firhing costs at different locations around 
the country imply differential impact. 
Difficulties in  enforcing present area  restrictions  provide indication of potential difficulties  and 
costs in any  area  restriction without  reorganization  of management authority to include eom- 
munity participation and ability of nan-trawl fishermen to enforce. 
Multirpeeies  nature of fisheries maker  prediction  of  effects  difficult. Greater idleness of fleets 
snd  processing establishments during the closure. Specier-specific seasonal closure generally not 
poaribie,  except  for  anchovy by mandating  increased mesh size far trawlers  during anchovy 
wwn. Anchovies could then be harvested solely  by non-trawl liftnets.  Extremely difficult to 
mplement in  a multispecies multigear fishery. 
Level of  dislocation is high if  implemented with no warning. 
Unnecessary  negative impact on  mini trawlen at present: wrgertid shrimp may b-me  aver- 
exploited in  the'future, however, thus requiring regulation of mini  trawlerr. 
Negative impact ai; mini trawlers. 
Only approach which leads to increaser in  fishing incomes in  the long run. 
Marketing  improvements,  by incraasiiq prices received,  lead to further entry and dissipation of 
resource rents 10  the long run. but possibly gensrme addmonal secondaw employment with labor 
ntansive pmcsssing at the fishing household level 
TO the extent that education  permits individuals to taka better advantaw of other nonfirhing 
opportunltier,  investment  in education will atso lead to Imr  levels of fishing entry and effort 
then would otherwire be the care. upon means of reducing effective effort in the large-scale fishery,  particularly that of the small 
trawlers. 
There are also sound economic arguments related to the relative efficiency of the small-scale 
and large-scale fisheries for considering restrictions only on the latter. If  one considers only the 
private financial profitability of the small-scale and large-scale fleets, it would appear that the fish 
corrals, mini trawlers and small trawlers are the most efficient gears. Of these gear types, small 
trawlers earned the largest annual pure profits (P26,900) per unit and therefore at first glance 
appear to be the most efficient. However, this relative efficiency (when compared to small-scale 
gears such as  gill-netters)  is  art  if  icial since it is only 'made possible because of the fuel tax differential 
that favors those vessels,  such as small trawlers, that use diesel fuel. If small trawlers paid the same 
fuel tax per liter that is presently paid on regular gasoline, instead of pure profits (resource rents) 
each unit would have incurred losses exceeding P30,000 annually. 
This conclusion provides evidence to support the view that large-scale industrial fisheries are 
often subsidized directly or indirectly relative to small-scale fisheries (Garcia 1983). Though lower 
taxes on diesel fuel are viewed by the national government as conducive to industrialization in the 
economy as a whole, they have had a negative effect on small-scale fisheries that find themselves in 
competition with small and medium (so-called  "baby")  trawlers. 
In the case of San  Miguel Bay, the small-scale fisheries have also been subsidized in the past to 
the extent that much of the credit granted for vessel,  gear and engine purposes during the 1970s was 
never repaid. However, there are two differences between the benefits derived by the large-scale 
sector from the tax differential and by the small-scale sector from the credit subsidies. First, the 
fuel tax differential in effect reduces operating costs of small trawlers which produces benefits that 
are then spread according to the sharing systems between the crew (labor) and the owner (capital). 
In the case of the credit subsidy for the small-scale fishery, owners were the primary beneficiaries 
while crewmen benefited only to the extent that they were enabled to become owners themselves. 
As  noted in previous reports, a portion of this small-scale fishery credit never found its way  into the 
hands of bona f ide fishermen (see also F l  DC  and TBAC 1983). 
The second difference between the two subsidies is more important because it is likely to have 
a much greater impact on the relative competitiveness of the two fishery sectors in the future. This 
difference is that the fuel tax differential is certain to continue in years to come while small-scale 
fishery credit programs will almost certainly diminish in scope and size. The current crisis facing the 
Philippine  economy and the low repayment rates of previous credit programs that have been coursed 
through the rural banking system have made any major new small-scale fisheries credit initiatives 
highly unlikely for the forseeable future. Consequently, the financial picture for individual gear 
types which is described in earlier chapters of this report (and which included depreciation and 
opportunity costs of capital on the assumption that vessellgear owners were financing their own 
capital investments) is the picture likely to prevail in the future. Therefore, the large-scale fishery 
(small trawlers especially) will retain their competitive edge over the small-scale fishery (particularly 
gill-netters) even though they are in reality less efficient in the economic sense.  If an efficiency 
related management objective is thus deemed appropriate for San Miguel Bay, consideration could 
be given to enforcing existing regulations or establishing new restrictions over the activities of the 
large-scale fishery. 
Disincentives 
The alternative interventions that were listed by management objective in Table 15 have been 
grouped into disincentives and incentives in Table 16 and their short-term and longer-term impact 
on various parameters noted. Each intervention  is evaluated according to  a set of implementation 
criteria including enforceability, equitability, likely cost-effectiveness, flexibility and simplicity. As  indicated in Table 16, not all possible management intervention mechanisms will be prac- 
tical for the San Miguel Bay fisheries. Catch quotas, price controls and seasonal closures all appear 
to be impractical, given the multispecies and multigear nature of the fisheries and the fact that San 
Miguel Bay is but oneof many fisheries in the country contributing to national fish supply. Selective 
price controls on §an Miguel Bay products would be quite impossible to implement. 
Other intervention mechanisms in the category of disincentives-mesh  size regulations, licenses, 
taxes, area closures and gear  restrictions-offer  more promise, however, to deal with problems of 
economic overfishing and skewed distribution of benefits, as  do incentives. Each of these options is 
discussed in further detail below. 
Mesh size regulations 
Theoretically, controlling the age  (size) of fish at first capture is one method to  assure that 
cohorts are permitted  to grow for a longer period of time and that total weight of the catch will 
thus increase. This theory is certainly true in singlespecies fisheries, but in multispecies multigear 
fisheries as  occur in San Miguel Bay, the situation is more complicated. 
Mesh of various sizes is used by small-scale vessels,  such as  gill-netters, but these gears tend to 
be highly selective and are changed seasonally depending upon the major species sought (Pauly and 
Mines 1982). In the Philippines, "commercial"  vessels > 3 GT cannot legally use mesh sizes less 
than 2.5 cm, but there is no special regulation for small and mini trawlers. They are covered, how- 
ever,  by the general legal lower limit for all Philippine gears which is 2 cm. As shown in Navaluna 
(1982) and Pauly (1982) the present mesh size of 2 cm used by the San Miguel Bay small trawlers, 
combined with the high fishing mortality exerted by the trawler fleet, results in growth overfishing 
for literally all San Miguel Bay species, a problem which is enormously aggravated by the illegal 
8-mm mesh used by these vessels during the anchovy season. 
Based upon the method of Sinoda et al. (1979) it is possible to  compute the mesh size for 
small trawlers which would optimize yield per recruit or value of the catch given prices prevailing 
in 198081. The method involves a series of steps, based on the data in Table 17. The steps are 
shown in  Appendix B. 
The optimum mesh size determined with this method is 5.3-5.4  cm or almost 3 times the size 
of that currently used by the small trawlers. It  may be mentioned here that these values are similar 
to those estimated by Sinoda et  al. (1979) for the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea,  and 
by Meemeskul (1979) for the Gulf of Thailand although these authors did not include shrimps in 
their analysis, as  was done here. 
The above analysis does not allow for an estimation of the long-term increase in catch that 
would result from a transition to larger meshes in San Miguel Bay. In the short term, catch would 
diminish slightly with an increase in mesh size, with the decrease in catch being directly related to 
the magnitude of the mesh size increase.  For this reason, and based only on biological considerations, 
the increase from the small trawl mesh sizes presently used (2 cm) to 5 cm could be spread over a 
few years,  as  follows: 
Year 1  announcement of proposed mesh size changes 
Year 2  enforcement of the ban of mesh sizes less than 2 cm  (at present, meshes of 8 mm are 
used during the anchovy season) 
Year 3  minimum mesh size set at 3 cm 
Year 4  minimum mesh size set at 4 cm 
Year 5  minimum mesh size at 5 cm 
Such staggering of the mesh  size increase would most probably result in minimizing short-term 
losses in catch given the high regenerative capacity of Philippine demersal stocks (Saeger 1981  ). A 
year-by-year phasing would be appropriate because the average trawler replaces its nets each year. 
Mesh size regulations for the more selective non-trawl gears could also be similarly examined. Table 17. Data for the computation of  an optimum mesh size for the San Miguel Bay trawl fishery. See Appendix B for details. 
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Croakers (except 0.  ruber) 
Otolithes ruber 
Pomadasyds 
Small carangids (jacks) 


















Leiognathus  splendens 
Trichiurus haumela 
Scombemnorus  commesoni 
Loligo spp. 
Metapenaeus ensis 
'AS  defined in Pauly  (1982),  except that  carangids and slipmouths were split into large and small,  with slightly higher catches attributed to the smaller forms. 
Also note that crabs are not considered. 
b~hosan  as  species with characteristics (size, body shape) typical of the group they represent. 
?he  selection factors (S.F.)  were either taken from Sinoda et al.  (1979) or Meemeskul (1979). or estimated from the body shapes,  using the nomogram in  Pauly 
(1980, Fig. 12). 
d~he  estimates of asymptotic length were taken from Sinoda et at.  (1979), Meemeskul (1979) or are  maximum lengths given in Fischer and Whitehead (1974). 
eComputed from equation 1 (see Appendix B). 
f~btained  by adding to the catches in Pauly (1982) an equal amount representing the fraction of a given statistical group in  the catch of "miscellaneous  fishes" 
(which is about equal to the catch by taxonomic group,  and essentially consists of the juveniles of these groups).  This correction was  not applied to the shrimps, 
nor to  the squids. 
g~btained  as  the mean of the estimated mean price per kg for a given group and the price of miscellaneous fishes  (see footnote  (f)). The price for shrimps and 
squids,  however were  not corrected, as  no "miscellaneous  fish"  components were added to their catch (see f). The prices used in this column are average prices re 
ceived by fishermen in  the Cabusao area,  during the year 1980-1981. All other components of effort remaining unchanged, the long-term gains for the trawl fishery 
would be: 
- relatively higher catches of larger fishes  (i.e.,  reduction of the proportion of low value 
"trash"  fishes) 
- reduction of the costs involved in catching a given amount of fish. 
As  larger trawl meshes would catch less shrimps and very few anchovies, the non-trawl fishery 
for shrimps and anchovies could be intensified to  the benefit of the majority of the Bay's  fishermen 
using, in the case of the anchovies at least, gears that would be very selective (e.g.,  fixed gears with 
lights in  the case of the anchovies) and thus exempt from the mesh size regulations imposed on the 
small trawlers. 
It is difficult to say whether an increase in mesh size would, in addition to increasing the net 
value of the catch from the Bay, also increase the total catch in weight of fish and shrimps. The 
model used here cannot address this question as  it does not allow for biological interactions. Thus, 
for example, it is possible that the reduced pressure on the larger fish would result in  an increased 
natural mortality of the smaller fishes (via increased predation). This problem could be dealt with 
by monitoring the changes in catch levels and composition during the transition to larger meshes. 
Indeed, such monitoring of the effect of any management measure should be a major raison dkre 
of an information program in support of a management institution in the San Miguel Bay area in 
any case. 
It is assumed, too, that other components of effective fishing effort, especially engine and net 
size in small trawlers, remain constant. If these other components increase as  one would expect 
without explicit contrary regulation, increases in effective effort will offset any potential gains that 
can be realized by increasing mesh size. A final consideration is the enforceability of a new mesh 
size regulation. To date,  the existing 2cm regulation has  not been effectively enforced in San 
Miguel Bay; consequently, any change in mesh size should only be made if it is accompanied by a 
serious attempt to enforce the new regulation in a consistent fashion that overcomes opportunities 
for avoidance and noncompliance. 
In summary, this method for reducing effective fishing effort in the Bay has advantages of 
administrative simplicity, minimal dislocation, increased equitability between trawl and non-trawl 
gears and the opportunity for participatory involvement/enforcement by fishing community officials 
and organizations. This method of intervention, however, is only a partial method in  that it neither 
controls all  components of effective fishing effort of the largescale fishery nor limits the slow but 
steady expansion of effort in the small-scale fishery brought about by population growth and 
technological improvements. 
Licenses 
The present licensing system in San  Miguel Bay is ineffective, not only in terms of limiting 
entry because costs of licenses are low, but even in terms of providing an accurate inventory of 
fishing units. The sociology and economics research teams,  for example, found that municipal lists 
of licensed vessels  less than 3 GT were incomplete and thus insufficient for sampling frame pur- 
poses. When license feesare collected by municipalities, they are for nominal amounts only; small 
trawlers pay only P40-50 annually, for example. 
Theoretically, higher license fees are an effective way of limiting entry to any fishery (Crutch- 
fied 1979; Pearse 1980) and in practice this method has come into use with some success in certain 
temperate zone singlespecies fisheries such as  lobsters in Australia (Meany 1979). The rationale 
behind a licensing scheme  is that if the fee is placed at a high enough level, not only is entry limited 
due to the higher costs of fishing, but also resource rents are generated for the licensing authority, 
equivalent to some or all of the pure profits previously earned by the fishing units. Recall that small 
trawlers in  San Miguel Bay earned P26,900  pure profits on average in 1980/81. Legally, local municipalities in the Philippines are empowered to  collect license fees for the 
operation of all 'municipal' fishing units including small trawlers. In the case of San Miguel Bay, if 
license fees were increased substantially, coordination among the coastal municipalities  would be 
necessary, adding to the administrative complexity of any  licensing scheme.  If Calabanga,  for 
example, were to raise its small trawler license fees,  what would stop these trawlers from registering 
in the neighboring municipality of Cabusao, for example, where the fees might be lower? 
The primary interest here is to evaluate the potential benefits from a licensing scheme to limit 
the number or effective effort of small trawlers in the Bay. There are numerous variations of licens- 
ing schemes that might be considered. Important factors that must be considered include: 
@  Who or what is licensed (e.g.,  the fishing unit, engines, owners of fishing units, or fisher- 
men). 
The method by which licenses are awarded (e.g.,  automatically to all present users; by 
auction to highest bidders; by lottery; only to owner-operators). 
The fee for the license (e.g.,  awarded through bidding process;  set arbitrarily by the licens- 
ing authority; based upon previous year's  profits). 
The duration of the license period. 
e  The degree to which the license fee extracts the resource rent from the fishery (e.g.,  a low 
fee license issued to  a limited number of small trawlers would have the effect of leaving 
any resource rents in the fishery to  the benefit of all users to be used as  they choose; a 
higher fee would extract resource rents for the licensing authority). 
The means for transferring licenses among fishermen or fishing units (e.g.,  retire from the 
fishery licenses of fishermen as  they die or of fishing units as they become no longer 
operable; allow purchase of licenses on the open market; allow sons to inherit the license 
of their fathers; establish government 'buy back' schemes). 
The possible permutations are obviously large and are not presented in detail here. However, 
certain guiding principles should be considered. 
First, if  the desire is to limit effective effort in the fishery it is important that the licenses 
specify exactly the characteristics of the fishing units to be licensed. As  Pearse  (1982) has pointed 
out, "the problem of overexpansion is not simply one of too many boats; the capacity of a fleet 
depends also on the fishing power of individual vessels."  For example, engine size is a critical com- 
ponent of fishing effort; a scheme that licenses vessels without specifying maximum engine size will 
fail since increased engine size over time will offset any benefits gained by limiting numbers of 
vessels in the first place (see various papers in Rettig and Ginter 1978 and Sturgess and Meany 1982 
for numerous examples). Any attempt by the management authority to progressively add restrictions 
on vessels or gear will probably be offset by fishermen as  they innovate, thus adding to  the costs of 
fishing and not solving the overcapitalization problem (Meany 1979; Pearse 1982). Pearse describes 
the distinct lack of success of limited entry programs around the world, due to failure to account 
for technological improvement and fishermen's  ingenuity. He concludes: 
many governments have undoubtedly been attracted by the administrative simplicity of rudimentary 
limits on entry. But these controls do nothing to eliminate the incentives of fishermen to expand their 
fishing power even when the fleet is already too big; indeed if such a scheme succeeds at all so  that the 
returns to fishing increase, these incentives will be strengthened. However, while limited entry is not 
likely to offer an adequate fleet control policy, it may often be a useful first step in a broader fleet 
rationalization  program. (emphasis added) 
A second guiding principle relates to the generation of resource rent and its distribution. In 
Pearse's  examples, the limited entry scheme potentially produces resource rents but innovation and 
technical improvements in unregulated components of fishing effort are still possible. This occurs 
because only the number of vessels is limited and resource rents are earned by the licensed fishermen. 
This resource rent could, however, be extracted from the fishery in the form of higher license fees. 
For  example, in 198081  the average small trawler in  San Miguel Bay earned a pure profit of approxi- mately ?27,000  (75 small trawlers earned slightly over P2 million pure profits). Hypothetically, if 
annual license fees were set at  P27,000  instead of the present level of P40-50, much of the incentive 
for fleet expansion would be removed and municipal authorities could significantly increase their 
revenue. Nevertheless, individual fishing units would still wish to expand their fishing capacity and 
thus reduce their average costs in an attempt to generate pure profits again. Consequently, even 
with much higher license fees,  vessel and gear  upgrading would still continue as  individual vessels 
sought an edge over their competitors. The result of this response would tend to be continued 
overcapitalization in the fleet, even if actual numbers of fishing units were reduced. License fees 
would thus need to control all elements of effective effort and to be made flexible and responsive to 
changing profitability in the fisheries. 
One way to assure this is to award licenses initially based on competitive bidding and then 
allow these licenses to be exchanged on the open market, perhaps limiting the number of licenses 
that can be owned at any one time to  a certain number per individual owner (one would have to be 
on particular lookout here for dummy bidders). This might be desirable if the licensing authority 
wished to maintain but not reduce fleet size. A reduction in fleet size over time could be obtained 
by mandating no new vessel construction (a "grandfather"  clause) or even using the income from 
license fees to 'buy  back' vessels in the fleet. A one-time bidding for licenses should result in their 
value being established at or near the level of the expected future profits (discounted for expected 
inflation) during the proposed duration of the license for the vessel type in question. Any increase 
in value of the license over time would accrue to  the original owner, which he could then convert 
into cash by selling his license on the open market (if the licensing authority has decided to allow 
transferable licenses). Transferability without limitations on number that can be owned by a single 
individual is likely to result in concentration of ownership of the small trawler fleet as  presently 
prevails. 
The decision whether to extract the resource rent and put it in the public treasury or whether 
to leave it to accrue to licensees is important because of the potential economic or employment 
benefits that can be derived from its use. On the one hand, if left to the fishermen, this resource 
rent could be applied to other investments in the non-fishing  sector (the purpose of the licensing 
scheme would bedefeated if it were reinvested in the fishery), thus generating additional production 
and employment. The extent to which this re-investment would be beneficial would depend upon 
the multiplier effect of local investment. On the other hand, assuming that administrative costs of 
the licensing authority are less than the total license fees,  then the additional revenue could be used 
for other purposes (e.g.,  for road improvements to fishing communities, health services, or even 
alternative incomegenerating  projects, such as  those now being undertaken by the Kilusang Kabu- 
hayanat Kanmlaran national 'movement for economic progress' livelihood program). A careful evalua- 
tion of the costs of any licensing scheme and of the effectiveness of government investment would 
be necessary before a decision is made on this issue. Care should be taken not to simply establish 
a revenue absorbing administrative structure that produces no net positive benefit to the local 
economy. 
Taxes 
As  shown in Table 16, taxes can be levied at  several levels including: (1  ) inputs, such as  fuel; 
(2) catch or landings; (3)  exports; and (4) income. At present in Philippine fisheries, including San 
Miguel Bay,taxesare levied on fuel; the differential tax between gasoline and diesel fuel is significant 
as  previously discussed. Some inc~me  tax is paid by San  Miguel Bay fishermen, though the extent of 
avoidance is probably high as  elsewhere throughout the country. Finally, some small levels of tax on 
catch are paid by operators of small and medium trawlers in Sabang, Calabanga but the low level of 
this tax makes it more of a landing-use tax than an inhibition to fishing. 
The theoretical literature on fisheries management contains arguments in favor of taxes as  a 
means of increasing economic efficiency of fisheries (see Anderson 1977; Strand and Norton 1980). The Strand and Norton analysis concludes that taxes are more effective than landing rights and 
time/space/gear limitations  in minimizing production costs, distributing  benefits (to the government), 
redirecting  effort effectively and maintaining competition. However, management and enforcement 
costs of any tax scheme are likely 10 be high. Pearse (1982) agrees that to be effective "the charges 
would have to be perfectly adjusted to  account for the varying value of the catch and costs of 
fishing among species, areas and season,  so that the administrative task would be formidable."  To 
date, no major fishery is managed solely by use of landings taxes,  which may be indicative of the 
potential costs and headaches of this approach. 
Taxes on inputs are another matter, however, and in the Philippines the level of national 
government intervention is already high. As explained in detail earlier, the government levies taxes 
on regular gasoline (P2.5411) that are approximately equal to its wholesale cost. The tax on diesel 
fuel,  which costs almost the same  to produce as  regular gasoline,  is significantly less  (P0.4611). 
The result of these differential taxes has been an indirect subsidy for the small and medium trawlers 
that use diesel engines.  If  these trawl vessels had to pay the same fuel tax as  all motorized small-scale 
fishing units that use a standard, widety available, low-cost 16-hp gasoline engine, they would be 
operating at a loss. The fuel tax policy of the government has led to a greater expansion of the 
trawler fleet than would have been the case had the tax rates on the two fuels been equal. 
Redressing thesituation would require either a reduction in the regular gasoline tax, an increase 
in the diesel tax or some combination of both approaches. The situation is seriously complicated, of 
course, by the fact that both fuels are widely used throughout the Philippines, especially in the 
transportation, commercial fishing and agriculture sectors.  In fact, the incentive for diesel use  is a 
conscious decision of government to stimulate industrial development, apparently unaffected by the 
conditions it creates in the small-scale fisheries sector. The tax differential is perhaps best explained 
by a desire to keep costs down in sectors such as  public transportation, agricultural production and 
commercial fishing which, in addition to being so  important to the economy, have politically aware 
and active constituencies. There are also practical design-related problems in advocating use of diesel 
engines in small outrigger bancas. 
Consequently, if the management authority wished to provide conditions conducive to more 
equitable distribution of income in the San Miguel Bay fisheries, it would probably be necessary to 
lower taxes on gasoline used by small-scale fishermen. This administratively difficult task could be 
handled in a practical way by the use of color additives in fuel destined for small-scale fisheries to 
discourage redirection of this lower-taxed  fuel to other purposes. The costs of assuring compliance 
with such a scheme would be considerable, however. Conversely, a higher-taxed diesel fuel (also 
identified by color additives) could be used instead, but the administrative difficulties would 
remain. Finally, if there were a desire of the government to achieve taxation parity between large- 
scale and small-scale fishermen, a rebate scheme  based on regular gasoline purchases could be 
considered. 
Alternatively, a tax on shrimp exports might be considered. This tax would affect both small- 
scale and largescale (trawl) fisheries of San Miguel Bay equally because they share almost equally in 
the harvesting of shrimp. Such a tax would also face serious opposition from shrimp exporters and 
especially from fishfarmers who are currently investing large sums in this business in response to 
attractive export prices for shrimps. It would also be inimical to  the government's current drive to 
increase exports and hence foreign exchange earnings.  Finally, an increase in the landings tax at 
Sabang,  Calabanga, the home base of most of the fleet would be one possibility though this would 
probably only encourage trawlers to land their catch in Mercedes or elsewhere where the tax might 
be lower. 
Because most tax measures are difficult to confine solely to largescale fisheries, it thus appears 
unlikely that this option offers much hope for regulating effort in San Miguel Bay fisheries. Area closures 
Little need be said about the potential of area closures in San Miguel Bay, because the current 
situation in the Bay is the result of such an approach to the management of fisheries throughout the 
country. What needs stressing, however, is that the enforcement of current legislation (p. 30) would 
do much to  reduce the current problems of overcapitalization and skewed distribution of benefits. 
The current situation prevails because of the lack of enforcement of existing regulations. 
Of all the intervention mechanisms described to this point, effective area closures are probably 
the easiest to  administer. Purchase by enforcement agencies of a small number of vessels which 
could be used to enforce the existing arealdepth restrictions (see Fig. 11, p. 33) would do much to 
remove the sources of contention in the San Miguel Bay fisheries. Coupled with mesh size restric- 
tions, area closures could be most effective. 
Gear restrictions 
There are both direct and indirect means available to control the level of fishing effort of the 
various gear  types that operate in the Bay. As  pointed out by others (Christy and Scott 1965; 
Anderson 1977; Smith 1979 and Panayotou 1982) gear restrictions are not an effective management 
tool if one's  objectives are solely economic in nature. "Legislating  inefficiency" in this manner 
simply increases the average costs in the fishery and makes it more difficult to compete with other 
fisheries producing similar products at lower costs. The arguments in favor of restrictions on more 
efficient gears  are  usually based on needs to maintain more labor-intensive gears,  and are thus 
particularly relevant in economies with much underemployed labor with low labor opportunity 
costs. 
The interesting aspect of the San Miguel Bay fisheries is that in good measure it is government 
fuel-tax policy which has  encouraged the expansion of the capital-intensive small trawler fleet. 
Small trawlers are not inherently more efficient than the small-scale gear with which they compete. 
Consequently, if redressing the tax differential is not possible, and the management objective 
for the Bay  is to increase employment opportunities in the fisheries, then consideration could be 
given to restrictions  on the operation of small trawlers within the Bay. 
Because they exceed 3 GT and are considered "commercial",  medium and large trawlers are 
already banned totally from fishing in the Bay,  though it is understood that despite this ban, 
medium trawlers continue to operate in the Bay.  If all trawlers,  including small trawlers were 
effectively banned, it would have a quite dramatic impact on the Bay's fisheries and on trawler and 
secondary employment. 
Banning small trawlers would remove 75 fishing units that presently account for over one-third 
of the total catch in the Bay. Most of this catch is landed in Sabang, Calabanga where secondary 
employment in processing activities and transport is high. Banning small trawlers would have an 
immediate effect upon catch and secondary employment not to mention dislocation of the 500 
crew members and their families. Presently, 10% of the fishing labor force in San  Miguel Bay 
depend directly on the small trawlers for employment. 
On the positive side, catch of the small-scale non-trawl  fishing units would increase and probably 
immediately. The percentage of trash fish in the total catch would decline and catch would become 
more dispersed at the numerous small-scale landing places around the Bay. This dispersion of land- 
ings would add to marketing costs and perhaps reduce quality of high-valued  species on the one 
hand, while increasing fishing community employment and incomes, on the other hand (except in 
Sabang, Calabanga). The trawlable biomass would probably increase quickly as  stocks rebound due 
to  the reduced fishing pressure. 
Combinations of disincentives 
Many of the disincentives discussed in this section represent only partial solutions to  the prob- 
lems of limiting entry and/or effort in the San Miguel Bay fisheries. For example, mesh size regula- tions and licenses by themselves do not control all components of fishing effort. Coastal area clo- 
sures such as  those which exist up to the 7-fm mark also do not necessarily limit total effort in 
the Bay unless fishing in the area beyond 7 fm is also restricted in some fashion, such as  through 
licensing. Consequently, the 'best'  management approach for San Miguel Bay and similar fisheries 
will most likely include some combination of management interventions and mechanisms, the exact 
mix depending upon the management objectives agreed upon. 
Some  of the mechanisms discussed earlier (e.g.,  licenses or taxes) can generate significant 
income for the managing authority; some cannot. For example, a final disincentive mechanism that 
might be considered is the placement of "artificial reefs"  on the bottom of the Bay at unmarked 
locations in  waters shallower than 7 fathoms which could serve as  fish habitats and at the same 
time inhibit trawling except in the depths beyond 7 fm where it is now allowed. The capital costs 
for such a program need not be high if  simple bamboo structures are used. But these impediments 
would also adversely affect even the slow moving (1 kmlhr) mini trawlers and their specialty fishery 
which does not interfere (physically, biologically or economically) with other small-scale gears. 
This balao  (sergestid shrimp) fishery is an important component in the Bay's  fishery employment 
and income and should not be overlooked when evaluating options of regulating, or through obstacles 
inhibiting, the activity of the small trawlers. 
In the past in the Philippines, political expediency has frequently led to rapid and drastic 
action regarding laws affecting fishing activities. When medium and large trawlers were banned from 
the Bay in 1982, for example, the time from promulgation of the new law to effectivity was only 2 
weeks, giving the individuals affected little time to adjust to  the dislocation. Granted the effect on 
large commercial trawlers was  probably minimal. Still, a similar step in such rapid fashion against 
small trawlers would incur quite substantial hardship among those affected, particularly the owners 
of large numbers of boats, their crewmen and the processors and laborers that depend upon them. 
Various government compensation or "buy-back" programs and sufficient advance warning of 
changes in current laws could reduce these hardships and also assure that fishermen can pay back 
any bank loans they may have incurred. It  is possible with forethought to minimize the hardship 
and costs of dislocation while still proceeding with firmness. 
Over time, thesmall-scale  fishery would fill the niche previously occupied by the small trawlers. 
The increased effort in the small-scale fishery would come from four sources: 
Most of the 10% of the Bay's  total fishing labor force which would be displaced if trawling 
were banned, would most probably join the small-scale fishing fleet. 
New entrants from outside fishing would be attracted by the additional short-term profits 
that would be earned by the current small-scale fleet. Fishing incomes in the small-scale 
fleet are  now roughly comparable to the opportunity wage  in other activities, so  any 
increase in the returns to labor and capital in small-scale fishing would likely attract new 
entrants from the agricultural sector as long as access to use most small-scale gears remains 
open. 
Technological improvements would then follow. For example, when Indonesia banned all 
coastal trawling, gill-net fishermen switched to trammel nets and learned to use them for 
catching shrimp. 
Continued population growth will continue to add to  the small-scale fishing labor force. 
Assuming current rates of outmigration continue and non-fishing employment opportuni- 
ties in the San Miguel Bay area remain limited, the natural rate of population growth in  the 
Bay's fishing communities will remain approximately 2% annually. Consequently, within 
3540 years, the fishing population of San Miguel Bay will have doubled. This labor force 
growth can be expected regardless of action taken with respect to  small trawlers. 
The end result of this increased effort in the small-scale sector will be that, again, despite any 
efforts to regulate the large-scale fishery, fishermen will be earning no more than thei~  opportunity 
wage which, unless development occurs in the Bid,  will remain low. Limiting the effective effort of small trawlers of San Miguel Bay, without at the same time 
limiting expansion of effort in the small-scale fishery, thus essentially "buys time" for other sectors 
to  take up the task of employment and income generation. The same  limitation holds true regarding 
all the previously discussed management interventions and mechanisms in that to the extent that 
they limit effort in only part of the total fishery, they are also only partial or temporary solutions. 
Incentives 
The theoretical arguments for increasing labor opportunity cost as  a means to reduce levels of 
fishing effort have been expressed by Munro and Chee  (1980), Smith (1981  ) and Panayotou (1982). 
Bailey (1982a) has presented the need for this longer-term perspective for San Miguel Bay fisheries. 
Because of the extreme difficulties and costs associated with controlling levels of effort in the 
fishery, these arguments are attractive and certainly correct if one takes a long-term perspective.  r"'e 
The introduction of alternative income-generating activities that would supplement fishing house-  lub'?- 
hold income should be a part of the San Miguel Bay fishery management plan regardless of what  ''6  &'' 
steps are taken to limit effort in the short term. Educational programs to lengthen the average  *AA 
number of years that children from fishing households spend in school and to diversify their skills 
can also assist in reducing the long-term dependency of such households upon fishing. 
It is often argued that improvements in marketing and processing are appropriate interventions 
to increase fishing household incomes. However, in cases of fully exploited resources, marketing 
improvements are a double-edged sword. To the extent that fishing households can actually partici- 
pate in marketing and processing they will be able to earn part of the added value previously earned 
by others. However, to the extent that improvements in marketing result in higher prices at the 
beach, the more likely are the income benefits to be transitory, dissipated by new entrants attracted 
by the higher prices. Consequently, a heavy dependence upon marketing and processing improve- 
ments to the exclusion of attempts to regulate fishing effort must be avoided. This is not to suggest 
that marketing programs should be neglected. This report has earlier discussed oligopoly/oligopsony 
control of the fuel supply/processing activities in some locations and every encouragement should 
be given to female members of fishing households to undertake these activities themselves, perhaps 
as a group activity. 
The complexity of the problems and solutions in a fishery such as  that in San Miguel Bay sug- 
gest that concerted effort and attention should be directed to managing the fishery. Current levels 
of management interest extend little  beyond collection of catch statistics. One might argue that the 
San Miguel Bay fisheries need not command much attention in the context of the whole Philippine 
economy, the Philippine fisheries or even the Bicol Region. However, the fisheries are significant in 
terms of annual value (P55 million), employment (5,600 fishermen) and as a source of supply of 
fish and shrimp. A fishery of this size should be able to support a management authority with a full- 
time professional staff and a representative council to address the management issues. The potential 
for generating significant resource rents and the need to solve prevailing inequities in income distribu- 
tion suggest that the benefits should exceed the costs of undertaking such an approach. Moreover, 
with the relatively good database now available for San Miguel Bay, this fishery, if managed,  could 
become an instructive example for fisheries elsewhere. 
A MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Within the current institutional framework it is difficult, if not impossible to envision that 
common management objectives and means of achieving them can be agreed upon among the many 
agencies, institutions  and communities presently involved in the San Miguel Bay fisheries. These 
interested parties include several national agencies, two provinces, six municipalities, and 46 fishing 
communities with 5,600  fishermen using diverse, often competing gears.  Agreement would be 
especially difficult because at  present there is no single forum where the many different opinions of 
these diverse groups can be given adequate hearing. This confused situation is characterized by (1) national legislation that ignores locale-specific differences, (2) municipal ordinances that are 
often insufficient to regulate fishing activities within municipal waters and  (3) petitions from 
small-scale fishermen seeking redress that bypass all intermediary authorities and are submitted 
directly to the President of the country. 
One solution to this confusion that would be worth considering is the creation of a San Miguel 
Bay Fisheries Management Authority that would have responsibility for developing and implement- 
ing a management plan for the Bay in  close collaboration with the various fishing communities that 
presently use the Bay. The Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP), which to date has 
focused its  work almost exclusively on irrigation infrastructure and agricultural community develop- 
ment, could also be considered as an institution for implementing management decisions regarding 
San Miguel Bay. However, the broad scope of this institution's mandate which covers all of the 
Bicoi may not be areaspecific enough,  so  a separate  institution especially for San  Miguel Bay 
may be necessary. 
To assure local support for the management program, municipal and provincial officials and 
fishermen themselves (through elected representatives?) should be represented. The management 
authority could be organized as  a council that would need to liaise with BFAR, the Philippine 
Coast Guard and Philippine Constabulary to assure enforcement of regulations that it passes. 
Proposed regulations of the Authority could be subject to review by national authorities (e.g., 
Ministry of Natural Resources) as  is currently true of municipal ordinances that impact on fisheries. 
The council would require a supporting technical staff headed by a professional fisheries manager. 
The technical staff should consist of biologists, economists, statisticians and sociologists because 
each of these disciplinary perspectives will be necessary to management decisionmaking. 
Tasks of a San  Miguel Bay Fisheries Management Authority 
Management planning and the management institution proposed for San Miguel Bay should 
address the following tasks (after Smith 1983): 
1.  Evaluation of  management costs and benefits. This report outlines various management 
options for San Miguel Bay in a nonquantifiable way. With additional data and application of more 
rigorous systems analysis or simulation modelling  techniques it should be possible to  determine in  a 
preliminary fashion the costs and benefits of various management options. Calculation of costs 
should include those expenses necessary to maintain the management infrastructure itself. A single 
management authority for the Bay is likely to be far more cost-effective  than the current mix of 
national and municipal authorities. 
2.  The establishment of an information system. Allocation decisions cannot be made without 
the necessary database,  and at the minimum the following timeseries data should be collected 
(after Larnpe 1980) : 
catch by competing users 
effort (number of units of competing gear types, number of tripslyear) 
catch composition and length-frequency data on major species 
prices by species 
costs and earnings of major gear types (and from this, incomes of competing users). 
The first four variables above will allow determination of the total value of the fishery and the 
relative shares earned by each gear type or user. Alternatively this could be estimated from annual 
costs and earnings data by gear type obtained from private operators, who may need considerable 
persuasion to cooperate. There are advantages,  however, to record-keeping  and surveys in that they 
invite the involvement of competing users in the management process. Steps must be taken,  of 
course, to assure the reliability of the data provided by these users.  Nevertheless, regardless of the 
data collection method, cost data are necessary for evaluating the economic health of the fishew. In  addition, data collected should also cover: 
patterns of ownership among the various users to determine the degree of concentration, 
and 
opportunity costs of labor and capital since these two cost items must be included in the 
calculations of total costs to  determine if any positive resource rents are being earned. 
The information system and complementary research that might be considered for San Miguel 
Bay are more fully discussed in part B of this report. An immediate task that could be addressed is 
a revised definition for municipal fisheries in the Bay designed to separate small-scale non-trawl  and 
largescale trawl fisheries (i.e.,  "baby"  trawlers). For example, a 20-hp engine size demarcation may 
be more appropriate than the current 3 GT distinction between commercial and municipal fisheries. 
3.  Setting of  objectives. Alternative goals of management were fully discussed in the previous 
section and in Table 15. Setting of management objectives can best be accomplished with participa- 
tion in the decisionmaking process by all interested parties, including small-scale fishermen. 
4.  Selecting a mechanism for controlling access and use rights. Alternatives identified in this 
study as worthy of consideration include licenses, restrictions on certain gear types, mesh sizes or 
on vessel sizes or power, closed areas or some combination of these. The choice of the most appro- 
priate mechanism would depend upon the management objectives to be achieved. As  part of this 
task, a system for transfer of use rights such as an open market or bidding for licenses, for example, 
needs to be considered. Licenses that are transferable on the open market appear to be a better 
system of assuring that positive resource rents are sustainable over the long term. 
It is in this area of selecting and enforcing the management regulation(s) and mechanism(s) 
that the best-intentioned management schemes break down. Either an  inappropriate mechanism 
which fails to limit effort adequately is selected or the regulations are not enforced. Total catch 
quotas, for example, have been found to be ineffective in some locations because they fail to limit 
expansion of the fleet and thus do not control effective effort; overcapitalization of the fishery still 
results (Gulland 1972). In an extreme case,  the Pacific yellowfin tuna total catch quota in 1970 was 
taken in 2 1/2 months with many of the vessels lying idle the remainder of the year, thus represent- 
ing considerable waste to the economy and lost resource rents (Joseph 1972). 
5.  Monitoring and evaluation. Needless to say,  a continuous system of monitoring  and evalua- 
tion to permit refinement and change of any management interventions is warranted by conditions 
of the fishery and fishing communities in San Miguel Bay. The bulk of the data necessary for this 
task should come from the information system described above,  supplemented by inputs from 
fishermen and others obtained at regular meetings of the management authority. 
A detailed discussion of how the suggested San  Miguel Bay  Fisheries Management Authority 
might operate is beyond the scope of this study and report. However, the brief outline of tasks 
above gives some idea of the dimension of the management task and its complexity. 
It is worthwhile in this context to cite one example of a successful management system that 
has promise of success in Asia. The most comprehensive and effective coastal management system is 
in Japan where coastal and inland waters are under the management of fishing communities and 
cooperatives (Comitini 1976; Akimichi 1982). The fishing communities exercise jurisdiction over 
coastal waters to a distance of 26 miles (41.8 km) and within national guidelines make all the use 
and allocation decisions related to  who can fish, where, when and with what kind of gear. The 
cooperative serves as  a forum for the resolution of conflicts and cooperative leaders are highly 
respected in their communities. The keys to the success of these Japanese systems is not that they 
are based around cooperatives per se but rather that they have complete authority within their area 
of jurisdiction and they have involved a high degree of participation  by the fishermen themselves. 
This is in marked contrast to the capture fisheries elsewhere in Asia, including San Miguel Bay, 
where there are hybrid systems of national and local jurisdiction and regulation but little participa- 
tion by fishermen. CONCLUSION 
A key element in any future management scheme for San Miguel Bay will be the provision for 
participation  of users in the decisionmaking process. In the Philippines, fisheries regulations and 
authority tend to be centralized at  national levels though there is great potential for municipal roles 
in  certain cases.  Locale-specific refinements are rare, however, and the total lack of fishermen in- 
volvement in planning and management has created a situation where enforcement is extremely 
difficult, if  not impossible. The Japanese system of coastal fishing rights cited above indicates the 
potential for systems that include a prominent role for fishing communities and which could be 
considered for San Miguel Bay and other coastal and inland fisheries in the Philippines, although the 
exact form of the management authority need not be cooperatives per se. 
Decentralizing authority in this fashion would require participation  by fishermen themselves in 
those decisions related to choice of management objectives and interventions. To date, the majority 
of fishermen have had little option but to  send occasional petitions to national authorities due to 
the lack of a local forum. There are many who argue that political decentralization is a necessary 
condition for economic development (e.g.,  Loehr and Powelson 1982) and this perspective is en- 
dorsed. Stated differently, the problem for the fishery is the gap that presently exists as elsewhere 
in the Philippines between economic and political levels of the society (Goodell 1982) and the 
absence of resource management institutions to narrow the gap,  Indicative of the problem, for 
example, is the government's fuel tax structure, whereby diesel fuel is taxed at much lower rates 
than is regular gasoline. This national level tax has encouraged capital-intensive small trawlers in the 
San Miguel Bay and other similar fisheries, thus exaggerating the economic gaps within the fishery 
in the absence of any management institution that might have foreseen the effects and taken steps 
to ameliorate them. 
The advantages and potential of participation  by fishermen in  the development and manage- 
ment process have been eloquently argued by Johannes (1981), Kent (1981), Bailey (1982~)~  and 
Thomson (1983).  Similar arguments have been put forward by Friedmann (1981) for rural dwellers 
as  a whole. These arguments for 'participatory democracy' are more than mere rhetoric; it is abun- 
dantly clear from the case of San Miguel Bay that centralized fisheries management lacks the neces- 
sary localespecific refinements and support of fishermen themselves that are necessary ingredients 
of any effective management program. 
Regardless of one's political views regarding control over natural resource use, there is a strong 
practical argument in favor of decentralization of authority over fisheries in the case  of San Miguel 
Bay. Without fishermen participation, enforcement of management regulations will be extremely 
problematic  as experience with current legislation has shown. Indeed, many of the problems present- 
ly existing in  theSan Miguel Bay fishery would be overcome if only current legislation  were enforced. 
National authorities must ask  themselves why enforcement is such a problem and whether it could 
not be more readily assured through participatory management of the fisheries by fishermen, among 
other interested parties. 
These issues are limited neither to  fisheries, nor to  the Philippines; they are broad development 
issues facing much of the developing world today. The conclusions of a recent comprehensive study 
of rural organizations in the Philippines (Po 1980) are worth repeating here: 
Development has increasingly become the concern of both government and peoples. Essentially, 
development entails the growth of societies into higher forms which allow the fulfillment of human 
needs and actualization of human potential for more and more people. Critical participation  of people 
and their control  over the conditions  which determine their livelihood, thus, become the key to develop- 
ment. 
Characterized by uneven development, most Third World countries, however, are crippled by, 
precisely, this lack of participation  of the majority of their people in the political processes and social opportunities and benefits. Primarily, therefore, efforts aimed at rural development through rural 
organizations should make up for this limitation by allowing the rural population greater control over 
their own organizations and greater  participation in policy-making processes.  Only in this way  rural 
organizations begin to serve the interests of the rural masses and function as  effective means for rural 
development through rural mobilization. 
The above sentiments are equally applicable to the San  Miguel Bay  fisheries because the 
IFDR/ICLARM study has clearly shown that managing the Bay's  resources will require some limita- 
tion of fishing effort, that is, some of the current users will be denied access.  Failure to take this 
step will not only contribute to continued waste of resources, but will also exacerbate the already 
inequitable distribution of benefits from the fishery between the competing large-scale and small- 
scale sectors. Denying access to  some present users is clearly a political decision because it affects 
the distribution of income from the fisheries. A decision of this nature, before it is taken and if it is 
to be abided by, requires the opportunity for expression of different, possibly opposing points of 
view. The best way of reaching this integration would be to  set up a permanent body (e.g.,  involving 
fishermen representatives, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and the municipalities 
concerned) with clear prerogatives and tasks related to setting management objectives, agreeing 
upon management interventions, and collecting the necessary  information to make informed 
decisions. 
In addition to the participatory dimensions discussed above,  the success  of a management 
program for a particular fishery such as in San Miguel Bay will depend in great measure upon the 
support of an information gathering and research activity to clarify management options and 
monitor the impact of management interventions. Part B. Research Options 
A successful management program for any fishery cannot proceed without an  information 
base.  Biological, economic and sociological data are required not only to clarify current conditions 
in the fishery and fishhg communities but also to monitor and evaluate the impact of any manage- 
ment intervention undertaken. A useful first step in considering the possible need for a manage- 
ment program is to undertake a multidisciplinary  research study of the type conducted by IFDR 
and ICLARM in San Miguel Bay, which consisted of three components-biology,  economics and 
sociology. 
The purpose of this part of the report is to discuss the research data and methods that were 
used in this study and also to identify information requirements and research options for a continu- 
ing management program for San Miguel Bay. 
GENERAL ISSUES 
Various categories of data are necessary for either an initial investigatory study of the type 
already conducted for San  Miguel Bay  or for an  information acquisition system to support an 
ongoing management program. The two required data sets are not the same,  however. For the initial 
investigatory study, a comprehensive and exhaustive information collection effort is needed to build 
up an initial data bank. These efforts should include collection of the following indicative informa- 
tion: 
Previously published and unpublished research studies on the fish stocks,  fisheries and 
communities in question, including not only fisheries-specific research but also that related 
to other sectors, such as agriculture, upon which the fishing communities in the area may 
depend in part. 
Secondary data on the fish stocks, fisheries and communities in  question. Historical data 
on exploratory fishing (yields per unit area), number of vessels  by type, catch,  catch 
composition and length-frequency of major species are particularly important, if available. 
Equally useful are historical data on prices, incomes, costs and earnings, population growth 
and migration, incomes and costslearnings of other income-generating activities in the 
vicinity of the fishing communities. 
Literature on research on other fish stocks and fisheries similar to those being investigated. 
This is important because generalizations can often be drawn from the conclusions of 
others regarding similar environments (e.g.,  estuaries). 
Information on past, current and proposed government programs in  the area. For example, 
lending agencies, such as  rural banks, are often valuable sources of information on historical 
investment flow into the fisheries and on feasibility analysis of particular gear types or 
development projects. Past efforts at community organizing (e.g.,  cooperatives) should also 
be identified and evaluated in a preliminary fashion at  this stage. 
Only after the above set of information is collected and analyzed should the research team 
embark upon major efforts  to collect new primary data. Stressing the above process may appear to 
some readers to be stating the obvious; it is done because all too frequently3 regrettable tendency 
has been observed for fisheries researchers-both  fisheries and social scientists-to  rush hastily into new surveys and primary data collection without first evaluating what is already known by others  -- 
aboutthe  ---  -  fishekunder investigation. The present I  FDRIICLARM research group was  no excep- 
tion; several errors in this respect were made.  i 
The above point is more than an argument for a thorough research process; it has cost implica- 1 
- 
t&nsas well. Primary data collection is expensive. Multidisciplinary research of the scope undertaken 
for San Miguel Bay is particularly expensive. Funds for research are scarce and cost-effectiveness 
should be a concern not only for multidisciplinary research studies of the IFDRIICLARM type but 
also for information systems that are established to support fisheries management programs. Costs 
are directly related to information requirements, which is why careful identification of the latter is 
so  important. 
Multidisciplinary investigation of tropical multispecies multigear fisheries is never simple. How- 
ever, one does not necessarily need to develop overly sophisticated models in the first instance to / 
improve~~&~s  understanding of a given fishery. The important key is to make clear statements 
about manageable objectives with an early plan of how these goals are to be obtained by listing data 
requirements including quantity and quality, data sources and analysis planned (Pauly and Smith 
1982; Smith and Pauly 1982). 
The complexity of multispecies multigear fisheries should not prevent one from beginning with 
manageable approaches to  data collection  and analysis long before sophisticated momling  approaches 
-/-  - 
are applied (see also Sutinen et al. 1981). In fact, it will be some time before suchmethods are 
applicable for tropical multispecies fisheries and if researchers await these models, the damage to  1 
fisheries from overfishing and the losses due to overcapitalization and inequitable distribution of 
benefits will continue unabated. 
Before fieldwork of the IFDRIICLARM San Miguel Bay study was  initiated, the importance of 
integrating  the methodologies and findings of the various disciplines (or modules) involved in the 
study was  recognized. Constructing a sophisticated bio-socioeconomic model of the fishery was  not 
planned due to anticipated data limitations, but it was clear that the status of the fishery, its poten- 
tial need for management and its potential for inclusion in area development planning had to be 
evaluated in the broadest terms. The 1977 and 1978 petitions to  the President of the Philippines 
and other government officials from the small-scale fishermen of San  Miguel Bay  regarding the 
operation of trawlers, and the sensitive management issues implied, necessitated this multidisciplinary 
approach. The IFDRIICLARM research goals were thus very much site related in contrast to studies 
conducted elsewhere on small-scale fisheries information needs which have focused primarily upon 
evaluation of alternative data collection methodologies (see for example ICM R D 1981 and Stevenson 
et  al. 1982). 
At the initiation of the study of San Miguel Bay, a detailed work plan was developed for each 
discipline and which included agreement on the following elements in order: 
statement on objectives; 
working hypotheses, as applicable;  '  types of analysis to be performed to achieve objectives or test hypotheses; 
list of data requirements; and 
list of all potential  data sources. 
This anticipation of  the research process in the context of research objectives also enabled ex- 
clusion from consideration of certain biological and oceanographic research that is normally con- 
ducted as  a matter of course in studies of this nature, but which was thought to be irrelevant in this 
case,  given the objectives established. Inevitably, changes (and mistakes) were made as  the study 
progressed; still, these detailed work plans greatly assisted in identifying information requirements 
for the study and allowing integration of data collection among the three modules of the study. 
This integration helped avoid duplication of effort and keep data collection costs within reasonable ! , 
b,ounds. It must also be recognized that data such as  those collected by the multidisciplinary San 
Miguel Bay study represent only the first step in developing a management program for a fishery. 
Observations over time are needed. Because of the political connotations of the competition among 
various gear types in the case of San Miguel Bay (i.e.,  small-scale gears  vs. trawlers), fisheries decision- 
makers and local politicians were under extreme pressure to take immediate action, and they looked 
to the research project to provide them with recommendations. This was  avoided because it was 
believed that the allocation decisions belong to administrators and politicians; instead management 
options have been outlined, assuming various objectives (e.g.,  economic efficiency, employment or 
equity), and the likely impact of each was  discussed (see Part A of this report). There is a crucial 
need for monitoring  fisheries over time. Monitoring is particularly important because short-term and 
long-term approaches to management are unlikely to be similar and the institutional framework for 
fisheries management will take time to evolve. 
Early in 1980, discussions were held with Dr. Harlan Lampe of the University of Rhode Island 
regarding conceptual considerations for fisheries management programs. In his report to the Fishery 
Industry Development Council, Government of the Philippines (Lampe 1980), he enumerated the 
"minimum  requisite (data) set to evaluate the economic and biological behavior of a fishery". 
This set consists of: 
catch and effort data 
catch composition data 
costs and earnings data 
supply and price information. 
Lampe's  recommendations confirmed that the San Miguel Bay project was  on the right track with 
its concentration on collecting the above data set plus sociological variables. Most importantly, of 
course, this data set could reasonably be collected within the financial limits of the project, and 
analysis of the data collected could be completed in a timely fashion to be of optimal use to the 
government agencies in the San Miguel Bay area with responsibility for regulating the fishery. At the 
inception of the project in late 1979, it was decided that this data set should cover a minimum 
period oC12 months to capture seasonal variation. In fact, the project eventually included data col- 
lected for a period of 24 months. 
In addition to this biological and economic data set, sociological data needs were identified 
regarding the intricacies of sharing systems and their change over time, social relations in marketing, 
the role of women and children, the attitude of fishermen towards their resource and extent of and 
attitudes towards occupational and geographic mobility. The labor mobility issue was  particularly 
important. If the Bay was overfished as alleged (Simpson 1978), it was  crucial for managing the 
fishery and improving incomes of small-scale fishermen that this study examine the nature of the 
flow of human resources between small-scale fisheries and other sectors, and assess  the potential of 
programs that seek  to reduce the heavy dependence of fishing households on capture fisheries. 
Maximum use  was  made of historical and secondary data to supplement the primary data 
collected by the project's three disciplines. Too often, these sources of data are rejected outright as 
being unreliable. Particularly for the biological analysis, such data,  with modifications based on 
knowledge of how they were collected, were found to be extremely useful. In fact, the biologists' 
assessment of the status of the San Miguel Bay fisheries would have been very difficult without such 
information. 
Following are some  techniques and comments, grouped according to the three disciplines 
involved in the San Miguel Bay study. The data sources and sampling methodologies of the present 
study are summarized in Tables  18-20, while the corresponding data gathered in each  research 
module are summarized in  Tables 21  -23. Further details on methodologies can be found in Pauly 
and Mines (19821, Smith and Mines (1982), and Bailey (1982a, 1982b). The San Miguel Bay multi- 
disciplinary study has shed considerable light on a complex fishery but it remains but the first step 
in initiating an active management and information program to monitor interventions in the Bay's 
fishery. Table 18. Sen Miguel Bay Project: major date sources and sampling methodology of stock assessment module. 
Phase  Duration  Data collected  Frequency  Sampling methodology  Sample size 
a)  Catch end effort  2 years  Catch. effort and catchleffort 
data for all gears 
Continuous  - small-scale fishery:  gear 
counts and beachside sam 
pling of catch-per-trip data 
Very large,  i.e.,  giving 
clf on daily basis for 
some, and on  month- 
ly  basis  for  most 
gears 
Continuous  - trawl fishery: sampling on 
board trawlers, complement- 
ed with in-depth analysis of 
adjusted catch statistics 
About  2  trips  per 
month 
b) Length-frequency  2 years  Langth-frequency data on 
data  15 species of fish 
Continuous  Measurement of length-frequency 
samples on board trawlers 
About 2.500  fish mea- 
sured 
Forty percent of the 
Bay's  surface  area 
was covered 
nla 
Bathymetric survey  1 day  Present depth contours of 
San Miguel Bay 
Once  Echosounding  of Sen Miguel Bay 
with portable echosounder 
Survey of previous  2 years  List of  fish and general hydro- 
literature and  graphy of San Migual Bay. 
historical data  Reviews, estimates of  effort 
and of  btchleffort  of  trawl- 
ers. Previous catch composi- 
tion and anecdotal infor- 
mation on changes in  the 
Bey's fishery 
Continuous  Scanning of  all likely sources of 
primary and secondary data, 
including files containing un- 
analyzed  data, theses,  pub- 
lished and unpublished 
reports 
Table 19. San Miguel Bay Project: data sources and sampling methodology of economics module. 
Sampling 












3 months  Assets and no. of fisherman 
per household; sources of 
financing for owned assets; 
gean used 
Single visit per house-  Census of all households 
hold in  target com-  in  target community 
munity 
Established  sample 
frame  (430  house- 
holds) for subsequent 
data collection 
1 year  Exvessel prices of major 
species. Catch per vessel 
landing. Number of vas- 
selslgear types landing 
3 times weekly at each  Data collected from all 
landing site in  target  vessels landing thmugh 
communities  0bSewati0n and personal 
intewiews of fishermen, 
wives,  and buyers 
Varied depending upon 
number  of  vessels 
lending 
1 year  Prices of fresh and pro 
(concurrent  cessed products in  4 
with land-  markets 
ing suwey) 
2-3 times weekly  Data collected from all 
sellers in  each market, 
supplemented by 
secondary price data 
of government 
Varied depending upon 
number  of  sellers  in 
the markets 
I  month  Assets, investment costs, 
life of assets, age and 
educational level of 
fishermen, sharing 
system used 
Single interview  20% purposive sample 
(see below) of fishing 
units in  2 target com- 
munities 
64 fishing units 
Continued Table 19. Continued. 
Phase  Duration  Data collected  Frequency  Sampling methodolog/  Sample size 
1 year  Catch, operating costs,  Daily record keeping  20% purposive sample  64 fishing units 
value of catch par  of respondents willing 
triplday. Repair and  to  cooparate 
maintenance costs, 
sharing system modi- 
fications 
V  Middlemen  2 months  Fixed and variable costs,  Single recall interview  M50%  random sample  64 firms 
and pm-  estimated life of fixed  of middlemen  end pro- 
cessors  assets,  daily volume,  cessors in  target corn 
cost  cost of purchases and  munities 
su  my  receipts, attitudinal 
data regarding ease 
of entry 
Table 20. San Miguel Bay Project: data sources and sampling methodology of sociolcgy module. 
Phase  Duration  Data collected  Fmuency  Sampling methodology  Sample size 
Community  5 months 
inventory 
Socioeconomic  7 months 
su rvey 
Participant  1-6 months 
observation 
16 months 
Geographic  6 months 
mobility 
study 
Infrastructure, social services 
population, no. of fishing 
households 
Household characteristics, 
assets,  income, education, 
attitudes, role of women, 
sharing systems, market- 
ing practices, occupa- 
tional and geographic 
mobility. Physical count 
of all gears in  all com- 
munities 
Indepth information on 
marketing practices, 
role of woman and 
and children, sharing 
systems and kinship 
Occupational and geo- 
graphic mobility, 
labor absorption 
capabilities  of other 
norl-fishing sectors 
Population gmwth and 
migration patterns 
Single visit to  all fish- 
ing communities 
Single interview  of 
fishing households 
"Live-in"  in  tingle 
community 
"Live-in"  in  selected 
communities 
Key informants  interviewed; 
secondary data fmm mu- 
nicipalities 
30% sample of fishingbouse- 
holds in 22 out of 41 fish- 
ing communities; mix of 
purposive and random 
sampling 
Participant observation and 
indepth interview with 
key informants 
Participant 0bse~ation  and 
indepth interviews with 
key informants 
Examination of census popu- 
lation and migration data, 
including  preliminary 
tabulations on municipal 
and barangay data fmm 
1980 census 
Established sample 
frame for Phase 
I  I 
nla 
nla Table 21.  Data collected by the stock assessment module. 
Catch per effort (elf) of major gears 
Historical data on fishery (catch, effort, 
c/f, miscellaneous data) 
Total catch during period of investigation, 
by species groups and gears 
Total effort during period of investigation, 
by gears 
Length-frequency  data 
Hydrographical and biological data on 
ecosystems (estuaries) 
Fish taxonomy 
High  emphasis;  data  of stock-auessment module complemented 
with data from socioeconomics module of project 
High  emphasis  on extensive search  for old publications,  unpub- 
lished manuscripts, theses and raw data 
High emphasis,  but mainly based on effort and c/f data obtained 
for all modules of project 
High emphasis,  but mainly based on gear  counts and annual num- 
ber of trips by gears,  obtained from socioeconomics module 
of project 
Low emphasis,  about 2,500 fish (15 species) measured 
Low emphasis  on collection of  new  data;  a lday bathymetric 
survey was conducted 
Low emphasis;  one  list of scientific  names  compiled from the 
literature  (i.e.,  records  of  occurrence  in San  Miguel  Bay) 
and complemented by ad  hoe collections 
Table 22. Data collected by the economics module. 
Capture sector 
Costs and earnings of major gears 
Inventory of fishing assets 
Catch and effort 
Income of boat owners and crew 
Prices received by fishermen 
Opportunity costs of labor and capital 
Marketing sector 
Quantities purchased and sold 
Wholesale and retail prices 
Marketing costs of wholesalers 
Marketing costs of retailers 
Market structure, conduct and performance 
Economies of scale 
Highest  emphasis:  daily  record-keeping data  collected over  12 
months from 64 fishing units representing 6 major gear  types 
Interview of  all  respondents keeping daily records;  gear  counts 
provided by sociology module 
Observations at  landings for 1 year  and separate  record-keeping 
for 1  year 
Interview of all respondents keeping daily records; annual income 
based on sharing system used 
Observations at landings 2-3 times weekly for 1 year 
Collected  for  alternative  occupations  in fishing  communities, 
supplemented  by  other  publications and  data  collected by 
sociology module 
Low  emphasis:  single  interview  of  middlemen  and  processors 
to  collect data on previous day's activity only 
High  emphasis:  monitored prices  of  fresh  and  processed  pro- 
ducts for period of 1 year in nearby retail markets. Secondary 
price data used for more distant wholesale and retail markets 
Interviews of 33 processors (salting and drying) in 2 target com- 
munities 
Interviews of 31 retailers in 2 target retail markets 
Low emphasis: from interview data 
Low emphasis: from interview data Table 23.  Data collected by  the sociology module. 
Community infrastructure, social services,  and 
fishing population 
Sociocultural (age,  education, no. of family 
members, years fishing, no. of dependents, 
kinship involvement in  fishing, material 
culture, mass media exposure, crew structure) 
Fishing and non-fishing assets 
Attitudes,  beliefs and values 
Attitudes and beliefs regarding  fisheries resource 
and its exploitation 
Effort, income, personnel 
Attitudes towards saving 
Role of women and children 
Sharing systems and ownership patterns 
Marketing practices 
Attitudes towards mobility 
Occupational and geographic mobility 
Labor absorption capacity of non-fishing sectors 
Key informants in  all fishing communities 
Survey of 30% of fishing households in 22 of 41 fishing commu- 
nities; total of 641 households chosen randomly 
Survey  of 30% of fishing  households in 22  of 41 fishing com- 
munities; total of 641 households chosen randomly 
Survey  and  participant  observation  in selected  communities 
Survey  and  key  informants.  No folk-taxonomy data  collected 
Survey 
Data collected in  survey 
Survey and intensive participant observation 
Survey and intensive participant observation 
Survey and intensive participant observation 
Survey and intensive participant observation 
High emphasis given to examination of census and migration data 
High emphasis given to examination of possibilities in  agriculture, 
aquaculture and cottage industries 
BIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
The primary purpose of the biological analysis was to  assess the status of the fish resources of 
the Bay; several data sources were considered and used or rejected. 
Stock assessment data 
The stock assessment methods used in the present study were based on available data,  particu- 
larly catch and length-frequency  data. With such data alone, it was  possible to generate all parameters 
necessary for a basic assessment of the state of the fish stock (see Pauly 1979b; Pauly and Marto- 
subroto 1980; Pauly and David 1981; and Pauly et  al. in press for additional discussion and applica- 
tions). 
A costeffective data acquisition system for assessment and management of tropical multi- 
species  multigear fisheries has recently been proposed by ICLARM (Munro 1983). The system 
requires sample:;  of the major species to  be collected on a routine systematic basis. Fig. 14 shows 
how the system works. Additional data from the fishery, as  shown in the lower left side of the 
figure, can be used to  generate the same parameters, but are more expensive or unavailable in  many 
cases. Other production modeling approaches based on mortality estimates have also been recently 
developed (Csirke and Caddy 1983). 
Other techniques for estimation of fish abundance include acoustic surveys but they are 
expensive and of limited use.  For those interested, however, FA0  has recently produced a manual 





Fig.  14.  Flow chart for biological and  fishery parameter estimations leading to fishery  assessments. 
Required inputs are  shown in  the boxes on the left-hand  side; outputs on the right. Notation as  follows: 
B = biomass;  C = catch of a species by numbers or by weight;  F = fishing mortality coefficient; K = 
growth coefficient; LC  = mean length at first capture; L,  = asymptotic length; M = natural coefficient; 
P = probability of  retention of fish in a given length group;  q = catchability; qf = catchability index; 
R = number of recruits;  R'  = index of recruitment; W,  = asymptotic weight;  Z =total mortality coef- 
ficient; f = effort. (Adapted from Munro 1983). 
Tagging-recapture data 
Data from returns of tagged or marked fish (or shrimp) can in principle be used to obtain such 
information as  movements and migration patterns, population sizes,  mortality estimates and growth 
parameters. This methodology was not used in the IFDRIICLARM study because of its anticipated 
high cost and low likelihood of success.  Other researchers have given high emphasis to this tech- 
nique and spent considerable effort to inform fishermen about the program (Stevenson 1981a, 
1981  b), but found it extremely difficult to obtain the number of returns (on a per-species basis) 
needed for parameter estimation. Using limited data could lead to biased mortality estimates when 
many fish may have been caught but not returned. 
Major problems are still experienced with analyzing tagging data in temperate waters (Jones 
1977). When assessing a multispecies tropical stock, it does not seem appropriate to rely on this 
methodology except when straightforward questions are to be answered, such as those pertaining to 
growth or local movements (Randall 1962). 
Biologfcal and oceanographic data 
Very little emphasis was given in the San Miguel Bay project to the collection of biological 
data. However, the fish species occurring in trawl catches were recorded, which, combined with San 
Miguel Bay records from the taxonomic literature, enabled a compilation of list of fishes from San 
Miguel Bay containing 188 species, 28 of which were new records. 
An exhaustive literature search was  conducwd of known biological characteristics of those 
fishes,  allowing the grouping of species into various feeding guilds and building of a model of the 
trophic interrelationships in the Bay and hence a crude assessment of the potential impact of the selective exploitation of various groups of species on the multispecies stock as  a whole. Also, the list 
of fishes was divided into various groups depending on the reported extent of their euryhalinity, 
with the result that it  was possible to  characterize the San Miguel Bay fish fauna as  a typical estuarine 
fauna, markedly separate from the hard bottom/reef fish fauna off the mouth of the Bay. The 
species  list thus helped define the multispecies "unit  stock" exploited by the San  Miguel Bay 
fishery . 
Slobodkin et al. (1980) discuss the theoretical background behind approaches based on com- 
piling species lists, then inferring from those lists the (probable) properties of a given ecosystem. 
These approaches are highly recommended in all cases where a minimum of literature data (includ- 
ing occurrence in other ecosystems) is available on the species concerned, which is more often the 
case than generally thought (Simpson 1982). 
Sufficient oceanographic and hydrological data were available for San Miguel Bay to provide a 
coherent picture of the Bay as an estuary. However, if such data as  tidal amplitude, rainfall and 
salinity are absent, some measurements and estimates are needed to  characterize the study area. 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
Economic research for San Miguel Bay was concentrated in two of the most important of the 
41 fishing communities and the research assistants lived in one of these communities for almost two 
years. 
The major elements of the module's work included collection of costs and earnings and price 
data from sample respondents in the harvesting and  marketing sectors.  Experimentation with 
various methods of data collection and analysis was  a necessary step to reach the objectives of 
assessing the economic health of the fishery. 
Costs and earnings data 
In the San Miguel Bay study, the highest emphasis was given to obtaining annual costs and 
earnings data from a sample of the major gears operating within the Bay. 
Initially, the same approach was taken as  has been applied elsewhere (e.g.,  Sutinen and Kolberg 
1981  ); that is, through a combination of interview and observation at major landing sites, data were 
collected from various gears for each fishing trip (operating costs, catch, value of the catch, fishing 
location, age and education  of major fishermen, sharing system used). This approach was  abandoned, 
however, when it was  realized that recurring samples of fishermen could not be monitored in this 
manner to obtain costs and earnings by fishing unit over time. For example, if a particular fisher- 
man did not appear at the landing on a given day it was  not known if he had fished with another 
fishing unit, used a different landing or simply not fished at all. Instead of trip interviews at landing 
sites, therefore, 12 months of record-keeping  were used with a smaller sample (64 fishing units) of 
the major gears. This procedure produced a total of 1  1,248  daily trip records and was supplemented 
by an initial interview to  obtain asset ownership and investment cost data.  Landing observations 
were continued for one year to collect catch, effort and price data. 
The conclusion that record-keeping is preferable to  interview or observation techniques is con- 
sistent with the recommendations of Hussen and Sutinen (1981) who conducted similar work in 
Costa Rica. Confirming the appropriateness of this approach, Sutinen and Kolberg (1981  have used 
a general cost function to demonstrate the cost effectiveness of record-keeping over interview tech- 
niques when the number of variables to be measured is small (<  50). 
One may question record-keeping  techniques because participants must often be selected non- 
randomly; this was the case  in the San Miguel Bay studies though representativeness was sought. 
However, it is believed that it is better to obtain reliable data from a smaller sample of purposively 
chosen respondents than to collect poor quality data from a larger random sample. Prices received by fishermen 
Landing sitedata, supplemented by secondary data from the Philippine Fish Marketing Author- 
ity, were used to  determine ex-vessel fish prices in the San  Miguel Bay project. Wholesale and retail 
prices for fresh and processed products were obtained 2-3 times per week from processing centers 
and two nearby provincial markets. 
A study by the University of Rhode Island in Costa Rica made use of an imaginative factura 
system whereby receipts were used in triplicate by the primary buyers; one copy was given to the 
seller, one kept by the buyer and one given to the research team (Lampe 1980). On the factura were 
recorded quantities and prices by species, plus data on the fisherman's  (seller's) fishing activity. 
Such a system would work well in situations where fish is sold by weight and where computational 
facilities exist for compiling and analyzing the huge amount of data that would be generated. In 
situations where fish is still sold unsorted by volume (rather than by weight) as  in the Philippines, a 
fully satisfactory system for generating data on ex-vessel prices by species has yet to be devised. 
Consequently, estimates for price spreads and marketing margins in the San Miguel Bay study were 
rather crude approximations. 
Other data 
To estimate the extent of resource rents or pure profits in a fishery, additional data beyond 
costs and earnings of individual fishermen are needed (Panayotou 1981  ). Resource rents represent 
that portion of the total value of the fishery that exceeds total costs. To compute resource rents, 
the following information is necessary: 
An estimate of totalcosts, including (1)  all fixed and variable costs of fishermen, (2) oppor- 
tunity costs of labor and capital and (3) any subsidies, but excluding (4) any government 
taxes. Subsidies represent a government cost and taxes, as  on fuel in the case of §an Miguel 
Bay, represept the taxing authority's share of the resource rents. 
An estimate of the total value of the fishery which includes the sum of (1) the value of the 
catch sold by fishermen,  (2)  the value of the catch taken for home consumption and (3) the 
excess or oligopoly/oligopsony profits that suppliers or middlemen may earn through their 
charges for inputs (e.g.,  fuel) or payment of reduced prices to fishermen. 
The difference between total costs and total value as defined above represents the resource 
rent accruing to the fishermen. Resource rents may thus be divided, as  they were in §an Miguel Bay, 
between the fishermen, the government and suppliers/middlemen. 
In contrast to price/kg data (see preceding subsection and detailed discussion in Yater et  al. 
1982) the fishermen's estimations of the value of catch sold and consumed at home are much more 
reliable. Consequently, this method of determining catch value seems better than the use of ex- 
vessel prices and catch data as long as the funds are available to support a record-keeping  activity. 
On the cost side, the estimation of opportunity costs of labor and capital was  problematic in 
the San Miguel Bay study as  it is in any study. More rigorous methods based on careful assessments 
of average labor earnings in other occupations and estimation of the marginal value product from 
labor use in fishing would have led to  a more precise estimation of labor opportunity costs. Never- 
theless, the most important point to  stress is that these opportunity costs should not be omitted in 
the calculation of resource rents. Approaching the economic analysis from the point of resource 
rents rather than private profitability and returns on investment is also  recommended for any 
economic component of  any management-oriented research project. 
Finally, a more rigorous analysis of the costs and benefits of the various management options 
for the Bay would be desirable under ideal circumstances. Such analysis would require time series 
data of the type collected by this project but would be needed for more than 12 months. It could 
become an integral part of any management scheme for San  Miguel Bay. SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
The sociology researchers relied heavily upon three familiar techniques for primary data 
acquisition-household  or fishermen surveys, key informants and participant observation. In addi- 
tion, secondary data on population and migration were analyzed. 
Studies conducted elsewhere often put exclusive emphasis on primary data and on perceptions 
of fishermen (see for example Pollnac 1981a, 1981b). This type of material is certainly important, 
but it should be supplemented with secondary data and measurement of constraints and actual 
behavior where possible. For example, the fishermen of San Miguel Bay showed very high interest 
across all age  groups, educational levels and asset ownership in leaving fishing for another activity. 
While encouraging in the sense that it indicates receptivity to change, it was found that the actual 
potential for gainful employment in other activities was  minimal. Examination of census and migra- 
tion data showed what in fact the members of fishing households were doing in response to their 
desire to change from fishing-and  that was  "voting with their feet" and migrating to Manila. This 
was particularly true of young female members of fishing households. If  the sociological surveys had 
concentrated solely upon attitudes and beliefs, this very important fact about population change in 
fishing communities and response to hardship in the fishing sector would have been missed. 
In gathering primary data, attempts should be made to limit the number of variables covered. 
In the San Miguel Bay study, for example, the household survey was designed to serve part of the 
data needs of the economics, biology and sociology researchers; instead it should have been limited 
to basic sociocultural attributes, asset ownership and attitudinal questions. In particular, the fishing 
income and cost data that were collected through respondent recall during the survey were not of 
much use other than to roughly estimate the percentage of households exclusively dependent upon 
fishing. 
MONITORING THE FISHERY 
While the research approaches outlined above emphasized the initial studies that must be con- 
ducted to establish a basic database on a given fishery, an important role of research in fishery man- 
agement remains to be described. This role is that of monitoring studies, i.e.,  studies conducted on a 
continuing basis, to  document among other things, the impact of management measures on the 
fishery, and to help finetune, or modify some of these measures. 
Essentially, the methods used in monitoring  studies will be a small subset of the wide variety 
of methods used in the initial study; also, the samples taken and analyses will be fewer andlor 
smaller in some cases than in the initial study. Certainly the number of variables monitored will be 
less. 
The selection of methods will rely in part on the results of the initial study; the method found 
to provide most information at the least co5t should be selected for continued application in  the 
monitoring  studies. 
In the case of the San Miguel Bay study, which established which gears are most important in 
and most representative of each sector of the fishery, and which method provided most information 
on each gear, it would be appropriate to concentrate routine monitoring efforts on the motorized 
gill-netters as  representative of the small-scale fishery and on the small trawlers as  representative of 
the large-scale fishery. The balao fishery exploited by the mini trawlers should also be included, as 
should the liftnets if funds permit. These four gear types are recommended for inclusion because 
together they caught 72%0 of total catch by volume (70%  by value) in 1980-81 and employ approxi- 
mately 41% of the Bay's  labor force. 
It would be sufficient to  select a few fishing units (-  20 of each category) representative of 
these four types of gears,  and to monitor, on a monthly basis, their catch (weight, value), catch 
composition (species, lengthcomposition  by species) and their costs and returns (including sharing 
agreement) to  maintain  a fair understanding of the basic forces affecting the San Miguel Bay fisheries. The total number of these fishing units operating should be determined once per year to establish 
rates of entry and exit and ownership patterns. 
Limiting the routine data collection to these items would allow for some research effort to be 
available for special investigations, conducted as  the occasion arises  (e.g.,  in conjunction with 
students collecting data for a thesis, or with specific problems arising in the fishery). Such special 
investigations could include, for example: 
(i)  indepth investigation of a given fish species (e.g.,  as done by Navaluna 1982 with the 
tiger-toothed croaker). 
(ii)  indepth investigations  of a given gear  (e.g.,  as done by Vakily I982 with the small trawlers). 
(iii)  investigations regarding  fishermenrsattitudes  to the management regime, specific interven- 
tions undertaken and enforcement problems. 
(iv)  modelling of the Bay ecosystem as  a whole using, e.g.,  the ECOPATH model of Polovina 
and Ow (1  983). 
(v)  developing a bio-economic model of the Bay and its fisheries. 
Tasks (iv) and (v), as  in any other modelling exercise would themselves help generate new 
interesting topics for special investigations, because models of any system need comprehensive data, 
and generally help in identifying gaps in one's  database on the system in question. As such models 
become refined they could become valuable 'predicterst of the impact of alternative management 
interventions. 
COMMUNICATION OF RESULTS 
A multidisciplinary  study, such as the present investigation, produces results of interest not only 
to a research audience in the Philippines but also to interested biologists and social scientists around 
the world. Also to be informed are the diverse interest groups in the vicinity of San Miguel Bay and 
elsewhere. All parties need to be advised of research findings in a way appropriate for them. 
Monitoring research, whether or not including special investigations must be reported upon in 
timely and readily understandable fashion. For this purpose a San Miguel Bay  Fisheries Management 
Authority could issue a semi-regular Newsletter or leaflet series containing data on variables monitored 
continuously by the authority, e.g., 
- number of gears  (by gear type operating in the Bay); 
- input prices and selling prices of major species caught in the Bay; 
- the value of major indices representative of the health of the stock (e.g.,  the catch per 
effort of the selected gears that are monitored on a continuous basis; length-frequency of 
important species). 
Such a Newsletter would also include, obviously, items about legal and political aspects of the 
Bay's  fishery, a continuing self-presentation of the Authority and of its mandate and role, as  well as 
items about and from individual fishermen (e.g.,  interviews, letters, etc.). The Newsletter should 
be in the Bicol language, not English or Tagalog. 
The research audience can be addressed through formal communications in reports and articles 
in the primary literature, as well as  through informal popular or "Newsletter"  type articles. 
For example, the results of the present study consisted of 24 articles in five technical reports 
which were distributed worldwide. A comprehensive summary was  published in the  ICLARM 
Newsletter, reprinted  by IFDR and ICLARM and subsequently translated into the Bicol and Tagalog 
languages. Some detailed results were presented in theses, while summaries of various aspects were 
presented at  conferences and at  seminars in the Bicol area and abroad. Press releases to the local 
and overseas press were also made. 
The special interest groups who should also be informed of research results include fishermen, 
concerned fisheries agencies and other governmental bodies with jurisdiction over the fisheries 
under investigation. Communication to  these groups is more problematic than communication with other scientists 
and researchers for several reasons. The first problem facing fisheries researchers is that all too often 
no one is listening. Failure to integrate research findings with development planning is common, and 
the researcher often has to wait until the research is completed before being able to  convince the 
fisheries planners and administrators of the usefulness of such integration. This was also the case 
with this study of San Miguel Bay fisheries because no cohesive management framework or adminis- 
trative structure yet exists into which the study's  findings could be injected. 
INTEGRATION OF  RESEARCH AND 
MANAGEMENT PLANN  IN6 
Research is seldom seen as  part of the necessary continuing process of data collection and 
analysis required for rational management of fisheries. In most tropical countries, statistics collection 
efforts are concentrated upon catch and possibly prices, and exhibit a lack of appreciation of the 
value of management-oriented research. Researchers themselves often contribute to this problem 
when they concentrate on partial analyses, whether biological or socioeconomic, that stop short of 
evaluating management options. 
Fisheries agencies usually expect researchers to come up with a list of recommendations on 
what should be done by way of followup. If  the researcher is examining a narrow issue, such as 
vessel or gear efficiency, then recommendations for improvement may be appropriate. In  the case  of 
studies as  broad as the I  FDRIICLARM San Miguel Bay study, however, where the major issues are 
those of potential overfishing, use rights and allocation, it is unreasonable to expect researchers to 
make explicit recommendations. This is because any action that redistributes income should be the 
result of a political process, a process that should not be preempted by the researcher. 
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Establishing a Closed Season of Five (5) Years for the 
Operation of Commercial Fishing Boats in San Miguel Bay 




ORDER NO. 136 
Series of 1982 
Subject: Establishing  a closed season of five (5) years for the operation 
of commercial fishing boats in San  Miguel Bay 
Pursuant to the provisions of Sections 4 and 7 of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended, otherwise known 
as "Fisheries  Decree of 1975,"  and Section 1  of Presidential Decree No. 101  5 the following rules and regulations are 
hereby promulgated for the protection and conservation of fisheries and  aquatic resources in San  Miguel Bay. 
SECTION 1. Definition -  For the purpose of this Administrative Order, the following term shall mean: 
(a)  San Miguel Bay -  a body of water located in the Southeastern part of Luzon and bounded in the West  by 
the coastlines of the Province of Camarines Norte, and on the South and East by the coastlines of the 
Province of Camarines Norte, and on the South and East by the coastlines of the Province of Camarines 
Sur and enclosed in the North by an imaginary straight line drawn from Culasi Pt. and Siruma Island. 
SEC.  2.  Prohibition -  It shall be  unlawful during the five-year closed season established herein from the 
effectivity of this Order, for any person, partnership, association, cooperative, institution or corporation to operate 
all commercial fishing boats of more than three (3) gross tons in San  Miguel Bay. 
SEC. 3. Penal Clause. -  Violation of the foregoing prohibition shall subject the offender to a fine of not less 
than Five Hundred Pesos  (P500.00) but not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)  or imprisonment  from six (6) 
months to four (4) years or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court; Provided, That the 
Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources is hereby empowered to impose upon the offender an administrative 
fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)  including the confiscation of the gear  and all the fishing 
paraphernalia used therein. 
SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. -  All existing administrative orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof which are 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Order are mreby repealed or amended accordingly. 
SEC.  5. Effectivity. -  This Order shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette 
andlor in  two (2) newspapers of general circulation. 
TEODORO Q.  PE~A 
Minister of Natural Resources 
RECOMMENDED BY: 
FELIX R.  GONZALES 
Director 
Bureau of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Resources 
DILIMAN, QUEZON CITY Appendix B: Estimation of Trawler Mesh Size that would Optimize Yield Per 
Recruit (MI ) or Value of the Catch (M,)  of the San  Miguel Bay Fishery, 
Given Prices Prevailing in 1980-81 (based on the method of Sinoda et al. 1979) 
Step 1.  Estimation of set values of asymptotic size  L(=) for each species represented in the catch (in the present 
case,  representative species for each of the statistical groupings are used). These species and their values 
of L(,)  are given in Table 17, p. 48. 
Step 2.  Estimation of a selection factor (S.F.) for each species considered. In the present case,  most of the S.F. 
values were taken from Tables 1 and 2 in Sinoda et  al. (7979); the remaining S.F.  values were determined 
using the nomogram given in Pauly (1980, Fig. 12) 
Step 3.  Estimation of species-specific optimum mesh sizes (M,)  using the relationship 
0.59  *  L(,) 
M,  = 
S.F. 
where the factor 0.59 is the midpoint of the range of Lc/L, values known to maximize yield per recruit 
at high fishing mortalities (Jones 1976; Sinada et al.  1979) and where  LC  is the mean size at first capture. 
Step 4.  Estimation of the mesh size which maximizes total multispecies catch (MI  ),  obtained by taking the mean 
of the Ms values, weighted by catch in weight, i.e.,  by performing &/El  (see Table 17). The value of 
MI  so  estimated is 
Step 5.  Estimation of the mesh size which maximizes the value of the total multispecies catch (M2),  obtained by 
taking the mean of the M,  values, weighted by the value of the catch, i.e.,  by performing z4/x2  (see 










INSTITUTE OF FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH
The Institute of Fisheries Development and Reseaxch (lI:DR) of the College of Fisheries, .
University of the Philippines in the Visayas was created in 1965 by Republic Act No. 4514
to undertake basic and applied reseaxch~ in the major fields in fisheries, namely: maxine,
inlait<\ and fish processing technology, with the aim of promoting the fisheries in the country.
The Institute is also auth°iZed to maintain experiment and demonstration stations in
st!ategic locations in the P4jlippines (Rizal, Bataan, Sorsogon, Cagayan, Pangasinan, Polillo'
Island, I'anay Island, Palawan, Sulu, Leyte and Davao).
The IFDR core staff consists of reseaxch personnel with local and foreign training and back-
ground in axeas of maxine biology, gear technology, aquaculture, inland fisheries and socio-
economics, post-harvest technology and quality control of fish and feeds. Affiliate reseaxchers
from \.arious agencies, both local and abroad, help strengthen the manpower capability of the
Institute.
Its research facilities in the U.P. Dillman campus include maxine biology and fish nutrition






INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR LIVING AQUATIC RESOURCES I1ANAGEMENT
I, .
The Int"rnational Center for living Aquatic Resources Management (lCLARM) is an auto-
nomous, nonprofit, international scientific and technical center wroth has been organized to
conduct,stimulate, and acceleraterescaxch on all aspects of fIsheries and other living aquatic
resources. J
The Center was incorporatfd in Manila in 20 January 1977 and ~t§operational base was



















the organization's primary att~tidfi is being"ilircded to problems in Soikheast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. " -
ICLARM is an operational organization, not a granting or funding entity. Its program of
work is aimed to resolve"Clitical technical and socioeconomic constraints to increased pro-'
duction, improved resource management, and eq~table distribution of benefits in economic-
ally developing countries. It pursues these objectives in the fields of aquaculture, ,traditional
fisheries, resource developmi~nt and management, fishe~es affairs, ,and education and training
through cooperative reseaxch\with institutions in developing and developed countries.
Policies axe set by a Board of Trustees with members drawn from the international com-
munity. Direction of ICLARM, under the policies' set by the Boaxd, is the responsibility of
the Director General. Advice dl1programs is received by the Director General from a Program
Advisory Committee composed pf sCientists drawn from the international community.
The ICLARM core staff cortsists of internationally recruited scientists drawn from the axeas
of aquaculture, fIShery biology~ population dynamics: economics, anthropology, and interrta-
. tionallaw.In addition, provision ismade for interns, consultants and visiting fellows, contribut-
ing to breadth of competence and flexibility. The core program and core staff are supported by
private foundations and governments.
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